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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION ~~ REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Statement of Problem 
The Industrial Revolution is a great leveler. It knows nothing of 
differentiation by race and color. It can serve with equal effi-
ciency democracy and communism. It can erase the disparity between 
the advanced and the backward (Dean, 1957). 
Development is an economic, political, and social process in which 
industrialization and integration are included as sub-processes. In 
turn, industrialization is viewed here as a socio-economic process hav-
ing far-ranging social and economic consequences. 
Although industrialization is occurring in most nations, research 
findings in the social sciences as well as current events suggest that 
the above quotation is applicable only in terms of what industrializa-
tion could potentially generate. In recent times, the developing na-
tions have presented demands to the United Nations for international de-
velopment planning to reduce the "disparity between the advanced and the 
backward nations." At the same time, there is the recognition that past 
national and international planning has failed, as noted by Castel 
(1971:xiii-xvii) and ECLA (1972:3), largely because it has not occurred 
in the light of national system needs. The "lt:!veling" role of industri-
alization therefore comes into question. 
1 
The research problem is to investigate the relationship between 
the levels of industrialization and national integration in Brazil, 
Chile, and the United States. The overall objective is to understand 
the process of national integration. Three specific objectives orient 
this research: 
1. To contribute to efforts at specifying adequate social indicators 
2. To contribute toward the construction of intermediate-level theory 
by focusing on the relationship between two sub-processes of de-
velopment--national integration and industrialization 
3. To test and revise an original analytic model developed for this 
research project 
These objectives are related to three contemporary problems in 
the field of sociology: (1) the lack of an adequate theory of develop-
ment which is partly due to (2) a failure to understand areas at an 
intermediate level which, in turn, is hampered by (3) the lack of em-
pirical research and cross-cultural comparisons related to social in-
dicators (Sheldon and Moore, 1968:9-12, 21-23; also see Gross, 1966) to 
determine whether or not they actually indicate what they are supposed 
to indicate. Potentially, this project can contribute to the solution 
of these problems by addressing itself to the following questions: Is 
national integration a concomitant of industrialization? Do these two 
variables interact or is one directionality to be assumed? If they 
interact, in what manner does this occur? If one causes the other, why 
and how? Are there variations between nations and, if so, what are the 
sources of variations? 
2 
3 
Relationship of the Problem to Related Literature 
Social indicators 
In the presentation of the functions that a system of social in-
dicators can fulfill, Zapf (1975:488-493; also see Wilcox et al., 1972: 
1-49) summarizes the expansion of the social indicator movement from a 
function of national planning and program evaluation to five major func-
tions: (1) the monitoring or measurement of social change, (2) evalu-
ation of social policy, (3) social reporting on changes in social struc-
ture and/or system performance, (4) explanation of social change through 
the use of causal models, and (5) innovative social policy based on the 
fulfillment of the first four functions. The approach taken in this 
project is to explain the association and changes in the association 
between industrialization and national integration by developing a causal 
model and formulating theoretical propositions for use in future re-
search. 
One approach to constructing analytic models and systems of social 
indicators begins with general systems theory and leaves the develop-
ment of social indicators for that time in the future when there is full 
understanding of the social system. Proponents of this position include 
Levin (1970), Gross (1966), and Attinger (1970). The opposite approach 
and the one taken in this study begins with an analytic model incorpo-
rating specific social statistics as social indicators for use in re-
search that has as its objective the construction of intermediate-level 
theory to contribute towards the understanding of the social system and 
changes in it. 
To the extent that an historical context is necessary in this 
project, the author agrees with Gross (1966) that qualitative data ful-
fill as important a function as quantitative data in understanding the 
association between social indicators. Similarly, there is agreement 
with Gross (1966) and Bauer (1966:1-67) that a system of social indica-
tors involves all social sciences, i.e., all types of data. The terms 
"social statistics" and "social indicators" in this report therefore 
include social, economic, and political data. 
4 
Zap£ (1975:481, 489-491) notes that the adequacy of social sta-
tistics used as social indicators depends on their reliability and their 
validity as measures of social reality. The methodological problems en-
countered in this study, as in similar research, and their consequences 
serve to illustrate that there are two distinct sets of problems associ-
ated with the development and use of social indicators: (1) how to use 
existing data and (2) how to set up a system of comparative data for use 
now and in the future. 
Development theory and research 
Development is a process that can be comprehended only in his-
torical context. However, the study of this process has been increas-
ingly limited to contrasting the past experiences of developed and de-
veloping nations. These contrasts should be included in a model of 
development since they are important for understanding cross-cultural 
variations, changing characteristics of the system of international re-
lations, and many of the problems faced by developing nations today. 
From another perspective, however, the emphasis on contrasting 
past experiences has resulted in the polarization of social scientists' 
thinking. While the paucity of research pertaining to national inte-
gration makes this a more difficult topic to deal with, research in the 
general areas of change and development has tended to (a) fail in for-
mulating generalizations and (b) falsify rather than support existing 
theory because this theory is based on: (1) the experiences of devel-
oped nations, (2) isolated case studies of developing nations or con-
cerning developing nations but not based on empirical research, or 
(3) ideal types that cannot account for variations (as in recent func-
tionalist or nee-evolutionary attempts). As one consequence, in the 
social sciences we now have a set of ~ post facto "theories of devel-
oped nations" (such as demographic transition theory and most theories 
of economic growth) and a set of unconfirmed hypotheses or "quasi-
theories of developing nations" (such as Pye's theory of political de-
velopment and all efforts at theory pertaining to nation-building). 
5 
Efforts at theory construction in the area of change tend to be 
general theories as in the case of Parsons (1966), Ogburn's (1966) 
cultural lag, theories of history (cyclical and spiral theories in 
particular), conflict theory, or evolutionary, nee-evolutionary (func-
tionalist attempts), and modernization theory. In contrast, development 
research is implicitly intermediate-level as it deals with such topics 
as the concomitants of industrialization, of urbanization, of economic 
growth, of the spread of mass media, or the impact of any of these pro-
cesses on a specific aspect of social structure. Similarly, the litera-
ture on national integration tends to focus on specific types of inte-
gration, e.g., political, economic, religious, or social integration. 
However, a universally applicable framework for development research 
and planning does not exist or, as in the case of Chodak's (1973) work, 
attempts at constructing such a framework have not been subjected to 
empirical analysis. 
Given the existing state of development theory and research, it 
is suggested here that the most adequate approach to research is to 
gradually construct increasingly more general theories by seeking uni-
formities in intermediate-level areas. Empirical work is accumulating 
in this direction specifically in the contrasts that have been made be-
tween developed and developing nations. Some of the principal conclu-
sions based on these contrasting experiences are: 
1. Economic growth, urbanization, and industrialization are no longer 
closely related processes. 
2. Occupationally, the tertiary (service) sector in developed nations 
grew after the expansion of the secondary sector whereas the re-
verse is true in developing nations today and is usually explained 
by a combination of factors such as over-population and over-
urbanization. However, the researcher is limited by (a) the fact 
that "service sector" is a statistical category in government re-
ports and (b) the more narrow definition of "service sector" in de-
veloping nations (usually referring to menial labor) which makes 
comparison difficult. Similarly, there is a difference among na-
tions in the type of industrial labor force; i.e., a larger propor-
tion of the industrial labor force is employed in extractive indus-
tries in developing nations than in developed nations. 
3. The "push and pull" thesis suggests that the rural population was 
"pulled" to the cities to become part of the urban labor force when 
developed nations were industrializing while, in developing nations 
6 
7 
today, people are "pushed out" of the countryside due to rural over-
population. 
4. Demographic transition theory is not applicable to developing na-
tions (for criticism of the applicability of this theory to devel-
oped nations, see Drake, 1969). 
5. Technology and entrepreneurship were internal in developed nations 
whereas they are now exogeneous forces of change contributing to 
the dependence and substitutability of developing nations' economies 
and indicative of the increasing importance of planning. 
6. State intervention in capitalist-type economies in developing na-
tions is occurring at earlier stages of capital investment than it 
did in Western developed nations. 
7. The "birth of modern nations" in referring to developed nations is 
seen as different from the contemporary "nation-building" of devel-
oping nations; i.e., developing nations are attempting to establish 
by political means the socio-economic "prerequisites" (to political 
"stability") and political "stability" at the same time. 
8. }~ss media emerged during the later stages of industrialization in 
the developed nations whereas today the media are contributing 
toward a sense of relative deprivation and the creation of internal 
demands for automated products and improved socio-economic condi-
tions prior to significant automation with the result that mass 
media indirectly contribute to the dependence and substitutability 
of developing economies and socio-political instability. 
These conclusions not only contribute to the understanding of variations 
in the development process. They also point to the need for a central 
concept that would permit generalizations in spite of the contrast in 
experiences. Functional linkage has been selected as this concept. 
Functional Linkages and Integration 
Functional linkages are defined as those ties established to ful-
fill national and international system needs, e.g., initiation of vo-
cational programs to train unskilled labor in needed skills. The 
reasons for selecting functional linkage as the key concept are: 
1. It is a concept that does not exclude cooperation, conflict, and 
competition as inherent in the social system and as sources of 
change. 
2. The proponents (principally anthropologists) of the concept of con-
vergence have been criticized for focusing on "functional integra-
tion." However, there is support for this position in that func-
tional relations do exist (Moore, 1965:13-19). 
3. Acknowledging the multilinear (Steward, 1955) nature of change, the 
study of any process is made more complicated by cross-cultural 
variations and influences. Similarly, the study of national inte-
gration has to be carried out in the context of the system of in-
ternational relations if, in the study of industrialization and 
national integration, such phenomena are to be understood as, e.g., 
dependence, substitutability, and the range of problems that arise 
from nations being incorporated into the system of international 
relations prior to being nationally integrated. The concept of 
functional linkage facilitates the search for generalities while 
taking these complications into account and it is susceptible to 
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data analysis. 
4. The need for research on national integration is accompanied by the 
difficulty of operationalizing the many qualitative definitions of 
integration and its sub-aspects, e.g., political integration. 
However, national integration as both causal-functional and logico-
meaningful in Sorokin's (1957) terms can be inferred from the 
existence of functional linkages. 
One common thread running through sociological and related liter-
ature is the notion of increasing differentiation and interdependence 
both within and among societies. This can be discerned in Parsonian 
functionalism and, more directly related to interest in dynamics, it is 
evident in development theory, to some extent in theories of history, 
and to a certain degree it is a notion implicit in conflict theory 
(although this last type of theory contributes more by specifying that 
conflict--as a source of change--is inherent in the social system). In 
the body of literature that can be categorized as evolutionary or nee-
evolutionary, this notion is found in the dichotomies that have been 
constructed whether they deal with larger systems (Redfield's folk vs. 
urban society, Bendix's feudalistic structures vs. nation-states, 
Hoselitz's ascription-diffuseness-particularism vs. achievement-
specificity-universalism), communities (TBnnies' Gemeinschaft vs. 
Gesellschaft), roles (Smelser's multifunctional vs. more specialized 
role structures), authority (Weber's traditional vs. rational-legal 
authority), or interaction (Cooley's primary vs. secondary groups, 
Durkheim's mechanical vs. organic solidarity). 
Industrialization is not only disruptive (as an initiator of 
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change and economic growth) by generating differentiation but it is 
also accompanied by integrative processes; i.e., it generates a situa-
tion requiring the expansion of functional linkages. The rise of in-
ternal demands--partly a consequence of industrialization--further 
contributes to the expansion of linkages. Given that industrialization 
is part of economic organization, if industrialization generates inter-
dependence (and the implied functional linkages), then it is suggested 
here that economic linkages are the first to generate integration, i.e., 
planned cooperation to achieve shared economic goals. It is also sug-
gested that the gradual establishment of political and finally social 
linkages within a nation will accelerate and expand the meaning of the 
process of integration; it becomes possible to speak of national inte-
gration and not only of economic and/or political integration. 
National integration is defined here as a process of continual 
definition and redefinition of the lines along which a population is 
differentiated. It is assumed here that the definition of lines of 
differentiation within a nation is first based on ascribed characteris-
tics (which will vary from nation to nation in some cases). One uni-
versal ascribed characteristic is ethnicity which is defined in this 
project as "national origin or ancestry." In addition, rural-urban 
differences have been found to decrease with development. While resi-
dence may be either ascribed or achieved, it is often an assumed charac-
teristic, i.e., involving some voluntary choice. Both ethnicity and 
rural-urban residence were selected as control variables in this re-
search project. 
In order to be consistent with the underlying assumptions of the 
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data sources that this project utilizes, the term "nation" is used in 
the sense of administrative-political and geographic boundaries. Simi-
larly, "provincial" is used to refer to sub-national administrative 
units with political and geographic boundaries (specifically states, 
provinces, and territories). 
In specific terms related to this research project, national in-
tegration is therefore defined as a process which, due to the estab-
lishment of functional linkages generated by industrialization, con-
sists in the redefinition of the lines along which a population within 
political-geographic boundaries is differentiated such that former dif-
ferences based on ethnicity and/or rural-urban residence are weakened. 
It is suggested here that redefinition occurs on the basis of achieve-
ment (as former differences on the basis of ascribed characteristics 
weaken) and then on the basis of increasingly more specialized or 
narrowly defined roles. 
The literature on integration within the social system emphasizes 
the integrative role of education, the state or political system, the 
legal system, and association structures such as interest groups. Even 
though functional linkages are established, e.g., through legislation, 
these linkages may latently support non-integration either because 
(1) they favor specific groups explicitly (e.g., tax incentives to 
multinational corporations may serve to discourage national entrepre-
neurship) or (2) due to lack of enforcement and/or lack of supportive 
mechanisms, certain sectors of the population do not utilize existing 
linkages. 
The latent dysfunctionality of some functional linkages or the 
lack of linkages may eventually contribute to integration in two ways: 
(1) it may be a source of conflict which can give rise to demands for 
integration or (2) non-integration can result in anomie which for 
Hoselitz (1960) and Hagen (1963) is one source of entrepreneurship and 
change. 
There appear to be, therefore, two sides to participation as an 
aspect of integration: (1) the opportunity to develop a capacity to 
participate in collective activities in a similar sense as Weber's 
(Gerth and Mills, 1958) discussion of an individual's life chances 
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and (2) actual participation. Functional linkages may be imposed and/or 
demanded and the establishment of functional linkages does not neces-
sarily mean that they will be maintained, utilized, or supported. 
Finally, what appear as functional linkages for the larger social system 
(or for the system of international relations) may be dysfunctional for 
some groups within the system (or for some other nation within the 
system of international relations). 
It is concluded that not only do indicators of economic, political, 
and social linkages need to be included but also: (1) ethnicity and 
rural-urban residence should be controlled as possible bases of dif-
ferentiation and (2) since the fruits of industrialization might be 
reaped by non-national entrepreneurs or a favored group within the na-
tion, some measure of the distribution of these benefits needs to be 
used (specifically average annual income by economic sector). A meas-
ure of social disorganization should be included since it is expected 
to accompany industrialization and, in addition, can be expected to 
exist among non-integrated groups; however, reliable data for indicators 
frequently used as a reflection of social disorganization (e.g., homi-
cide rates, suicides, divorce rates) are not available for all three 
nations included in this study. 
In summary, the theoretical framework for this research project 
is based on four assumptions. Two of these are statements of (1) the 
feasibility of eventually building a universal theory of development 
and (2) the requisite of proceeding by first building intermediate-
level theory. The remaining assumptions refer directly to building 
intermediate-level theory, asserting that the most adequate approach 
is (1) to begin with a key concept (functional linkage) and (2) to 
focus on two sub-processes of development by defining a not fully 
understood process (national integration) on the basis of functional 
linkage and investigating its relationship to a process (industriali-
zation) that, it is suggested, generates functional linkages. By 
proceeding in this manner, a series of theoretical propositions will 
hopefully result and serve as a starting point for gradually building 
a theory of development. 
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CHAPTER II 
ANALYTIC MODEL 
Analytic Model for Cross-Cultural Research 
on National Integration 
The model shown in figure 1 was developed to illustrate the ex-
pected relationship among the variables selected for this project and 
the framework within which to conduct research on the relationship be-
tween industrialization and national integration. The context is shown 
as an influence on the level of industrialization and on the type and 
degree of functional linkages. The section on the type and level of 
functional linkages represents sources of internal demands contributing 
toward generating functional linkages which vary according to the level 
of national integration. The'rest of the model depicts the research 
topic, i.e., the relationship between the level of industrialization 
and national integration as one characteristic of the social system. 
The general expectation is that only at relatively high levels of in-
dustrialization is it possible for a socially as well as economically 
and politically integrated system to emerge. 
Operational Definitions of Variables 
Three problems related to social indicators are (1) whether or 
not they indicate what they are assumed to indicate, (2) whether or not 
generalizations can be made concerning any single indicator among na-
tions or from national to sub-r1ational levels, and (3) whether ·or not 
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Fig. 1. Analytic model for cross-cultural research 
on national integration* 
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*The variables in this model are interrelated; therefore, the unbroken lines indicate 
the path of interest in this research only and do not imply causality. 
aFertility, mortality, migration, urbanization, population distribution. 
brncluding civil conflicts (e.g., riots), administrative divisions, percentage of 
registered voters who vote, and legislation related to economy and society. 
cay economic seccor (specifically agriculture, industry, commerce, and ser<ices in 
this study). 
dusing the price ~ndex for wheat. 
erncluding the growth of port facilities (locacion and tonnage). 
£percentage of the labor force employed in industry and concributions of major 
economic seccors co Che G.N.P. 
~Ethnicity and rural-urban residence. 
~Average annual incone by economic sector. 
~Illiteracy rates. 
jRadios per capita. 
kPercentage of the economically-active population covered by social security; school 
enrollment; percentage of the voting-age population that is registered; access to mar-
keting districts (pores). 
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acceptance of the notion of multilinearity means that different social 
indicators should be used in cross-cultural comparisons; e.g., today 
automation is by-passing the earlier stages of industrialization that 
occurred in developed nations but it does not necessarily reduce em-
ployment levels (ILO, 1972:223-243) although it may inhibit growth of 
the industrial labor force. As a consequence, the operationalization 
of industrialization and national integration takes the form of multi-
dimensional definitions. 
The Industrial-Economic Set of 
Functional Linkages 
Since industrialization could be defined by the changing size of 
the industrial labor force or simply as a changing occupation struc-
ture, this process is operationally defined in two ways. In addition, 
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it is expected in this project that the first functional linkages to be 
established are economic in nature. Therefore, communicative and other 
economic variables that tend to vary with, and have often been used as 
indicators for, industrialization are included in this set. The 
industrial-economic set of variables and their operational definitions 
follow. 
Industrialization 
Percentage of the labor force employed in industry. For this 
first operational definition of industrialization, Brazil, Chile, and 
the U.S. use different classifications of the major economic sectors. 
To assure ~hat these classifications would coincide for this and re-
lated variables, it was necessary to define "industry" as including 
mining (including quarrying), manufacturing, construction, public 
utilities, and communications (including transport and storage) and to 
tabulate the data accordingly. 
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Percentage contributions of the major economic sectors (agricul-
ture, industry, commerce, services) to the G.N.P. This second in-
dicator of industrialization was treated as four variables in the 
regression and partial correlation analysis of provincial data, repre-
senting the economic sectors of interest in this project. The specific 
operational definitions therefore become the percentage contribution to 
the G.N.P. of (1) industry (as already defined), (2) commerce (retail 
and wholesale trade, finance), (3) agriculture (value of agricultural 
products), and (4) services (receipts from personal services andre-
lated services as included in national censuses, e.g., hotels and 
motels, recreational, repair, and miscellaneous services). The G.N.P. 
as a national estimate is not broken down by provincial sectoral con-
tributions. Each province's percentage share of national production in 
each sector was either available or easily calculated from available 
statistics for the three nations in the study. Based on the sectoral 
composition of the gross product, each province's percentage share of 
production in each sector was then transformed into a percentage of 
the total gross product. 
Communications 
Radios per capita. Radios per capita is the one variable from 
the industrial-economic set for which 1960 and 1970 provincial data 
were not consistently available for the three nations. It was left in 
the study, however, to see if any relationship might appear in cross-
cultural comparison between the national level of radios per capita 
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and provincial variations in the socio-political variables. For each 
nation, radios per capita at the national level for 1960 and 1970 was 
assigned to each province. This procedure raises both methodological 
and theoretical questions; therefore, the findings are included in this 
report as tentative. They should be viewed with caution and within the 
context of not constituting a commonly used methodology. 
Other economic linkages 
Access to marketing districts (number of ports). The selection 
of the number of ports by province as the indicator of access to mar-
keting districts includes both national and international marketing. 
The number of ports tabulated by province consists in all those listed 
in the official statistics of the three nations as having been used for 
coastwise and/or maritime shipping in 1958-1960 and 1968-1970. 
Average annual income in the major economic sectors. Average 
annual income in the major economic sectors refers only to wage earners 
in this study. Income is expressed in U.S. dollars and, because of the 
extremely high inflation rates in Brazil and Chile, a constant rate of 
exchange was used in tabulating the data. These rates (representing 
the exchange rates for 1960) are CrN$.09=US$1 for Brazil and E0 1.053= 
US$1 for Chile for both 1960 and 1970. This indicator was also treated 
as four variables representing each of the sectors (agriculture, indus-
try, commerce, services) of interest in this study and as defined above 
for the variable concerning the percentage contributions of the major 
economic sectors to the G.N.P. 
Social linkages 
The Socio-Political Set of 
Functional Linkages 
Percentage of school enrollment (at primary, secondary, and col-
lege levels). In collecting the 1960 and 1970 provincial data for 
Brazil, Chile, and the U.S., the difficulty encountered was similar to 
that expressed by Vera (1963:288), i.e., to calculate the school-age 
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population of developing nations; this difficulty in Latin America stems 
in part from the variation in the definition of "school-age" among na-
tions and in part from a census breakdown by nation and/or province of 
age groups that is inadequate for the purposes of studying the school-
age population. Data for the total school-age population at the pro-
vincial level were not consistently available for the three nations in 
this study. Therefore, a primary-school enrollment ratio was developed 
and used for the three nations so that findings would be comparable and 
cross-cultural analysis possible. This ratio is: 
province's primary-school enrollment 
as a percentage of the nation's school-
age population aged 5-19 
province's percentage share 
of total population 
X 100 
The age category of 5-19 in the ratio was selected after examining 
school enrollment figures by age distribution in Brazil and Chile; the 
minimum age represented was 5 and, although youth older than 19 were 
included in primary enrollment figures (the same is true for secondary 
enrollment) because of high repetition rates, it was decided that their 
numbers were too few to risk further distortion of the data. The 
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primary-school enrollment ratio therefore signifies each province's 
relative share of primary enrollment of the nation's school-age popu-
lation in relation to its share of the total population. For the same 
reasons as in the case of primary education, a secondary-school enroll-
ment ratio was developed: 
province's secondary-school enrollment 
as a percentage of nation's school-age 
population aged 10-19 
province's percentage share 
of total population 
X 100 
The minimum age of 10 is used in the secondary-school ratio since data 
on enrollments in the three nations showed this to be the minimum age 
included in enrollment figures. The upper limit of age 19 was selected 
for the same reasons as in the primary-school enrollment ratio. The 
secondary-school enrollment ratio represents, therefore, each prov-
ince's relative share of secondary enrollment of the nation's (secon-
dary) school-age population in relation to its share of the total popu-
lation. 
The commonly used indicator of university enrollment per 100,000 
population conceals, for the purposes of this study, and more likely 
than not underestimates actual access to university education (1) by 
not taking into account the population that has a university education 
but is not currently enrolled and (2) by including individuals of all 
educational levels (without distinction among these levels) in a single 
measure. Enrollment at different educa~ional levels as a social indi-
cator in this study focuses on the percentage of the population that 
is eligible by being actually enrolled in school. University enroll-
ments were therefore calculated as a percentage of total primary- and 
secondary-school enrollments (actual enrollments and not the ratios 
that were developed) in each province of the three nations. It is a 
measure of the relative access to, and importance assigned to, uni-
versity education in relation to the actual size of pre-university 
educational participation (potential university students) in each 
province. 
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Illiteracy rates. These rates for Brazil and Chile refer to the 
population aged 15 years and over defined by the census as illiterate. 
Of the population aged 14 years and over in the U.S., 2.2 per cent were 
illiterate in 1959 and 1.0 per cent in 1969. With such a low rate, data 
for the 50 cases in 1960 and 1970 would not vary enough for regression 
and correlation a~alysis. Therefore, functional illiteracy rates 
(population 25 years of age·and over with less than five years of 
schooling) were used for the U.S. with comparable rates unavailable in 
Brazil and Chile for this age group. 
Percentage of the economically-active population covered by social 
security. The provincial data in this study refer only to the estimated 
percentage of the labor force covered by the main social security system 
in each nation. 
Political linkages 
Percentage of the voting-age population registered to vote. In-
consistencies in provincial data available on the voting-age population 
in Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. resulted in limiting the operational 
definition of this variable to the percentage of the eligible (literate) 
voting-age population registered to vote in election years which repre-
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sents estimates in the three nations. 
The Control Variables 
The two controlled variables are ethnicity and rural-urban resi-
dence. Although controversy exists over the importance of ancestry in 
Brazil and Chile, discrimination has been documented especially in the 
case of blacks, mulattoes, Amerinds, and mestizos in Brazil; two groups 
in particular are treated as unassimilated--the Japanese and Amerinds. 
Similar controversy in Chile centers on whether or not it is a mestizo 
nation and whether or not discrimination based on ancestry exists; 
Amerinds are viewed as an unassimilated group. Therefore, ethnicity in 
this study is operationally defined by national ancestry, specifically 
percentage of the provincial population of non-European ancestry. The 
Brazilian census classifies individuals as branco (white or of European 
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ancestry), preto (black or of African ancestry), pardo (brown, usually 
of mixed ancestry), and amarelo (yellow or of Asian ancestry). Given 
the controversy over the importance of ancestry, the specific control 
variable here is the percentage of the provincial population that is of 
non-European ancestry which includes the pr~to, pardo, and amarelo cate-
gories of the Brazilian census and the sum of "non-white" categories in 
the U.S. census. Chile's population of non-European ancestry includes 
Amerinds and mestizos. 
Rural-urban residence is operationally defined as the percentage 
of the provincial population living in cities having a population of 
20,000 or more. The Brazilian urban classification is by municipios 
and the Chilean by comunas of 20,000 or more which therefore include 
some rural population over which the "urban place" has jurisdiction. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SELECTION OF CASES 
Selection of Cases: Brazil, Chile, 
and the United States 
Brazil, Chile, and the United States were selected as: (1) na-
tions at different levels of industrialization within the same hemi-
sphere; (2) nations representing former colonies of the major colonial 
powers in this hemisphere: England, Portugal, and Spain; and (3) na-
tions among which functional linkages--e.g., in trade agreements, 
foreign aid, and participation in several hemispheric organizations--
have existed since their struggles for independence. 
Units of Analysis and Statistical Procedures 
The units of analysis are provinces within the three nations. 
These provinces consist in Chilean provinces (N=25), Brazilian states 
and territories (N=25), and the states of the United States (N=50). So 
N's are 25, 25, 50, and 100 (for the combined cases in cross-cultural 
analysis) for the statistical tests. There is a combination of three 
levels of analysis--provincial, national, and international--but the 
focus is on the province as the basic unit. The research interest is to 
focus on (1) the co-variation of the two sets of variables within each 
province in contrast to the co-variation at the national level in each 
of the three nations and (2) the sources of provincial variation in con-
trast to variations at the national level and as possible explanations 
of the level of national integration in each of the three nations. 
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While the analysis focuses on making a time comparison using 
data for 1960 and 1970, descriptive statistics covering a longer span 
of time are included to describe the historical context of the re-
search. These statistics are related to demographic and ecological 
change, changes in real income per capita, inflation (since inflation 
may consume any gains made), and the system of international relations 
(specifically dealing with trade relations). For the same purpose, 
general qualitative description is provided~ e.g., in relation to geo-
graphical factors (particularly ecological barriers as well as type and 
abundance of natural resources), development of the political and strat-
ification systems, and international relations. 
The descriptive statistics are used to (1) trace changes in the 
selected variables, recognizing that rates of change in early stages of 
development accelerate and begin to taper off at later stages, and 
(2) to place a check on some variables that might carry a hidden bias; 
i.e., descriptive statistics on retention rates in primary education, 
location and tonnage of port facilities, and the percentage of regis-
tered voters who vote are included. In all cases, the qualitative and 
quantitative description contains possible sources of provincial and 
national variations. Given this descriptive context, data for 1960 and 
1970 (or as close to these years as possible since some data are col-
lected between census years, e.g., the agricultural census) are used to 
investigate the relative importance of each variable for each nation 
separately. Then, a causal analysis based on partial correlations is 
done. 
In the regression analysis, the first criteria for selecting 
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industrial-economic variables for subsequent use in causal analysis 
were: (a) maintain the variables in the order in which they appear in 
the regression equation, (b) eliminate those which were excluded from 
the regression equation because of insufficient tolerance and F values, 
(c) exclude all variables entered at those steps in the expansion of 
the equation where the overall F test indicates the increase in Multiple 
R to be insignificant at the .OS level, and (d) exclude variables that 
contribute nothing (R2 change = .000) or less than one per cent to ex-
plaining variation in the socio-political variable. Beta weights 
(chosen instead of unstandardized regression coefficients since the 
variables are expressed in different units) and the standard error of 
estimate are included in appendix C (tables 47-54) only for the reader's 
interest since the regression program is based on zero-order correlation 
matrices and primary interest is in first-order partials controlling for 
rural-urban residence. 
The two control variables (rural-urban residence and ethnicity) 
were entered into the regression equation and, in some cases, were the 
only variables significantly correlated with elements of the socio-
political set. Ethnicity was eliminated early in the study as a con-
trol variable because of inadequate data; in addition, problems ap-
peared in relation to multicollinearity and to indicators that proved 
to be seriously inadequate. These problems made any attempt to pro-
ceed with a regression analysis based on first- and/or second-order 
correlation matrices impractical. 
The scatterplots of residuals (standardized residuals plotted 
against standardized Y 1 values) were directly examined. No curve indi-
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cative of a non-linear (e.g., curvilinear) relationship was discovered. 
In the correlation analysis, first-order partials controlling for rural-
urban residence where p~.05 were examined. A partial of ~.400 was 
arbitrarily defined as the weakest correlation to be retained in the 
study; industrial-economic variables were therefore defined as rela-
tively unimportant and eliminated if the first-order partial was less 
+ than ~.400. If, when controlled, the correlation between variables was 
reduced to less than :.400, this is noted in the discussion. Two-
tailed significance tests were used. 
After using the above criteria, multicollinearity became a prob-
lem in the two groups of industrial-economic variables that were each 
treated as four variables--percentage contributions of the major eco-
nomic sectors to the G.N.P. and average annual income in the major eco-
nomic sectors (see tables 38-41 in appendix C). When multicollinearity 
appeared in one of these groups, the decision in this project was to 
select the variable in that group which either (a) had no ties with 
other elements in the group or (b) had, of the tied elements, the 
strongest partial correlation with the socio-political variable in-
valved. The selected variable(s) was then assumed to be an indicator 
of the same underlying phenomenon as those which were omitted. The 
fact that multicollinearity appeared as a problem should be taken into 
account when examining the beta weights in appendix C. 
Finally, relationships among variables were determined to be di-
rect, indirect, or both and after discussing each subfile, a causal 
analysis was done. On the basis of the research findings, generaliza-
tions are limited to the Western Hemisphere and the attempt is made to 
construct intermediate theory. 
Data Collection 
Data utilized for correlation and regression analysis were col-
lected from, or based on, Brazilian, Chilean, and U.S. census publica-
tions. Supplementary sources for descriptive (quantitative and quali-
tative) data consisted in statistical bulletins, case studies, and 
histories of the three nations. Sources used primarily for quantita-
tive data collection are listed on pages 260-266. Sources consulted 
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for geographical description and for the history of economic, political, 
and social development of the three nations are included on pages 249-
260. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONTEXT: 180Q-1970 
As a context for the research findings, it will be helpful to 
provide a descriptive overview of some national and international 
events and trends. A brief introduction to Brazil, Chile, and the 
United States is followed by a review of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Particular emphasis is on shifts in functional linkages. 
A geographical description of the three nations can be found in appen-
dix A. A discussion of functional linkages and lines of differentia-
tion in the three nations in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries is provided in appendix B. 
Introduction to Brazil, Chile, and 
the United States 
Population 
The population of Brazil increased from 17,318,556 in 1900 to 
41,565,083 in 1940 and 93,204,379 in 1970; Chile's population was 
3,220,531 in 1907, 5,023,539 in 1940, and 8,853,140 in 1970; and the 
U.S. population grew from 75,994,575 in 1900 to 131,669,275 in 1940 and 
203,211,926 in 1970. Comparable densities/km.2 in 1970 were 11.1 in 
Brazil, 11.7 in Chile, and 22.2 in the U.S. 
Three basic factors contributing to the ethnic composition as 
well as population size of the three nations were the original Amerind 
population, the voluntary immigrant.s, and the involuntary immigrants 
(chiefly African slaves). The Amerind population has faced isolation 
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and/or extinction through wars (Chile, U.S.), slavery (Brazil, Chile), 
amalgamation, and the reservation system. Today it is estimated that 
they account for between .4 per cent and 1.5 per cent of Brazil's 
population, between 3.2 and 5 per cent of Chile's population, and .4 
per cent of the U.S. population. African slaves were negligible in 
Chile but significant in Brazil and the United States; actual numbers 
of slaves cannot be compared since Brazil (Weil et al., 1975:81) de-
stroyed all records when slavery was abolished in 1888. 
Immigration has played an important role in Brazil and the U.S. 
not only in relation to ethnicity but in having an economic impact as 
a source of labor and as a significant factor in industrialization. 
About 4,800,000 immigrants entered Brazil from 1850 to 1950, 459,285 
from 1954 to 1963, and 65,381 from 1964 to 1970; the nations of origin 
in terms of numbers of immigrants are in order of importance Portugal, 
Italy, Spain, Germany, Japan, and USSR (also prominent were Dutch, 
Polish, Lebanese, and Syrian immigrants). In the U.S., 45,533,116 
immigrants entered from 1820 to 1971; in the twentieth century, the 
peak of 8,202,388 from 1900 to 1909 dropped to a low of 699,375 from 
1930 to 1939 rising to 3,213,749 from 1960 to 1969. The nations of 
origin in order of importance are Germany, Italy, England, Ireland, 
Canada, USSR, and Mexico. 
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Immigration has never been as important in Chile; the foreign-born 
population numbered 19,669 in 1854, 134,324 in 1907, and 107,273 in 
1940. In one of the peak periods between 1883 and 1901 only 36,000 
Europeans entered Chile and by 1960-1966 the average number of immi-
grants was less than 1,000 a year. The nations contributing immigrants 
listed in order of importance have been Spain, Germany, Italy, and, to 
a lesser degree, Switzerland, France, England, and Yugoslavia. 
Contemporary Politico-Administrative 
Systems 
At present (see appendix B for the history of the politico-
administrative systems of the three nations), Brazil is technically a 
constitutional republic consisting in 21 states, 4 territories, and a 
federal district. The Constitution of 1967 remains in effect. Elec-
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tions are indirect with the president elected by the national congress. 
The administrative divisions of states and territories (referred to as 
provinces in this study) are divided into districts with towns as 
seats. The states have unicameral legislatures while territories are 
administered by the federal government. 
The Chilean government remains highly centralized. Political 
subdivisions are the 25 provinces divided into departments which are 
further divided into subdelegations and then districts. Administra-
tively, the provinces are divided into comunas which coincide with 
political subdelegations; groups of comunas make up municipalities. 
Chile has no federal district. Elections (up to 1973) are direct with 
the president chosen by popular vote and the Constitution of 1925 re-
mains in effect. 
The U.S. consists in 50 states (referred to in this study as 
provinces) and a federal district under the Constitution of 1789 with 
a president elected by popular vote and the Electoral College. The 
states are governed by bicameral legislatures with the exception of 
Nebraska which has a single-chambered legislature. Politically and 
administratively states are subdivided into counties, except for 
Louisiana (parishes) and Alaska (boroughs). The District of Columbia 
is under federal legislative administration. 
The Impact of Plantation 
Systems 
In the colonial era (see appendix B) of Brazil, Chile, and the 
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U.S., the land had been left to private initiative, a policy resulting, 
on the one hand, in the rapid growth of agricultural production but also 
the poor utilization and abuse of the land, soil erosion, and waste of 
a basic natural resource. The consequences would affect agricultural 
production in the twentieth century. On the other hand, this policy 
permitted the emergence of plantation systems in Brazil, Chile, and the 
southern U.S.; the consequence from this perspective was a landed aris-
tocracy dominating economic and political institutions characterized by 
paternalistic-dependent relationships, one of the greatest and most 
persistent obstacles to development in these regions. 
From the time of the colonial era, economic linkages predominated 
nationally as well as internationally. The African slave, the Amerind, 
the indentured servant, and the mestizo were first viewed as important 
to plantation and commercial economic interests as manual laborers and 
as consumers. They were not, however, linked to the political system. 
In some instances, even economic linkages were severed; e.g., the end 
of Amerind enslavement came in Brazil once the Amerind was defined as 
"unproductive" and underlying the eventual acceptance of the abolition 
of African slavery by the landed aristocracy in Brazil was the notion 
that slaves were 11non-producers" and "non-consumers, 11 as noted by 
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DeKadt (1968:41-45; also see Toplin, 1969:640). 
The political, or more accurately, politico-economic linkages 
originally belonged to the aristocracy, most of whom were European-born. 
Until they became upper-class members after independence, creoles in a 
sense were an "intermediate" group as, it can be suggested, were the 
Jewish and Middle Eastern immigrants in Brazil and Chile as well as 
other of the immigrant groups in the three nations whose importance, 
particularly in commerce (and in industry in the twentieth century), 
was recognized. The original Amerind inhabitants of Brazil, Chile, 
and the U.S. were perceived as the "conquered" and therefore the "iso-
lated" be it in the Andes Mountains, Amazonian jungle, or on reserva-
tions. 
As Hicks et al. (1970:394) note, wherever slavery has existed, 
manual labor is viewed with disdain. This notion has not completely 
disappeared in the U.S. but remains especially prevalent in twentieth-
century Brazil and Chile where it inhibits governmental attempts to 
establish a system of vocational schools to meet national development 
needs. The manual laborer--black, Amerind, mestizo, or immigrant--of 
the nineteenth century continued to be isolated from political partici-
pation in part because of elitist-oriented educational systems that 
provided a rudimentary, if any, education where the right of suffrage 
carried with it a literacy requirement. In turn, the creation of a 
massive uneducated or poorly educated, unskilled labor force subse-
quently became an obstacle to industrialization in the nineteenth-
century U.S. and twentieth-century Brazil and Chile. 
Functional Linkages and Lines of Differentiation 
in the Nineteenth Century 
Changes in Functional Linkages and the Redefinition of 
Lines of Differentiation in the International System 
Impact of the Napoleonic Wars 
Independence of Brazil. Following Napoleon's take-over of 
Portugal in 1807, the English took the regent Joao (who became Joao VI 
in 1816) and his family to Brazil. After liberating itself in 1820, 
Portugal protested against having its government located overseas; 
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J~o returned to Portugal in 1821 leaving his son Pedro as prince-regent 
of Brazil. In 1821-1822, Portugal, opposed to free trade and the in-
creasing autonomy in Brazil, moved to make it a dependent colony once 
again. Pedro was recalled to Portugal in 1822 but, with the support of 
Minas Gerais (especially the miners), he declared Brazil an independent 
empire. 
Independence of Chile. When it was apparent that Napoleon had 
triumphed in Spain, a national government was established in Santiago 
(1810); the captain-general of Chile was deposed and a junta, elected 
by open cabildo, assumed authority in the name of Fernando VII. The 
Spanish reconquest (1814-1817) came to an end when San Mart{n's army 
defeated Spanish forces in Santiago in 1817. San Mart~ refused the 
post of Supreme Director which was then given to Bernardo O'Higgins and, 
in 1818, independence was declared; Spain did not recognize Chilean 
independence until 1844. 
Awareness of economic interdependence. The interdependence of 
the European and U.S. economies became apparent by the effect in the 
U.S. of the Napoleonic Wars. They were the primary reason for the 
Panic of 1819 (Hicks et al., 1970:394-395), the first of a series of 
typical U.S. depressions. 
Emergence of Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. as world powers: 
redefinitions as a consequence of war 
Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. emerged as 11world powers" in the 
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nineteenth century basically as a consequence of wars. After attaining 
this status, they became characterized by a tendency to adopt expan-
sionist policies followed by a period of isolationism or at least non-
involvement in conflict. It was by winning the War of the Pacific 
(1879-1884) against Peru and Bolivia (and gaining one-third of its 
national territory today) that Chile became the dominant power of West 
Coast South America; following the War of the Pacific until 1929, Chile 
was isolationist. 
It was because of expansionist motives that Brazil went to war 
with Argentina (1825-1828) and Paraguay (1865-1870). In spite of 
failure to expand its boundaries, these conflicts--in combination with 
a reversal of the expansionist policy that had prevailed 1840-1889--led 
to Brazil's growth of prestige in South America; it did not then be-
come so much an isolationist nation as an advocate of arbitration and 
negotiation to avoid conflict. 
For the U.S., the War of 1812 and the 1846-1848 war with Mexico 
in which Texas, New Mexico, and California were acquired were expan-
sionist wars that marked more or less the beginning and end of Manifest 
Destiny. The U.S. was already alienated from European affairs by 1812; 
in the latter half of the century, attention turned to westward expan-
sion and domestic reform with an isolationist foreign policy, as illus-
trated by the Monroe Doctrine. It became increasingly difficult to 
avoid world contacts by 1890. The U.S. had capital, agricultural, and 
manufacturing surpluses; other nations wanted U.S. agricultural pro-
ducts in particular. As the principal result, U.S. diplomacy began to 
operate in an ever-widening sphere. It was, however, by involvement 
in the Spanish-American War that the U.S. emerged as a world power at 
the close of the century. 
Beginning of U.S. economic expansion overseas 
By 1860, goods consumed within the U.S. were mainly of domestic 
origin. Surpluses (especially of capital, agriculture, and manufac-
turing) increased but by 1890, with both the population and national 
boundaries having reached the Pacific coast, the domestic market could 
no longer absorb these surpluses. For the economy to continue to ex-
pand, outlets were needed abroad. Substantial investments overseas 
had begun following the Civil War. The increase in world gold pro-
duction and in the demand for U.S. agricultural products led to a 
period of prosperity for agriculture in the U.S. (1897-1901) but it 
was the Spanish-American War in particular that thrust the U.S. into 
overseas economic expansion. 
Expansion of linkages in trade and foreign investment 
In Brazil, foreign capital was invested mainly in the trade sec-
tor and the construction of public utilities until the twentieth cen-
tury; the English continued to hold their dominant position as a trade 
partner, as builders of the Brazilian railway system, and until 1844 
as having the power by treaty to limit Brazil in the imposing of tar-
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iffs. Chile's international trade, aside from wheat exports to Peru, 
remained until 1880 predominantly with Western Europe. Europe also 
continued to dominate in U.S. exports and imports but Asia began to 
increase in importance as trade agreements were made with China (1844), 
Japan (1854), and Siam (present-day Thailand) in 1856. With Canada and 
South American nations also becoming trade partners, trade relations 
increased rapidly in the last decade of the nineteenth century. For-
eign capital in the U.S. was important in transportation in particular. 
Fluctuations in inter-American linkages 
The U.S. fully comprehended Latin America's problems as colonies 
of foreign powers; during their wars of independence, the U.S. offered 
assistance (which was also requested, e.g., by the Carrera faction in 
Chile) and later served as a mediator in their disputes. In spite of 
these ties and the trade relations that had begun, hemispheric unity 
did not emerge in the nineteenth century. 
Brazil's shift away from expansionism toward arbitration and 
negotiation had improved relations with other Latin American nations 
but Brazil remained relatively isolated from them throughout the nine-
teenth century. The U.S. had been the first nation to recognize (1824) 
Brazilian independence but Brazil's ties remained predominantly with 
Europe. Chile was already investing capital in Peru and Bolivia 
(in nitrates and guano) prior to the War of the Pacific (when Chile 
gained control over guano- and nitrate-producing areas); by the end 
of the century, Chile's relations with Latin America had improved but 
nineteenth-century relations with the U.S. worsened. 
The alienation of the U.S. from European affairs and the Monroe 
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Doctrine came at a time when domestic concerns were emphasized. There-
fore, when Latin American nations first attempted to strengthen rela-
tions with the U.S., they met with limited success as in the reluctance 
of the U.S. Congress to send delegates in response to Bolfvar's invi-
tation to the 1826 Panama Congress (organized to jointly demand that 
Spain recognize the independence of Spanish-American Nations). The 
1846-1848 expansionist war with Mexico did not enhance the image of the 
U.S. in Latin America but relations had improved by 1889 when the first 
Pan American Congress met in Washington and the Pan American Union, an 
information bureau, was established. Then the U.S. became involved in 
the internal affairs of Chile by backing President Balmaceda in the 
1891 Civil War against Chilean Congressional forces. Balmaceda's 
forces lost the war and Congressional forces remained antagonized be-
cause of the U.S. position. Shortly after, a lengthy dispute over an 
attack against U.S. sailors in Valpara~o resulted in anti-U.S. feeling 
throughout Latin America at the close of the nineteenth century. 
Changes in Functional Linkages and Redefinition of 
Lines of Differentiation within National Systems 
Divergent experiences in economic growth: basis of 
differences in the type of economic linkages 
The functional linkages of Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. to the 
international system in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
defined on the basis of their status as dependencies. Although in-
dividual immigrants may have had different motives, economic linkages 
predominated and resulted in extractive, export economies to meet 
Europe's needs. Particularly in the nineteenth century the economies 
of the three nations diverged drastically in their characteristics. A 
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basic difference between these economies was that industrialization 
emerged in the U.S. on the basis of an already existing infrastructure; 
in contrast, it was left to governmental planning in the twentieth cen-
tury to simultaneously attempt to industrialize and build an industrial 
infrastructure in Brazil and Chile. Although Brazil and Chile had 
emerged in the nineteenth century as world powers politically, their 
economies remained characteristically extractive and export-oriented. 
Nineteenth-century economies of Brazil and Chile. Economic ex-
pansion was rapid from 1830 to 1900 in Chile (particularly 1841-1876) 
and in Brazil from 1850 to 1900 (especially after 1889). For Chile, 
the acquisition of the North as a consequence of the War of the Pacific 
signified wealth in nitrates; population expansion and settlement 
(mainly by immigrants) south of the B{o-B{o River would come to signify 
wealth in agricultural and forest resources. In large part, Chilean 
economic expansion was due to a shift from silver to coal production 
followed in the 1870s by a shift to nitrates. While the Chilean economy 
continued to rely on the mining sector, Brazil depended on coffee. The 
first substantial coffee exports were in 1818 with a coffee cycle well-
established by the 1830s (beginning in Rio de Janeiro State); coffee 
became the major export until World War II although this cycle continues 
today. Adding to the importance of coffee was the continued shift away 
from sugar and cotton after the slave trade was abolished (1852). Con-
tributing to the rapid economic growth after 1889 in Brazil was the ex-
pansion in trade, cattle raising, mining, agriculture, and forestry. 
Industrialization of the United States. The industrialization 
of the U.S. passed through the following phases during the nineteenth 
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century: 
1. The handicraft stage of colonial times continued up to 1810. 
2. Gradual, although unsteady, growth occurred between 1810-1840 with 
manufacturing well-established--mainly in New England--by the end 
of the War of 1812. A series of factors began to operate con-
comitantly leading to a period of rapid growth: population growth 
(a source of labor and consumers of domestic production), devel-
opment of a market economy, changes in technology (cotton gin, use 
of power machinery i.n textiles), new sources of energy (steam, 
anthracite coal), the transfer of capital from merchandizing. to 
manufacturing, and the influx of foreign capital, especially in 
canals and railroads; in addition, the textile industry commonly 
had all operations under one management by the 1830s which was im-
portant to the subsequent development of corporate organization. 
As Fite and Reese (1973:142, 267) indicate, however, the most im-
portant economic factor prior to 1860 was the acquisition and 
settlement of the West which: provided more resources, markets, 
and exports; drew foreign capital; and encouraged transportation. 
3. From 1840-1860 the shift away from agriculture to manufacturing 
began with rapid industrial and commercial development. Contrib-
uting (and interrelated) factors were: as a consequence of more 
machinery, the factory system (relatively unimportant before the 
1840s) became well-established and labor productivity increased; 
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as a consequence of the growing need for capital, the corporation 
emerged as the predominant form of business organization thus making 
a sharp distinction between labor and management; and, as a conse-
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quence of improved transportation, domestic and foreign markets 
rapidly expanded. Manufacturing, however, was only beginning to be 
concentrated at strategic points and was still limited basically 
to using raw materials produced within the U.S. In all economic 
sectors specialization was under way in both production and trade 
while manufacturing was rapidly approaching self-sufficiency. 
4. The Civil War period reflected both pre- and post-war regional 
differences. The concentration of industry in the North prior to 
the war contributed to the outcome of the Civil War and, because of 
the needs of the war, the shift from agriculture to manufacturing 
accelerated in this region. Industry in the South developed almost 
completely to meet wartime needs. In the North, the war brought 
prosperity; in the South, it brought ruin. 
5. In the post-Civil War period, several trends emerged: (a) the 
growth of large-scale business and corporate organization; (b) the 
concentration of banking and finance in a few strategic centers 
such as Wall Street; (c) the mechanization, specialization, and com-
mercialization of agriculture which impelled it into a less self-
sufficient exchange economy; and (d) the replacement of steel for 
iron and the growing importance of industry over agriculture. Agri-
culture continued to predominate until 1890, the turning point for 
industry; by 1894, the U.S. was the world's leading manufacturing 
nation. The shift in manufacturing away from New England to the 
Middle Atlantic made the latter the most important manufacturing 
region; rapid progress was made in the North-Central Region but 
not in the South prior to 1880. It was, however, to be those 
regions east of the Mississippi where manufacturing would still 
be concentrated in the next century. 
Impact of changes in transportation and communications 
on the expansion of functional linkages 
The War of 1812 was a turning point for transportation in the 
U.S.; the blockade forced movement by land which, in turn, brought the 
realization of a need for, and construction of, better roads. As a 
consequence of the expense of moving freight by land, the use of navi-
gable waterways became increasingly important. However, early expan-
sion westward encountered the problem of a lack of navigable water in 
some areas. It was then that the era of canals began with the opening 
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of the Erie Canal in 1825 joining the Hudson River and the Great Lakes; 
by 1850, there were 5,120 kms. of canals. 
Canals, particularly their expense, were problematic but it was 
the railroad that brought the canal era as well as the use of steam-
boats (first used in 1812) to an end; Great Lakes traffic was the only 
water transport that did not decline. Ocean transport, from the time of 
the War of 1812, became characterized by larger and faster ships; the 
clipper ships of the 1840s were gradually replaced by steamships 
(coinciding with the use of iron in ship-building) which, again because 
of a problem of expense, had to be subsidized by the government. 
The Baltimore and Ohio (1828) was the first public railway in 
the U.S. By 1860, and especially from 1865 to World War I, the rail-
road was the most important single form of land transportation. The 
New York-Chicago rail connection in 1853 had shifted the movement of 
trade from west to east instead of north to south, a trend that be-
came more firmly established with the completion of the first conti-
nental railroad at Ogden, Utah, in 1869. By the 1890s, the railroad 
network in the U.S. was complete as were telegraph and telephone net-
works that had been built concomitant to railroad construction. The 
first transoceanic cable had been completed in 1858. 
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As part of the infrastructure for industrialization, the changes 
in transportation and communications in the U.S. were important in 
economic and territorial expansion and as a link between different 
sections of the nation. These changes thrust Brazil, Chile, and the 
U.S. into closer contact with the world but the internal impact in 
Brazil and Chile varied from the U.S. experience. In all three na-
tions, the construction of transportation networks relied on foreign 
investment. Latin American transportation systems were built by 
Europeans for their purposes and, therefore, were oriented to the sea; 
this served to pull Latin American nations away from each other and 
linked sections of each nation to the sea rather than to other regions 
of the nation. 
Chile was the first South American nation to use steam naviga-
tion (1840), construct a railroad (1850), and use Morse telegraphy 
(1852). Brazil's first railroad was inaugurated in 1854; the railroad 
system grew rapidly after 1889. In Rio de Janeiro in 1851 the first 
steamship line to Europe and, in 1874, the transatlantic cable were 
inaugurated. Although Brazil and Chile had more contact with other 
nations, these transportation and communication routes of the nine-
teenth century did not compose part of an industrial infrastructure. 
They did, however, emphasize the export-oriented nature of their 
economies. 
Government intervention in the expansion of 
economic linkages 
Beginning as dependencies, the (external) government played a 
role in the economies of Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. in the colonial 
era although some private initiative and local autonomy were per-
mitted so long as it was beneficial to Europe's economic interests. 
Government was involved in the economy by the nineteenth century di-
rectly or indirectly in three areas: protectionism, a shift from 
laissez-faire economic policy to intervention, and sectionalism based 
on conflict between economic interests. 
Brazil. While still under Portuguese control, free trade was 
established and economic restrictions were lifted, especially from 
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1808 to 1816. Inflation first emerged as a problem after mid-nineteenth 
century (although it did not become a problem of major proportions until 
the mid-twentieth century). It was then that government began to in-
tervene in the economy. Protectionist tariffs began in 1860 to aid the 
small-scale industry that was emerging but economic policies of the 
government were designed to encourage agriculture, commerce, and rail-
road construction as well as industry. The government took steps 
1894-1910 to control inflation through a series of fiscal reforms and 
loans. The establishment of a republic in 1889 and a rapid increase in 
provincial powers had not, however, lessened the discontent and con-
flict that had grown during the empire period and the century closed 
without resolving sectionalist differences. Pedro I reigned 1822-1831. 
Forced to abdicate and return to Portugal, he left his five-year-old 
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son Pedro to rule; regents governed in his name 1831-1840 when at age 
fourteen Pedro was declared of age in hopes that reestablishment of di-
rect monarchy would reduce the secessionism, revolts, and discontent 
that had been characteristic during the rule of Pedro I and the regency. 
Pedro II ruled 1840-1889 but failed to actively push for change. In 
1889, Deodoro da Fonseca led the army revolt that forced Pedro II and 
his family into exile in Europe. A republic was proclaimed and a pro-
visional government was established. Unrest grew under the Empire 
(1822-1889) most noticeably among the landed aristocracy (primarily 
because of creditors and excessive taxation), clergy, and army; seces-
sionist movements and provincial revolts had already begun in 1817 
(Pernambuco) due to growing republicanism (especially after 1870) and 
antagonism of the creoles over the preference shown to the Portuguese 
(European-born). Sectionalism after the establishment of a republic 
was based on antagonism against the domination over the federal govern-
-ment by Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais in favor of their economic interests 
(particularly those of the coffee planters). From 1893-1895, discon-
tent became widespread with two abortive rebellions (Rio Grande do Sul 
and the navy under Admiral Custodo de Mello). However, Sao Paulo and 
Minas Gerais continued to be the most powerful provinces--politically 
and economically--into the twentieth century (one indication being that, 
until 1930, civilian presidents came either from Sao Paulo or Minas 
Gerais). 
Chile. Chilean civil wars represented conflicts primarily be-
tween Liberal and Conservative factions. However, the Civil War of 
1891 was in part due to President Balmaceda's position in favor of an 
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increase in government planning versus the laissez-faire Congressional 
forces that won the war. Laissez-faire forces also predominated in the 
copper industry (from 1811 to 1955) although Chile was the leading world 
producer of copper 1851-1880. Financial and administrative reforms were 
enacted 1891-1896 including an increase in provincial autonomy, similar 
to Brazil. Protectionist policies to aid the Chilean economy began in 
1897. 
United States. Prior to 1816, tariffs were intended mainly as a 
source of revenue but after 1816, they became protectionist in nature. 
Popular attitudes shifted towards a favoring of government interven-
tion. Federal aid to beginning industries through tariffs and tariff 
rebates contributed to the growing importance of manufacturing as did 
the lenience shown toward business by the government as industrializa-
tion accelerated and corporate organization expanded. However, as the 
Civil War period approached, the laissez-faire position was gaining 
strength concomitant to the growing popular reaction against government 
intervention. Although the regions of the U.S. economically comple-
mented one another, sectionalism grew because of different economic 
interests and the issue of slavery; what had been East-West conflict in 
the previous century became sharp rifts among manufacturers in the 
North, cotton planters in the South, and free farmers in the West. As 
in Brazil and Chile, sectionalism broke out into open conflict in the 
nineteenth century with the 1861-1865 Civil War. The manner in which 
Reconstruction of the South was conducted after the war contributed 
not only to the South becoming the most critical economic region of 
the U.S. but also to the strong sectionalistic feelings that continued 
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well into the twentieth century. Following the Civil War, government 
intervention in the economy increased and laissez-faire notions began 
to decline as (German-trained) U.S. economists began to seriously 
question them by the end of the century. Still, the business sector 
was not seriously limited by government intervention in the nineteenth 
century in spite of, e.g., demands for government intervention in the 
growth of corporations and the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Entre-
preneurship had come to be viewed as increasingly important as indus-
trialization accelerated; it influenced all aspects of U.S. society and 
the government intervention that did or did not occur tended to support 
and encourage the entrepreneur. 
Factors influencing changes in bases of differentiation: 
the combined impact of economic change, demands for 
reform, and government intervention 
The nineteenth century was an era of reform particularly towards 
the close of the century. Reforms and the demand for reform were 
closely interrelated to changes in the economy which, individually or 
jointly, had an impact on the position of some groups within society 
and the general characteristics of society. 
The abolition of slavery. Slavery emerged as an issue in Brazil 
around 1831; the British in particular pushed for abolition. Slaves 
were first freed in Cear/ and Amazonas; the international slave trade 
was abolished in 1852. The emancipation movement grew rapidly after 
1870, opposed strongly at first by the landed aristocracy but en-
couraged by the freeing of all children born of women in slavery (1871) 
and of all slaves over 60 (1885). All slavery was abolished in 1888. 
In Chile, slavery was abolished in 1823; opposition to this legisla-
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tion did not emerge since slavery had not been important and, by this 
time, most slaves had disappeared either through assimilation or death. 
The process of achieving the total abolition of slavery in the U.S. was 
a long one beginning with the prohibition of the African slave trade in 
1808 followed by a series of events including the organization of the 
underground railroad in 1838, the open debate of the issue in the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1857, the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 
in the middle of a civil war over the issue, and culminating in 1865 
with the 13th constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery. 
Encouragement of immigration and internal migration. Immigration 
with government encouragement had a significant impact on Brazil, Chile, 
and the U.S. in the nineteenth century. The principal motives under-
lying government intervention in Brazil were the need for a new source 
of labor after abolishing slavery and a desire to settle the interior; 
in Chile, it was a desire to settle the southern region; and in the 
U.S., it was a combination of a need for labor (because of increasing 
industrialization and the abolition of slavery) and the settlement of 
the West: 
1. Brazil. City growth accelerated but the most rapid urban growth 
did not occur until the twentieth century. The majority of 
Brazil's population was concentrated in Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, 
Pernambuco, and Bahia by 1818 when the first land grants were 
given to Swiss and German immigrants to encourage settlement in the 
interior. Because of the labor shortage, European labor was 
brought under contract; since coffee planters had already begun to 
extensively replace slave labor with Italian laborers, the aboli-
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tion of slavery did not have as severe an impact on coffee fazendas 
as it otherwise would have had. Total immigration to Brazil was 
about 960,000 from 1851 to 1890 and 4,800,000 from 1891 to 1900; 
Spanish and Italian immigration in particular became extensive 
while Portuguese immigrants continued to arrive in significant 
numbers. 
2. Chile. Since the Chilean population preferred to remain in the 
Central Region, the government encouraged European immigration to 
settle south of the Bfo-B~ River by offering free land grants and 
tax exemptions under an 1824 law. The first colonization law of 
1845 established a colonization agency for southern Chile pri-
marily designed to attract northern Europeans and especially 
skilled labor. After the close of the War of the Pacific (1884), 
soldiers joined others coming for free land and the settlement of 
the South as far as Puerto Montt intensified. Immigrants from 
some nations had been arriving since the beginning of the century 
but the peak periods were 1840-1860 for the Italians, 1881-1890 
for the French, 1889-1890 for the Spanish (mainly Basques), and 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for Middle 
Easterners (mainly Syrians). By far, the largest group of immi-
grants were Germans, the main group to settle the South with their 
peak period extending from the 1850s into the early 1900s. Still, 
the foreign-born in Chile numbered only 25,199 in 1875, 87,077 in 
1885, 79,036 in 1895, and 134,324 in 1907; they settled mainly in 
port cities and Santiago. 
3. United States. After the War of 1812, the fear of Indian up-
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risings was diminishing, southern cotton planters wanted to extend 
their territory, and farmers who did not own slaves wanted to mi-
grate to the West. These as well as other factors contributed to 
the rapid migration westward which transportation changes increas-
ingly facilitated. Particularly following the Civil War, the com-
mercial city gave way to the industrial city. Rapid city growth 
was in part due to natural increase and rural~urban migration but 
also immigration which accounted for an estimated 50 per cent of 
the city growth particularly 1870-1900. Immigration provided a 
solution to the continual labor shortage in the North (where immi-
grant labor had been relied on since the seventeenth century) and 
the new territory. The federal government and many western states 
had immigration bureaus (but no programs to assist new immigrants). 
Immigration rapidly increased after 1840 originating predominantly 
in Europe (mainly Irish and German) with a yearly average during 
the 1845-1855 period of 300,000 or more. In the 1870s, 2,812,191 
immigrants arrived which was surpassed in the 1880s with 5,246,613 
immigrants. From the post-Civil War period until World War I, 
immigrants came increasingly from southern and eastern Europe and 
Asia. In spite of their contribution to economic expansion in 
the U.S. by being part of the labor force (generally as unskilled 
labor) and by buying U.S. products, discrimination grew and the 
notion of restricting immigration gradually became widespread (as 
it did in Brazil in the twentieth century); some results were the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and General Immigration Law and the re-
versal in 1885 of the 1864 law permitting labor to be imported. 
Emergence of the wage system and labor organization. As the 
source of labor shifted from slavery to free labor, the wage system 
emerged in Brazil about 1850 and in the southern U.S. after 1865. 
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Labor unrest and organization did not develop in Brazil in the nine-
teenth century. In contrast, the wage system emerged earlier in Chile; 
labor protest began in the 1850s and, during the early stages of indus-
trialization in the 1880s, unionization began (in the mining regions) 
with violence becoming increasingly characteristic of labor activities 
until the 1920s. In the U.S., the wage system emerged concomitant to 
the rise of corporate organization prior to the Civil War; corpora-
tions, the major employer of wage earners from 1865-1914, signified 
different working conditions and problems which contributed to the 
labor unrest that reached a peak between 1892 and 1895. The U.S. 
government was slow to intervene in labor's problems given that a labor 
movement, led first by artisans, had already started (although weak) 
prior to the War of 1812, revived in the 1820s, but discontinued after 
the Panic of 1837 because of high unemployment. Organized labor did 
not become established until the Knights of Labor (1869-1890) fol-
lowed by the more permanent organization of the American Federation of 
Labor (1881); in the South, labor organization did not become estab-
lished until the twentieth century largely because of the paternalism 
of southern factories. 
Government policy in relation to Amerinds. Plantation systems 
based on slavery disappeared but the paternalistic-dependent rela-
tionships that they had spawned continued, e.g., in labor-management 
relations in the southern U.S., Brazil, and Chile and in the orientation 
of government toward some groups in society. It was this type of re-
lationship that characterized government policy in relation to the 
Amerind population in the U.S. and to a certain extent in Chile. Res-
ervations continue to exist in many parts of southern Chile; whether 
living on or off the reservations, Mapuches are now small farmers .• 
They were never conquered (in battle) but peace was made in 1887. 
Amerinds in Brazil had, prior to the nineteenth century, ceased to be 
utilized as slave labor; they continued to live relatively isolated 
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and primarily in Amaz~nia with an absence of government policies per-
taining to them prior to the twentieth century. With the opening of 
the nineteenth century in the U.S. came the defeat of the Amerinds in 
the Southwest followed by the Seminole and Black Hawk Wars, the up-
risings following the Civil War, and occasional outbreaks until 1890. 
Until 1843, the government had voiced the intention of protecting 
Amerinds' rights and in 1849 the paternalistic Bureau of Indian Affairs 
was created. Reservation policy was eventually developed by the Indian 
Peace Commission created in 1867 and by 1886 all Amerinds were in 
"Indian Territory" or on reservations. 
Legislation related to religion. The U.S. Constitution had al-
ready provided for the separation of Church and State at the national 
level (many states had established religions) and freedom of religion 
in the previous century. This did not occur in Brazil until the 
Constitution of 1891. In Chile, freedom of religion was decreed in 
1865 as part of anti-clerical reforms passed in 1865-1885. The 1845 
colonization law in Chile to attract northern European immigrants had 
first specified that they be Catholic; more rapid immigration was de-
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sired so persons of all faiths were admitted. The subsequent and wide-
spread religous conflict was resolved by the 1871 constitutional amend-
ment providing for freedom of religion. Therefore, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, religion had been removed (constitutionally) as a 
basis of differentiation in all three nations. 
Legislation related to education. In the end result, the educa-
tional systems of Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. did not greatly differ. 
Several seminaries and academies existed in Brazil prior to the nine-
teenth century, the first having been started by Jesuits in the 1500s; 
particularly those schools for Amerinds provided only a rudimentary 
education. Brazilian history of this era includes reports describing 
(see Freyre, 1963:57-72 for extensive discussion of this topic) the 
severity of students' lives particularly in religious schools (similar 
accounts exist of early schools in Chile) and suggesting a relationship 
between the consequence of chronically poor health and the lessened 
capacity of these students to later fulfill their governmental (begin-
ning under Pedro II) and other roles in careers that, by their nature, 
forced them out of their communities and into the cities. Still, these 
schools were vital to the families who could not send their children to 
other private schools because of the high cost of tuition. Education 
in Brazil after the establishment of the republic in 1889 continued to 
favor the elite; academic secondary schools constituted preparation for 
admission to the university for the elite while students other than from 
the elite attended vocational secondary schools which taught only the 
basics. The Chilean educational system, also elitist-oriented, devel-
oped more slowly; the San Luis Academy created in the nineteenth century 
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is considered the first secondary school although seminaries had been 
established in the eighteenth century. By 1800, the U.S. had three 
types of schools, i.e., tuition schools for the wealthy (for college 
preparation), tuition schools for apprentices, and charity or free 
schools; although all communities were to have an elementary public 
school, it was not the case in the pre-Civil War South and in the North 
it did not mean universal education except perhaps in Massachusetts 
due, for the most part, to the efforts of Horace Mann. In the nine-
teenth century, humanitarian reformers in the U.S. became the most ac-
tive promoters for universal education, more qualified teachers, and 
tuition-free high schools and colleges; their achievements were, how-
ever, mainly in the establishment of institutions of higher education. 
Yale College had already been founded in 1701. Mt. Holyoke Seminary, 
the first college for women, began in 1837. The first institution of 
higher education in Chile was the Universidad de San Felipe founded in 
the eighteenth century; it closed with the founding of the Universidad 
de Chile in 1842 and the Universidad Catblica (1888). Law schools estab-
lished in Olinda and Sao Paulo in 1827 came to be the centers of higher 
education in Brazil for almost a century although a "true" university 
was not founded until the early twentieth century. Brazilian students 
and Chilean and U.S. college graduates who wanted to continue with ad-
vanced studies had to do so in Europe. Most U.S. scholars went to 
Germany; as a result, when graduate schools of the modern sort began in 
the U.S. (the first being at Johns Hopkins University in 1876), they 
were patterned after German schools (German-trained U.S. economists, as 
previously noted, were influential in changes made in U.S. economic 
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policy). The promotion of expanding educational opportunities had been 
of concern to the Brazilian government from the colonial period; this 
concern grew in Chile after 1850 and in the U.S. particularly after 
1870. In 1891, as one result of this concern, education for Amerind 
children in the U.S. became compulsory. However, the expansion of edu-
cational facilities and legislation in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries did not necessarily signify an actual increase in opportuni-
ties or in the universality of educational opportunities throughout the 
population in Brazil, Chile, or the U.S. 
Legislation related to political participation. From the begin-
ning of the republican period, certain tendencies became apparent that 
have continued to characterize Brazil, i.e., the army as a power in 
Brazilian politics, the active involvement of the clergy, and the ex-
tremely low mass participation in national politics in large part be-
cause of the high rate of illiteracy. The level of mass participation 
in Brazil was also affected at first by political inexperience and the 
fact that no real political parties existed. Demands for reform tended 
to break into open conflict in Chile, e.g., during the 1823-1827 period 
of discontent with the government and the 1851-1861 period when two 
Liberal revolts were suppressed (although it was an era of Liberal 
reform); particularly during the subsequent 1865-1885 reform period, 
efforts were made to expand suffrage. vtliz (1968:xviii-xxiv) describes 
the reaction against Catholicism in Europe as one of "nonconformity" 
(the emergence of alternatives such as Methodism) whereas in Latin 
America it took the form of "anti-clericalism" (as in the series of 
anti-clerical legislation in Chile in the latter part of the nineteenth 
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century). In spite of this reaction, the clergy has characteristically 
been involved in Brazilian politics (and has experienced the same 
"purges" as other groups in opposition to the government). In the 
twentieth century, the Latin American Catholic clergy has taken a 
stance of activist involvement of the Church in social and economic de-
velopment; most recently, this position has been labelled a "theology 
of liberation" (see Gutierrez, 1973, for a detailed exposition of this 
perspective). Underlying these and other actions of the clergy is, 
however, the notion that Church and State represent two opposing groups. 
Political parties did emerge in Chile during the nineteenth century as 
they did in the U.S. especially after the War of 1812. There was also 
a growing demand in the U.S., encouraged by the election of Andrew 
Jackson, for public officials to come from the "masses" rather than the 
"traditional elite"; increasingly, more public offices became elective 
positions. By 1828, suffrage had been extended in most of the U.S. to 
non-propertied men and to all men by the 15th constitutional amendment 
in 1870. Wyoming Territory was the first (1869) to give suffrage to 
women. 
Bases of differentiation at the close of the 
nineteenth century 
Despite the legislation, the impact of economic growth, and the 
increasing heterogeneity of society through immigration and amalgama-
tion, the bases of social stratification in Brazil and Chile remained 
relatively unchanged by the end of the nineteenth century. In Brazilian 
society based on the plantation system with an upper-class aristocracy 
and lower-class manual laborers, Amerinds remained outside the system, 
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i.e., "non-persons." Similarly, the original system in Chile consisted 
in an upper-class aristocracy and lower-class peasants and servants with 
Amerinds outside the system (Gil, 1966:23), i.e., "maintaining their own 
way of life" as in Brazil. By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
Chilean upper class was composed of Spaniards born in Europe, the 
"middle class" of creoles, and the lower class of mestizo manual labor-
ers; surviving African slaves and Amerinds were outside the system. 
Creoles, many of whom had accumulated great wealth, did not rep-
resent a true "middle class"; in fact, when it came to who could or 
could not hold high-level public offices, those offspring of the 
European-born aristocracy that had been born in Chile were considered 
to be creoles. Following independence; creoles replaced the European-
born public officials in top-level positions; they also became Chile's 
upper class. A similar transition in the social stratification system 
occurred in Brazil and perhaps less abruptly in the U.S. following in-
dependence. Except for the upward mobility of creoles to the upper 
class following independence, the traditional class structure remained 
unchanged until the early twentieth century in Chile as similarly oc-
curred in Brazil. In both nations, by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the system was undergoing transition as some groups, particularly 
in commerce, attained power. 
In the U.S., several factors affected differentiation with some 
of the predominant influences being industrialization, the Civil War, 
the closing of the frontier, and the emergence of corporate business 
organization. The nouveaux riches, predominantly industrialists and 
financiers, emerged in the North as a result, e.g., of the stimulation 
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of industry during and after the Civil War and the growth of, and in-
vestments in, railroads and mining booms. In the South, landownership 
gradually shifted to farmers who had never owned slaves and, while the 
plantation aristocracy declined, small farmers became increasingly im-
portant in public affairs eventually forming a middle sector. The 
industrialization process and corporate organization contributed to a 
growing middle class but the closing of the frontier and the nature of 
corporate structure contributed to a slowing down of social mobility in 
the U.S. Immigrants of the nineteenth century in Brazil, Chile, and 
the U.S., in their majority, became part of the manual labor force but 
many of their descendants were to become middle-class members in the 
twentieth century. 
It is suggested here that the political decision as to where 
provincial boundaries are geographically drawn is one determinant of 
each province's economic-industrial potential, ethnic composition, 
urban system, and functional linkages that are likely to emerge (a 
similar suggestion can be made in relation to nations). A rural-urban 
cleavage was clear-cut in the U.S. by the end of the nineteenth century 
but less so in Brazil and Chile. Generally, the conflicts emerging 
within the three nations during the nineteenth century were in part due 
to sectionalist differences based on opposing economic interests; in 
part they were due to the emergence of reformism which occurred in the 
U.S. in particular but was paralleled somewhat in Brazil and Chile. 
During the nineteenth century, reform in Brazil and Chile was 
basically limited to a few legislative changes but more so in Chile 
where there had been continual conflict between Liberal reformers and 
58 
Conservatives since independence. In the U.S., the humanitarian move-
ments of the early nineteenth century that pushed for, e.g., prison re-
form, became transformed (with the growing dissatisfaction and demands 
for reform accompanying industrialization, as in Europe, and the rise 
of big business) into organized movements by the end of the century. 
Demands for reform were, however, to become more characteristic of the 
twentieth century than of the nineteenth century in the three nations. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the boundaries of the three 
nations were relatively complete. Having had achieved independence, 
they were both politically and economically linked to the international 
system as world powers but with a basic difference in economic linkages 
that, keeping in mind the numerous contributing factors, can be traced 
directly to the existence (U.S.) or non-existence (Brazil and Chile) of 
an adequate industrial infrastructure prior to industrialization. At 
the close of the century, the U.S. was moving towards an economically 
dominant position internationally; Brazil and Chile were moving towards 
a position of increasing vulnerability by which the viability of their 
economies depended increasingly on the U.S. as well as other more devel-
oped nations and on the international system itself. 
Factors Influencing the Expansion of Functional Linkages 
and Redefinition of Lines of Differentiation 
in the Twentieth.Centtiry 
The twentieth century opened with a growing sense of uneasiness 
both within and between nations. Brazil had already established it-
self as an advocate of arbitratior. and negotiation; Chile consistently 
emphasized neutrality and non-intervention; and the U.S. had come to 
have, although somewhat unwillingly by this time, an "empire." To all 
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three nations, trade was vital--to Brazil and Chile because of their 
export economies and to the U.S. because of the growing need for for-
eign markets and investment sources in order for the economy to con-
tinue to expand. Political and economic functional linkages had al-
ready begun to form among the three nations but it was not until the 
twentieth century that these linkages crystallized first as unity for 
defense and eventually as cooperation in development. The internal de-
mands for change that marked the beginning of the century receded in 
the face of world wars and world-wide depression. It was not until the 
1950s and 1960s that internal demands again came to the forefront. 
World war and depression sharply demonstrated the degree to which 
the international system had become interdependent--economically and 
politically--and the dangers of isolationism. In combination with in-
ternal demands, these events spurred the governments of Brazil, Chile, 
and the U.S. to redefine their international and national roles. Accom-
panied by an expansion of functional linkages at the international and 
national levels, this redefinition was, in large part, a reflection of 
the emerging awareness of the need for planning--social, economic, and 
political--if industrialization and national integration were to become 
realities. 
Emerging Trends in the International System 
The end of isolationism 
The end of isolationism has not necessarily meant involvement in 
the conflicts of other nations. Brazil, in spite of the emphasis on 
arbitration and negotiation, was the only Latin American nation to de-
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clare war (1917) on the Central Powers as well as assist the Allies 
during World War I and participate as a non-belligerent at the Paris 
Peace Conference; similarly, in 1942, Brazil first severed relations 
with the Axis Powers, declared war on Germany and, in 1943, began to 
assist the U.S. in the defense of the Atlantic. Throughout most of the 
twentieth century, Brazil has maintained close ties with the U.S. and, 
similar to Chile (particularly after the world-wide depression), has 
been actively involved in regional and international organizations. 
Chile's foreign policy has been clear-cut and consistent, characteris-
tically: (1) non-involvement in European and U.S. conflicts but in-
terested in trade and development assistance; (2) non-intervention in 
Latin American internal affairs by foreign powers; and (3) emphasis on 
limiting her interests to Latin America. 
By World War I, U.S. "imperialistic" expansion had come to an 
end; the U.S. declared war in 1917, signed the armistice in 1918, and 
returned to isolationism. The rapid economic growth of the 1920s 
sparked by World War I, the depression years, and U.S. involvement in 
World \.Jar II combined to bring the realization of the economic and 
political international interdependence and the need to be actively in-
volved in international affairs. The shift away from isolationism was 
reflected in the U.S. position in relation to Latin America and speci-
fically Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" policy. Franklin Roosevelt's 
Good Neighbor Policy reflected a reversal of the U.S. position and was 
first presented at the 1933 Pan American Conference in Montevideo with 
the U.S. declaration that no nation has the right to intervene in 
another. In large part, this reversal was due to: (1) the poor rela-
tions between the U.S. and Latin America, (2) the growing influence of 
Germany and Italy in Latin America and the need for hemispheric unity 
for mutual defense, and (3) the need to expand trade and investment 
activities in order to maintain a rapid rate of economic growth. 
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The end of isolationism--particularly in Brazil, Chile, and the 
u.s.--resulted from the perception of the need to participate in inter-
national affairs (a) to maintain peace or at least avoid open warfare 
and (b) to maintain economic growth. The concern for maintaining peace 
led to a growing emphasis on peace and hemispheric unity. The concern 
for economic growth led eventually to an emphasis on development plan-
ning. 
Emphasis on peace and arbitration 
This emphasis had long been part of the foreign policy of Brazil. 
In the twentieth century, Chile has been a firm supporter of interna-
tional law and the peaceful resolution of conflict. The use of con-
ciliation and arbitration in settling disputes was the point of dis-
cussion of the Pan American Conferences of 1923 in Santiago (resulting 
in a treaty), 1929 in Washington, and 1936 in Buenos Aires (when 
Roosevelt presented his peace plan consisting primarily in resorting to 
consultation and neutrality if conflict should arise between American 
nations) as well as the 1945 Inter-American Conference on War and Peace 
in Mexico City. In 1945, Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. became charter 
members of the United Nations, one instance in which the pursuit of 
peace and arbitration contributed to the emergence of international or-
ganizations. 
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Emphasis on hemispheric unity 
Particularly after 1914, both the bases for a growing emphasis on 
hemispheric unity and the continuing factors underlying disunity were 
inter-American defense and economic relations. Defense agreements have 
included the 1938 Declaration of Lima in which 21 American nations 
stated that they would unite in the defense of their abolute sover-
eignty against foreign intervention, the creation of the Inter-American 
Defense Board at the 1942 Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro 
to organize hemispheric defense, the Act of Chapultepec signed at the 
1945 Inter-American Conference in Mexico City by which 19 American na-
tions agreed to mutual defense if any were attacked, the Inter-American 
Mutual Assistance Treaty in 1947, and the 1952 military assistance pact 
between Chile and the U.S. for the defense of the hemisphere. 
Discussions of common economic problems had begun early in the 
century. Trade relations improved after 1929. Transportation changes 
linked the nations more closely; the Panama Canal had opened in 1914 
and by the end of 1941 the Pan-American Highway was two-thirds con-
structed. During and after World War II, inter-American relations be-
came characterized by agreements combining defense and economic inter-
ests; contributing to this trend was legislation in the U.S. designed 
to aid developing areas. 
The turning point in inter-American relations around 1945 was 
based on the second factor underlying hemispheric disunity--the ques-
tion of the degree to which Latin American nations were economically 
independent once the U.S. became the dominant economic power in Latin 
America. In addition, after the 1945 conference in Mexico City, the 
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u.s. became more involved in other areas of the world and less con-
cerned with the Good Neighbor Policy; Latin American nations then de-
veloped a more independent economic policy that lasted until the 1960s 
although defense agreements continued to be reached during this period. 
There was renewed interest in economic cooperation, e.g., with 
the 1961 Alliance for Progress Charter, but a new low in inter-American 
relations was reached with U.S. intervention in the 1965 civil war in 
the Dominican Republic. The subsequent improvement in relations was in 
part due to Brazil's position, as has often occurred, of intermediary 
(one source of conflict with other Latin American nations) between the 
U.S. and Latin America after 1967. 
Chile has continued to be more independent of political and eco-
nomic interference (but not completely) from more developed nations than 
has the rest of Latin America and more interested in maintaining close 
ties with other Latin American nations. Despite the fluctuations in 
inter-American relations, defense and economic relations remain impor-
tant to the three nations in this study and, particularly since World 
War II, the predominant theme has been "cooperation in development," 
related both to the emphasis on development planning and the role of 
international organizations. 
Emphasis on development planning and the role 
of government in economic decision making 
Two world wars, the 1920-1921 "slump," and the 1930s depression 
sharply demonstrated the particular dangers of having an export economy. 
Wartime brought economic prosperity to Brazil and Chile with the demands 
for raw materials and to the U.S. with defense expenditures. The slow-
ing down of economic growth in peacetime jointly with the economic 
crises of the twentieth century led to an awareness of the need for 
planning which had already begun by World War II. This recognition of 
the need for planning was evident in the government intervention fol-
lowing the 1929 depression in the U.S. (New Deal legislation) as well 
as Brazil and Chile. The government role in the economy has increased 
since this period in all three nations. 
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The increase in the role of government in the economies of Brazil 
and Chile can primarily be viewed as a requisite for economic growth 
because these two nations are characterized by (1) export economies and 
(2) the lack of an adequate industrial infrastructure prior to indus-
trialization. The Brazilian and Chilean governments have been most 
active in economic decision making as this relates to the major exports, 
import substitution industrialization, and agrarian reform. 
In the twentieth century, the major exports have been nitrates 
(which lost importance with the development of synthetic nitrates) and 
copper in Chile, rubber and coffee in Brazil. Copper did not contrib-
ute to rapid economic growth in Chile for two related reasons: (a) the 
government ignored the copper industry until 1955 when legislation was 
passed to encourage production and (b) export earnings were affected 
not only by competition from other copper-producing nations, but in 
addition, U.S. companies owned and began to operate El Teniente in 1905 
and Chuquicamata in 1913, the two largest copper mines in Chile. By 
1964, Chile's copper production ranked second in the world but the de-
cline in copper prices in 1970 brought the mining sector to a stand-
still. Although of greater regional than national importance in Brazil, 
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the decline in rubber production (peak period: 1910-1912) because of 
the beginning of competition from rubber plantations in the East Indies 
combined with the imbalances in the coffee cycle led to economic prob-
lems. Government intervention in the coffee cycle and competition from 
coffee-producing African nations contributed to making this a widely 
fluctuating cycle. As one consequence, coffee planting shifted to 
~aran{ State (susceptible to frosts, sandy soil poor for growing coffee) 
from Sao Paulo where many coffee growers switched to other crops. 
Brazil's coffee production dropped from 80 per cent of the world total 
in 1925 to 37 per cent in 1968-1969. Although industrialization had 
begun long before the 1960s, fluctuations in coffee prices continued to 
seriously affect the economy. 
By 1914, small-scale industry had emerged in Chile primarily con-
sisting in the refining of sugar, textiles, iron processing, and cement. 
Industrialization increased at an uneven pace after the late 1930s, but 
particularly since 1945, import substitution and protectionist trade 
policies have resulted in greater production and less imports of con-
sumer goods while capital goods (machinery, tools, etc.) have repre-
sented a growing proportion of total imports (26 per cent in 1952 and 
about 35 per cent in 1966). Still, import substitution serves only as 
a beginning phase of industrialization; as ECLA (1966) indicates, Chile 
has long passed this point such that import substitution policies are 
no longer effective. It is an illustration of substitutability as an 
obstacle to further industrialization. In 1939, the Corporaci6n de 
Fomento de la Producci~n (Development Corporation) or CORFO, the first 
development agency in Latin America, was created to plan and supervise 
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industrialization; ODEPLAN (National Planning Office) was later created 
as a coordinating agency of all economic planning in Chile. CORFO is 
responsible for most government investment including: (a) direct own-
ership and control of petroleum, electricity, LAN-Chile airline, the 
railroads (80 per cent are government-owned), and shipping and (b) joint 
control with the private sector (corporate) of the major iron and steel 
works. Oil exploration began in 1942 and the Empresa Nacional Petrolera 
or ENAP (National Petroleum Company) meets all gasoline and over two-
thirds of crude oil needs of Chile. The per capita consumption of elec-
tricity generated primarily by the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad or 
ENDESA (National Electric Enterprise) ranks first in Latin America. 
Brazilian industry evolved due to the impact of World War I and 
immigration from the crafts phase at the beginning of the twentieth 
century to textiles and other small-scale industry in the 1930s. Eco-
nomic decision making has been controlled by the Brazilian government 
since 1930 in recognition of the need for economic planning, although 
it had intervened prior to this. The 1930s and early 1940s represented 
a transition period that lasted until the close of World War II; in this 
phase, the production of non-durables was stimulated by the restricted 
import capacity (because of the depression) and by World War II. Fol-
lowing the war was the "take-off" period characterized predominantly by 
import substitution industrialization emphasizing heavy industry and 
limiting exports to surpluses (1947-1963); since the substitution of 
non-durable goods had already occurred, with the result that imports 
were mostly manufactured goods, the Brazilian government's import sub-
stitution policies encouraged rapid industrialization. However, global 
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development planning has not been realized with the exception of Celso 
Furtado's three-year plan which was put into effect in 1962. A serious 
attempt at planning first occurred under Kubitschek and now concentrates 
on: (a) transportation and power, (b) basic industries, and (c) less 
developed regions of Brazil with development agencies created for the 
Northeast, Amazon, and Southwest. Castelo Branco's Program of Economic 
Action for 1964-1966 reflected a "development strategy" emphasizing the 
private sector (agriculture in particular) and policies to control in-
flation followed by the 1967-1972 "strategy of the new economists" with 
similar goals but more flexible programs, and since mid-1970, a "devel-
opmental ideology" or the "challenge of the interior." About 70 per 
cent of imports are required to meet basic production-consumption needs 
but wheat is the only food staple in which Brazil is not self-sufficient. 
The central government of Brazil in the 1960s directly controlled or in-
tervened in production and investment in shipping and transportation, 
petroleum, steel, electric energy, exports, iron, exchange and capital 
markets, banking and credit, wages and prices, and private investment. 
One of the principal factors contributing to extremely uneven in-
come distribution and slow development in Latin America is the planta-
tion or latifundia system of land tenure. Thus, many writers such as 
Feder (1971), Beckford (1972), and Barraclough and Domike (1970) empha-
size the need to replace the existing counter-productive system; to 
achieve this transformation, drastic measures in agrarian reform are 
necessary. In Chile, economic difficulties have had their source not 
only in the heavy reliance on the mining sector for exports but also 
in chronically low agricultural productivity. The government has inter-
68 
vened in the agricultural sector in two major ways: 
1. Governmental policies to reduce the cost of living have included 
price controls in agriculture and the subsidization of food imports 
while taxing agricultural output with the result of reducing the in-
centives to invest and to increase production in agriculture. The 
degree of mechanization and farming techniques remain far from 
adequate. 
2. Government attempts to alter the system of land distribution and 
tenure that has contributed to low productivity accomplished little 
until the 1962 Agrarian Reform Law and later the 1967 Agrarian Re-
form Law. Some of the changes that were expected to result from 
these and related legislative acts were a decline in the concentra-
tion of landownership, a reduction of the problem of "absentee 
landlords," and a slowing down of the rural-urban flow which had 
inhibited agricultural production by too great a loss of rural man-
power in recent years. By June of 1970, CORA (Agrarian Reform 
Corporation) had expropriated 1,319 landholdings (3,408,783 has.). 
Mechanization of agriculture has also been slow in Brazil; the 
government has not effectively altered the dual technology (advanced 
vs. traditional labor-intensive) in agriculture in many regions. Pro-
ductive connnercial agriculture tends to be concentrated in the southern 
third of Brazil while subsistence farming predominates.elsewhere. In 
addition, the characteristic "boom-bust" nature (Margolis, 1973: 1-.2) 
of Brazilian agriculture has led to the rapid destruction of forests and 
to extensive soil erosion. Agricultural production has been affected 
by similar problems as in Chile, i.e., concentrated ownership of the 
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land and extensive subsistence farming as well as rapid rural-urban mi-
gration. Agrarian reform was a dominant issue in the 1960s; of eleven 
major proposals, three agrarian laws were passed. However, in both 
Brazil and Chile, landholdings of less than 10 has. (indicating subsis-
tence farming) increased in number while every other category showed a 
decline suggesting only partial success in agrarian reform in the 1960s. 
In contrast to the export economies of Brazil and Chile, the U.S. 
had, by World War I, a "modern domestic market economy" (Fite and Reese, 
1973:333) based on mass production, mass consumption, and a mass market 
which continued to expand throughout the century. Similar to Brazil 
and Chile, the government role in economic affairs increased but, as 
Fite and Reese (1973:424) point out, this occurred ironically during a 
period of strong resistance to government intervention. The general 
areas in which the U.S. government has intervened in the economy in this 
century are: 
1. Trade. Policies in this area were designed to stimulate the export 
sector and particularly to protect U.S. industry. 
2. New Deal legislation and emergence of a mixed economy. The gov-
ernment had previously intervened in the economy, e.g., by exten-
sive controls and planning during World War I, but it was after 
1920 that this role in economic affairs steadily and consistently 
increased. The expansion of this role occurred most rapidly and 
extensively with the New Deal legislation that covered all aspects 
of the economy; by World War II, the U.S. had a mixed economy based 
on private enterprise but with the role of government from 1950 to 
post-1970 becoming increasingly important (particularly in terms of 
employment and government contracts) as in Brazil and Chile. 
3. Agriculture. The government has intervened to a lesser degree in 
this area than is the case in Brazil and Chile. Major legislation 
related to agriculture has pertained primarily to conservation of 
resources (e.g., the 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment 
Act) and controls over production (e.g., the soil bank plan in the 
1956 Agriculture Act to reduce surpluses and a series of legisla-
tive acts designed to raise or lower price supports for agricul-
tural products). Contrary to the trend in Brazil and Chile, there 
has been a decline in small holdings in the U.S. and an increase 
in large landholdings. 
In the twentieth century, the impact of international crises on 
national economies contributed, in large part, to the emergence of the 
need for planning and to the increasing role of government in economic 
decision making to resolve immediate crises and to be responsible for 
national planning. The emphases on peace and arbitration, hemispheric 
unity, and development planning have jointly contributed to the emer-
gence and increasing importance of international organizations in this 
century. 
Emergence of international organizations 
Increasingly, international organizations have been the means in 
the twentieth century of achieving objectives similar to those under-
lying hemispheric unity, i.e., cooperation in the resolution of, and 
readiness for, conflict and in e~onomic development. These objectives 
are evident in the membership of Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. in, e.g., 
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the United Nations and most of its agencies, the Organization of Amer-
ican States created in 1948, the Alliance for Progress, and the Inter-
American Development Bank (!DB). One or both objectives are apparent 
in, e.g., U.S. membership in NATO and membership of Brazil and Chile 
in the Economic Conunission for Latin America (ECLA). Lastly, pertain-
ing to an issue touching on development, Chile created an affiliate of 
International Planned Parenthood in 1965, the first Latin American na-
tion to do so (Sanders, 196 7: 1) . 
It is suggested here that, with the current emphasis on the im-
portance of planning, nations are drawn into international organiza-
tions because: (a) to resolve common problems cooperatively is viewed 
as the most efficient means available of problem solving, (b) to re-
sort to these means enhances the possibility of meeting internal de-
mands and reducing potential or actual unrest, and (c) to utilize the 
assistance, e.g., loans through IDB and IBRD, is an alternative to, or 
a means of reducing, economic dependency (e.g., of Brazil and Chile) 
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on specific more developed nations (e.g., the U.S.). The objectives of 
peace and arbitration, hemispheric unity, development planning, and in-
ternational organizations have, in part, contributed to an additional 
trend--the increasing importance of the military. 
Growth in importance of the military 
At a practical level, defense spending has aided the U.S. econ~ 
omy and has continued to increase since the renewed emphasis on mili-
tary strength during the Korean War. In contrast, the rejuvenation of 
Brazilian and Chilean economies during wartime has not been primarily 
due to defense expenditures which, although proportionately less in 
Brazil and Chile than in the U.S. (Kemp, 1973:196-199), signify fewer 
financial resources for development needs. This difficulty, accompa-
nied by a basic governmental concern to maintain a "modernly equipped" 
military force, is alleviated in part by military assistance loans 
viewed as essential because of the recognition that the maintenance of 
peace and unity for defense require military preparedness. 
The growing importance of the military is of particular signi-
ficance in Brazil and Chile where military rule began (most recently) 
in 1964 and 1973, respectively. It is suggested that this transition 
is due in part to the recognition that national planning, to be maxi-
mally effective, must occur in a setting in which internal unrest is 
minimized. Whether or not "coercive regimes" actually reduce unrest 
(Feierabend and Feierabend, 1972:924-925) is not the issue here. 
Rather, a military regime may come to be defined by the nation or by 
key groups within the nation as the only alternative in order to mini-
mize unrest, a tendency that is possibly stronger in nations with a 
history of military involvement in the political arena. 
In the twentieth century, international crises have contributed 
to periods of internal unrest in Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. in part 
because of necessary measures taken by governments to stabilize the 
economy. However, internal discontent, as well as the growing im-
portance of the military, emerged also because of an awareness of the 
polarization (economic and political) of the world and of the internal 
unevenness of development. 
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Polarization of the world 
Latin American nations have tended to remain non-aligned in the 
process of political polarization although, after 1964, Brazil became 
allied with the U.S. especially in combatting "insurgency'' in the 
Western Hemisphere and in isolating Cuba. Polarization has been, how-
ever, economic as well as political. Technological changes have come 
at an accelerating rate in the U.S. since 1920; concomitant to scien-
tific advances were rapid improvements in living conditions. In 1970, 
the U.S. had an infant mortality rate of 20.7; it was 78.8 in Chile and 
an estimated 85-95 in Brazil (112 in 1964). In 1970, there were 600 
persons per physician in the U.S.; in Chile and Brazil, there were 
2,000. In 1972, the U.S. had 62.8 telephones per 100 persons; Chile 
had 4.1 and Brazil had 2.2. Steel consumption per capita was 663 
kilograms in the U.S. in 1972; it was 89 in Chile and 77 in Brazil. 
Between 1950 and 1970, not only did developed nations benefit 
more than did developing nations from the rapid economic expansion 
within the international system; the system itself ceased to be bi-
polar (ECLA, 1973) as U.S. dominance declined, Western European and 
Japanese economies expanded, and socialist economies became part of the 
developed sector. The political dilemma of non-alignment versus align-
ment for Latin America has been, however, partly due to the emergence 
of U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere in this century and the attempts--
with limited success--of Latin American nations to become less dependent 
economically. In the mid-1960s, Brazil and Chile attempted to estab-. 
lish closer ties with Africa and Asia mainly in trade relations but by 
1970 this trend had been reversed. 
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Emergence of U.S. hegemony in Latin America 
The 11 political11 influence of the U.S. has been mediated largely 
through inter-American organizations and bilateral agreements. Al-
though other developed nations are playing an increasingly more im-
portant role in Latin America, the U.S. continues to be the single, most 
important in economic relationships. The political and economic link-
ages that formed between the U.S. and Latin America in the twentieth 
century contributed to the emergence of U.S. hegemony and, correspond-
ingly, Latin American dependence in terms of trade, investment, and 
(~conomic, technical, and military) assistance. If economic dependency 
is an obstacle to Latin American development, then conversely U.S. 
hegemony (Furtado, 1970:65-67) has also become an obstacle. 
The U.S. continues to be one of the major sources of economic 
assistance to Brazil and the main source of foreign investment in Chile 
since 1939. As maritime nations, trade is vitally important to Brazil, 
Chile, and the U.S. and it is in this area where U.S. hegemony is ap-
parent as is the attempt of Brazil and Chile to reduce the role of the 
U.S. Although there has been less reliance on the U.S., it continues 
to be an important trading partner of both Brazil and Chile. 
Increasing economic dependency is now more characteristically 
financial-technological in contrast to capitalistic-commercial depen-
dency (Perlman, 1976:254) during import substitution industrialization. 
This trend is due in part to expanding financial ties. It is also due, 
however, to the transfer of a technology during and after import sub-
stitution that is too advanced for the existing economies and needs of 
Latin American nations; in the international system, it is the multi-
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national corporation (Clark, 1975:6, 19; Chase-Dunn, 1975:721) that has 
the greatest access to this technology. The impact of technology and 
foreign investment of the U.S. (and other nations) on Latin American 
economic dependency is therefore related to the growing influence of 
multinational corporations, another contributing factor to this depen-
dency. 
Emergence of multinational corporations 
U.S. economic expansionism reflected, in part, the growth of 
corporations within the U.S. and their extension overseas after 1945 
as was the case with other more developed nations. The impact of 
multinational corporations can be seen both in the importance of for-
eign direct investment for national economic growth and the signifi-
cance of foreign control over national industries. Although there does 
not exist an overall consensus over whether or not foreign investment 
contributes to economic growth (nor do the data justify absolute con-
clusions), it is asserted that U.S. investment in Chile has made a 
significant contribution and, similarly, that the establishment of 
foreign manufacturing companies in Brazil was largely responsible for 
Brazil's rapid industrialization and economic growth. 
A contrary assertion (Baklanoff, 1966:101-136) is that foreign 
investment in Brazil has not made a significant contribution to eco-
nomic growth although, since foreign investment represents "modern" 
technology, it would contribute to rapid development if it were to 
operate jointly with national entrepreneurship (which has not emerged 
because of the implantation of foreign corporate control). Brazilian 
economic policy makers have traditionally been anti-foreign investment 
except between 1955 and 1962; at the same time national investment in 
industrialization has been restricted by the difficulty of financing 
the import of machinery and equipment in particular. 
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One-third of Brazilian industry is controlled by foreign direct 
investment from the U.S., England, France, Germany, Japan, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Canada, Holland, and Argentina; these industries are petro-
leum, chemicals, machinery and appliances, steel, electricity, pharma-
ceuticals, automobiles, foodstuffs, plastics, and ship-building. Japan 
has become increasingly important, investing more in, and selling more 
products to, Brazil than any other nation. 
By 1970, over 100 U.S.-controlled corporations were operating in 
Chile (Cockcroft et al., 1973:4, 12-13) as well as European and Japanese 
firms. The U.S.-owned copper mines (prior to nationalization) had been 
one of the basic sources of conflict between the U.S. and Chile in this 
century and it has been in copper that most U.S. investments have been 
made. In addition to foreign control of copper and nitrates, foreign 
companies in Chile in 1970 controlled: 45 per cent of rubber products; 
50 per cent of machinery and equipment and petroleum; 60 per cent of 
iron, steel, and metal products and chemicals; 90 per cent of adver-
tising; almost 100 per cent of radio, television, pharmaceuticals, and 
office equipment; and 100 per cent of automotive assembly, copper fabri-
cating, and tobacco. 
Both U.S. hegemony and awareness of the impact of multinational 
corporations have sparked a movement in Latin America labelled and led 
by President Frei of Chile, i.e., the ''Latinization" Movement. 
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Emergence of the "Latinization" Movement 
The "Latinization" Movement developed in the 1960s with the ob-
jectives of expanding economic relations among Latin American nations 
and reducing the political and economic hegemony of the U.S., particu-
larly in regional organizations. This has been evident in three major 
areas: 
1. Creation of common markets. Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay created LAFTA (Latin American Free 
Trade Association) in 1961 on the basis of research conducted by 
ECLA in the 1950s; the basic objective is to cooperate in import 
substitution industrialization at a regional rather than national 
level by developing a system of exchange of the industrial products 
of each of the member nations. A second common market, the Grupo 
Andino (Andean Group) made up of Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Venezuela was agreed to in 1966 (created in 1967) with the basic 
objective of increasing the flow of trade by reducing trade barriers 
among the member nations. Trade relations among Latin American na-
tions had not, however, significantly changed by 1969; one basic 
difficulty is the transportation networks constructed by Europeans 
for overseas and not intra-regional trade. Of the total Chilean 
foreign trade, 99 per cent is shipped by ocean transport. Similarly, 
for international and intra-regional trade, Brazil still relies on 
ocean transport predominantly. Still, ECLA's (1966) studies indi-
cate transportation to be one area in which some progress has been 
made--most specifically since 1964. 
2. Nationalization. In Brazil, nationalization began with public 
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utilities in 1962 and all private oil refineries in 1964. In Chile, 
the Anaconda Company (copper) was nationalized in 1969 and the en-
tire copper industry was nationalized in 1971. 
3. Expansion of trade relations to other world regions. During the 
period of "economic nationalism" (1951-1964)~ Brazil established 
trade relations with Eastern Europe and developing nations in Asia 
and Africa; with the re-establishment of close relations with the 
U.S. and renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and Western 
Europe, Brazil lessened the relations with Africa and Asia but main-
tained ties with Eastern Europe. Chile's closest relations have 
continued to be with Western Europe while relations with the U.S., 
although lessening, remain important. Under Frei's administration, 
Chile re-established relations with communist nations and, as 
Brazil had earlier done, emphasized cooperation with Africa. 
The linkages between the U.S. and Latin America continue to be 
important. Whether or not it is a question of U.S. hegemony versus 
Latin American dependence remains an open question in the literature. 
The issue for Latin America is one of continuing cooperation through 
I 
regional and international organizations but with Latin American leaders 
having a greater voice in determining the paths that these organizations 
and their nations will follow. In part, this position is a reflection 
of the recognition that social, economic, and political problems and 
needs vary among nations and that planning must take this into account 
if it is to be effective. ECLA's (1973) studies substantiate the obser-
vations made by several writers including Stallings (1972), Bodenheimer 
0971), Clark (1975), Perlman (1976), Rubinson (1976), and Beckford 
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(1972) that: Latin American nations must analyze their situation--
social, economic, and political--and determine the most realistic solu-
tions; to do so they cannot rely upon foreign technology nor foreign-
trained manpower but, rather, must develop an appropriate technology 
and train their own manpower; and, lastly, only when dependency de-
clines, will Latin American nations begin to share in the economic ex-
pansion within the international system. 
Not only has the "Latinization" Movement been defined in terms 
of a nation's linkages to the international system but it is also high-
\ 
lighted by the awareness of uneven development internally in the U.S. 
as well as Brazil, Chile, and other Latin American nations. In turn, 
this awareness has produced internal demands for social, economic, and 
political reform. 
The Rise of Internal Demands for the Expansion 
of Functional Linkages within 
National Systems 
Brazil and Chile have been characterized by discontent throughout 
the twentieth century whereas the U.S. has experienced more distinct 
periods in which internal demands for change predominated. However, in-
ternal demands and the government response to these demands appear to 
have passed through three general and often overlapping phases in Brazil, 
Chile, and the U.S. in this century: early reform, conservative reac-
tion, and renewal in reform. 
Early reform period 
During this period, the governments of Brazil, Chile, and the u.s. 
met some demands with legislation. The Progressive Movement that had 
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begun in the nineteenth century in the U.S. continued until 1917 and the 
outbreak of World War I; many political and economic reforms advocated 
by this movement became legislation, e.g., workmen's compensation laws. 
In Brazil and Chile, demands for change were organized but as conflict 
between groups rather than as a "movement" (which has been associated 
more as a concomitant of industrialization in Europe and the U.S.). 
The 1901 election of Riesco as president of Chile signalled the 
rise of the "reformist" Liberal Party; demands for reform that had al-
ready begun among labor groups in the last century increased as a re-
sult of World War I and the economic measures necessarily taken by the 
government as a result of the depression. While Arturo Alessandri 
(candidate of labor and the middle class), elected in 1920, was an ad-
vocate of reform, it was Ib£nez (1927-1931) who put many of his reforms 
into effect. The reform legislation passed in the 1920s included the 
1925 Constitution of Chile which was in itself a body of social and 
labor legislation, the Social Security Law (1924), and the Labor Code 
(1931)--the first labor code in the Western Hemisphere. Reforms con-
tinued until 1938 in Chile but so too did labor unrest which Morris 
(1966) explains as symptomatic of labor's non-participation in there-
form process legislated by the ruling elite; this unrest is, in addi-
tion, illustrative of the emergence of combined "ideological-class 
conflict" that has continued in Chile throughout this century. 
In Brazil, economic reforms were initiated as a consequence of 
abortive military revolts (1922 Tenentes' or Lieutenants' Revolt and 
1924 revolt in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul); the most sudden change 
was the combination of middle-class and junior military officers' forces 
that helped Vargas put an end to the "Old Republic" in 1930. In 1933, 
a series of social and political reforms were initiated by the Vargas 
adtn.inistration. 
Conservative reactionary period 
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During this phase, governments met demands for reform with con-
servatism and restrictive legislation. In the U.S., rapid change con-
tinued but the reformist demands that ended in 1917 did not recur until 
the 1960s. Post-1917 emerging trends in the U.S. illustrate some de-
gree of fluctuation in the government's approach but they do imply an 
underlying tendency to become increasingly restrictive between 1917 and 
1960 as seen in the following: governmental reaction (conservatism) 
predominated in the 1920s; Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s was refor-
mist but did not effectively confront poverty or the basic problems 
faced by minority groups; Truman's FaiT Deal did not receive Congres-
sional approval in large part because of a return once again to con-
servatism; widespread labor unrest and large-scale strikes followed on 
the heels of World War II; and then the McCarthy "era" began and, in 
1954, the Communist Party was outlawed. 
In Chile, discontent continued in spite of reforms in a period 
characterized by conflict between opposing ideologies as seen, e.g., 
in the abortive revolt of the Fascists prior to the election of a 
Socialist government in 1938. The growth of communism among labor in 
the 1940s resulted in a period marked by violent strikes (1947-1948) 
and the outlawing of the Chilean Communist Party in 1948 (legalized in 
1958). 
Government reaction against communism i.n Brazil began much earlier 
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and overlapped with the early reform period of the late 1920s and early 
1930s; strong anti-communist measures and anti-strike legislation were 
put into effect in 1927. Unrest grew in the early 1930s as illustrated, 
e.g., by the abortive revolt in Sao Paulo, the increasing popularity of 
radicalism and communism among workers and fascism among members of the 
middle class, and the abortive Communist-led revolt (1935) in Pernam-
buco and Rio de Janeiro that resulted in martial law, censorship, and 
the trial of Communist leaders. Soon after, Vargas declared his Estado 
N3vo, a "benign dictatorship" that lasted from 1937 to 1945. The 
"Democratic Era" (1945-1964) was a period of political and economic 
disorganization although conflict was relatively absent except in the 
Northeast (contributing to the little success of SUDENE which already 
lacked government support prior to 1964). Reformist demands had in-
creased in Brazil 1937-1964, rising particularly from a growing working 
class. The response to these demands was a reflection of the continu-
ation of a political elite from the traditional upper class (landed 
aristocracy) combined with a slowly emerging bourgeoisie that identi-
fied with upper-class interests. The economic reforms included in 
legislation passed between 1937 and 1964 were reforms in name only; in 
actuality, they were never put into effect. 
Renewal in reform 
During this phase, governments again developed reformist legis-
lation in response to internal demands. Fite and Reese (1973:472) 
point out that the post-1950 U.S. has been characterized by the three 
"themes" of "development of an affluent society, war, and the contra-
dictory problem of poverty." The renewed demands for socio-economic 
reform in the mid-1960s (extending into the 1970s) dealt with issues 
similar to those during the Progressive Era: peace marches protesting 
the war in Viet Nam, university protests related both to the war and to 
education, poverty marches, civil rights' protests, and conservation. 
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It was also a period marked by assassinations: John F. Kennedy (1963), 
Malcolm X (1965), and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy 
(1968). The U.S. government responded to the reformist demands with ex-
tensive legislation. 
A similar response occurred in Chile with the election of Frei in 
1964. Frei's election has been interpreted as mass support (Frei re-
ceived 56.1 per cent of the vote, Allende received 38.9 per cent) for 
his non-violent, gradual, socio-economic reform program that was pur-
sued until the 1970 election of Allende (who received 36.2 per cent of 
the vote, Alessandri received 34.9 per cent). The role of the middle 
class in Brazil and Chile has been negligible in reformism; generally, 
demands for change have arisen from the working class but organized de-
mands for change in Chile have come from political parties (especially 
the Christian Democrats) and the Catholic Church (active in land re-
form, vocational and technical education, formation of credit unions 
and cooperatives). 
In Brazil, the government since 1964 has responded to some demands 
with reform. Economic discontent was one of the basic reasons for the 
1964 military coup. Since the coup, it has been mainly in economic 
planning that changes have occurred (Dutra's 1946-1951 administration 
is the only military regime in Brazil characterized by "economic mis-
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management") with middle- and upper-class support of the military's nee-
capitalist orientation (i.e., gradual growth emphasizing efficient re-
source allocation and solutions to immediate rather than long-run prob-
lems) to economic planning. The military has not been as successful in 
initiating basic reform in other areas, e.g., in low- and medium-income 
housing (especially in favelas), mass political participation, educa-
tion, agrarian reform, and social welfare. 
Reminiscent of Andreski's (1966) thesis that ruling classes and 
traditional Latin American economies are "parasitic" with the only pos-
sible means of change being subversion, the demands for reform in 
Brazil have become violent particularly since 1968 as seen in student 
demonstrations and the emergence of urban guerrilla and terrorist move-
ments characterized by kidnapings of foreign officials (including the 
U.S. ambassador) and bombings. This activity also supports the argu-
ment of Feierabend and Feierabend (1972:924) that "coercive regimes" 
generate rather than reduce unrest and violence in the population. 
Government reaction in Brazil is illustrated by the death of one 
of the most important leaders in the urban terrorist movement (Carlos 
Marighela, former Communist Deputy in Congress), shot by Sao Paulo 
police in 1969. The Catholic Church in Brazil, as in Chile, has been 
active in demanding reform with one of the most well-known leaders being 
Dom Helder c1mara; the government has also reacted against these demands 
rather than respond to them with reform measures as shown in the in-
creasing number of arrests of Catholic priests for "subversive activi-
ties." 
During the 1960s, the U.S. and Chile experienced a return to 
reformist governments in contrast to a combination of reform and re-
pression in Brazil; all three nations, however, experienced increas-
ing demands for reform during this decade. The effect of the response 
to these demands is expected to be reflected in the research findings 
in this study. 
Summary of twentieth-century trends 
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In summary, during the twentieth century, the concerns of peace 
and economic growth brought Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. out of isola-
tionism and formed the basis of regional (hemispheric) and interna-
tional cooperation. The organizations that emerged have increasingly 
become agencies through which development planning and funding for de-
velopment are channeled. The increasing political and economic polari-
zation within the international system contributed, on the one hand, to 
the national, regional, and international emphasis on the importance of 
the military; on the other hand, it contributed to the awareness of the 
unevenness of development that led to the "Latinization" Movement to re-
duce U.S. hegemony in Latin America. The recognition of uneven devel-
opment internally in Brazil, Chile, and the U.S., it has been suggested, 
led to a resurgence of internal demands for change to more evenly dis-
tribute socio-economic and political participation in the benefits ac-
companying industrialization. The basic question of this study of 1960 
and 1970 data for Brazil, Chile, and the United States is a simple one; 
i.e., was industrialization accompanied by national integration in 
Brazil, Chile, and/or the United States? 
CHAPTER V 
FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES AND LINES OF DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN 
NATIONAL SYSTEHS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND NATIONAL 
DATA ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL, CHILE, AND THE UNITED 
STATES BY PROVINCE FOR 1960 AND 1970 
Relative Importance of the Selected Variables for 
Brazil, Chile, and the United States 
The Control Variables: Ethnicity and Rural-Urban 
Residence as Continuing Lines of 
Differentiation 
Ethnicity as a line of differentiation 
The potential importance of ethnicity, specifically European vs. 
non-European ancestry, as a control variable stems from its relation-
ship to, and changes in the definition of, the stratification system. 
In the twentieth century, the Brazilian two-class system of landed 
aristocracy and rural peasantry has expanded to include four emerging 
intermediate strata (nouveaux riches, urban middle class, urban lower 
class, rural proletariat); the Chilean stratification system now con-
sists in (1) an upper class of landed aristocracy and nouveaux riches, 
(2) the predominantly urban middle class, and (3) the working class of 
manual laborers. 
"Racial democracy" in Brazil and "racial homogeneity" in Chile 
have become controversial issues in this century in relation to deter-
minants of social class and upward social mobility. In both nations, 
occupation has become the most important single determinant of social 
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class. Evidence of discrimination or the lack of equal opportunity and 
education in Brazil has been cited especially in the case of blacks, 
mulattoes, Amerinds, and mestizos; two groups are treated as unassimi-
lated--the Japanese and the Amerinds. The middle position in the de-
bate between Freyre's (1963:354-431; also see Freyre, 1956) consistent 
theme that Brazil is a "racial democracy" and the argument that "racial 
democracy" in Brazil is a myth (Ianni, 1970:258) is that discrimination 
is stronger by class than by race; "white" is defined by life style, 
family, education, and occupation (white-collar vs. blue-collar); and 
"skin color" becomes increasingly important as local competition to 
enter the upper class becomes stronger. 
Gil (1966:33) presents Chileans' view of themselves as the "myth 
of race homogeneity" by which Chileans define themselves as not being 
mestizos and having "no Indian problem." In the controversy over the 
importance of ancestry in Chile, the view of social scientists is not 
in direct opposition but is one suggesting that ethnicity operates 
"mildly" as one factor in the stratification system; the population was 
already decidedly mestizo by the beginning of this century and there is 
a tendency, as in Brazil, for occupation and income to be lower and for 
upward social mobility to be more difficult as skin color becomes 
darker. Evidence of discrimination against Amerinds has been suggested 
but perhaps the most extreme position concerning ethnicity in Chile is 
represented by Morris (1966) who asserts that much of the persisting 
labor-related conflicts between groups is based on "racism." 
There is no attempt made here to review the extensive literature 
substantiating the association between social class and ethnicity in 
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the U.S. since there is consensus among social scientists that an asso-
ciation does exist and that ethnicity continues to be a line of differ-
entiation within the U.S. The "non-white" population in the U.S. was 
11.4 per cent of the total population in 1960 and 12.6 per cent in 1970 
(not varying greatly from 12.5 per cent in 1890 to the low of 10.2 per 
cent in 1930 and 1940). The 1960 and 1970 provincial data have a mean 
percentage non-European of 11.65 in 1960 and 11.82 in 1970; the standard 
deviation was 13.11 in 1960 and 11.51 in 1970; extreme values were 0.2 
and 68.0 per cent in 1960, 0.4 and 61.2 per cent in 1970. 
Of Brazil's total population, 36.6 per cent were of non-European 
ancestry in 1940 and 38.4 per cent in 1950; the estimate for 1960 was 
that non-Europeans made up about the same proportion of the population 
as in 1950. Because of the 1951 Afonso Arinos Law (prohibiting police 
reports, employment application forms, and census questionnaires from 
mention of skin color), the 1950 Brazilian census was the last to clas-
sify individuals according to ethnicity but it was by self-definition 
as it has been in the U.S. beginning with the 1960 census. Chile's 
population of non-European ancestry includes Amerinds and mestizos esti-
mated to jointly make up 70 per cent of the total population in 1952 
with a relatively even distribution by province except in those where 
/ the Amerind population is concentrated (Malleco, Caut1n, and adjacent 
provinces); similar to Brazil, the Chilean census after 1952 does not 
include information concerning ethnic composition nor are data available 
on the basis of which estimates could be made for provinces. Since the 
literature on Brazil and Chile suggests stability in ethnic composition 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1950 data for Brazilian provinces and 1952 
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provincial estimates for Chile were held constant for 1960 and 1970. 
The mean percentage of non-European ancestry is 48.1 for Brazil and 
71.48 for Chile; the standard deviation is 20.82 for Brazil and 4.14 for 
Chile; extreme values are 5.4 and 72.9 per cent for Brazil, 70.0 and 
88.3 per cent for Chile. The cross-cultural combination of cases has a 
mean percentage of non-European ancestry of 35.72 in 1960 and 35.80 in 
1970; the standard deviation is 29.13 in 1960 and 28.72 in 1970; ex-
treme values are 0.2 and 88.3 per cent in 1960, 0.4 and 88.3 per cent in 
1970. 
Detailed examination of the data that are available for Brazil and 
Chile does not instill confidence in their reliability; in part, this is 
because Brazilian data exclude a jungle population of an unknown size 
and Chilean data are estimates or in the case of the census of persons 
of Araucanian ancestry (Chile, 1952:147), the data are questionable 
(e.g., that Atacama and Antofagasta Provinces each include only two per-
sons of Araucanian ancestry). Given the difficulties with this variable, 
it is included only in the regression equations which were used to order 
variables for subsequent analysis on the basis of their relative impor-
tance and which must be interpreted cautiously in the case of ethnicity. 
Partial correlation analysis is treated more rigorously since it is the 
basis for subsequent causal analysis; therefore, both first-order (con-
trolling for rural-urban residence) and second-order partials are pre-
sented, the latter for the reader's interest only. Significant associ-
ations by using second-order partials also appear in the tables showing 
the selection of variables for causal analysis to illustrate that it 
makes little difference whether first-order or second-order partials are 
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used for this selection procedure. 
Since ethnicity is treated in the literature as an important com-
ponent of the stratification system, an alternative control variable that 
is also a determinant within the stratification systems of the three na-
tions is suggested here for future cross-cultural research--occupation 
and specifically white-collar vs. blue-collar occupation. Therefore, 
Research Finding: Despite the accumulation of evidence in the 
literature suggesting that ethnicity is an important line of dif-
ferentiation in Brazil, Chile, and the U.S., it is an inadequate 
control variable for cross-cultural research based on national 
censuses because of unreliable data and/or the governmental de-
cision not to collect data related to ethnicity in some nations. 
Rural-urban residence as a line of differentiation 
Research Finding: Rural-urban residence must be controlled in the 
analysis of the relationship between industrialization and national 
integration in part because there is a significant association 
(zero-order) between percentage of the population living in cities 
of 20,000 or more and the industrial-economic variables in one or 
more of the nations in this study with the exception of number of 
ports and radios per capita (see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: Rural-urban residence must be controlled in the 
analysis of the relationship between industrialization and national 
integration in part because there is a significant association 
(zero-order) between percentage of the population living in cities 
of 20,000 or more and the socio-political variables in one or more 
of the nations in this study (refer to r's in regression summary 
tables). 
Research Finding: It therefore follows that rural-urban residence 
must be controlled in the analysis of the relationship between in-
dustrialization and national integration because, when controlled, 
it reduces or increases the strength of association between some 
elements of the industrial-economic and the socio-political sets of 
variables (see tables 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37). 
The necessity of removing the effects of rural-urban residence is 
based on its relationship to both industrialization (as a stimulus to, 
and concomitant of, urbanization) and to national integration. It in-
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tervenes not only where significant rural-urban differences persist as 
they do in Brazil and Chile in contrast to the U.S. but also where dif-
ferences in the degree of national integration emerge among groups with-
in urban centers. 
Rural-to-urban migration, the major population movement and the 
major source of urban growth (which also stems from the urban annexation 
of outlying areas that is not reflected in in-migration data) within 
Brazil and Chile, has not only been stimulated by (import substitution) 
industrialization in the mid-twentieth century; it has also been in the 
direction of the largest (primate) cities. The center of Brazil's popu-
lation was 480 kms. from the coast in 1960 (240 kms. in 1823) and almost 
all of the largest cities are on the coast as is the population concen-
tration in spite of the population shift to the interior in this century; 
the concentration of each interior province's population in one urban 
center also intensifies rural-urban differences. The capital of Chile 
(Santiago) now accounts for an estimated 25 per cent of the nation's 
population. Still, it must be taken into consideration when interpreting 
data on the size of rural and urban populations that massive population 
shifts to urban centers as has occurred, e.g., in Brazil and Chile, nec-
essarily subtracts from the rural population. Additionally, "urban" as 
"place" is not necessarily a social reality given, e.g., that rural 
"pockets" exist within urban centers. 
With the continuation of the concentration of social, economic, and 
political institutions in the largest cities in Brazil and Chile, the 
diffusion of urban influence and access to institutions such as education 
and medical care have been slow to expand; the one exception is the 
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German region of southern Brazil where urban centers primarily serve 
agricultural interests. Therefore, rural-urban migration is the predom-
inant means of coming into contact with these institutions. It is also 
a major factor in the characteristically uneven population distribution 
of Brazil and Chile and an urban population that has become too large 
given the level of industrialization. 
The sharp rural-urban differences that were emerging in the U.S. 
at the beginning of the twentieth century have become relatively insig-
nificant but the U.S. does not necessarily have an "even" distribution 
of population nor is there a lack of coastal population concentration, 
urban problems, a need for urban planning, and differences among urban 
groups in terms of their access to social, economic, and political in-
stitutions. The contrast with Brazil and Chile is more of a difference 
in degree rather than one of polar types. This contrast emerged basi-
cally because of the acceleration in the growth of the urban population 
after the Industrial Revolution in the U.S. rather than, as in Brazil 
and Chile, both prior to and during industrialization. 
Industrialization in Brazil and Chile has not yet been rapid enough 
to absorb the influx of labor (given too that much of the influx is of 
unskilled labor) which, in turn, increases urban unemployment, slum 
growth, and the costs of services such as welfare and education. Gov-
erment intervention in urban planning in specific cities, e.g., Bras{lia, 
of the three nations has not been entirely successful (Rabinovitz and 
Trueblood, 1973:11-19); the urban problems characteristic of other urban 
places are not lacking in these cities and have come to constitute ob-
stacles to local planning as well (also see Epstein, 1973:171-182). 
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The intervening effects of rural-urban residence are mediated, 
therefore, through rural-urban differences, differences within urban 
populations and the governmental impact on alleviating these differences, 
variations in the degree to which urban influence and access to institu-
tions diffuse to rural dwellers, and the relationship between the pro-
cesses of urbanization and industrialization. As found in this research, 
the removal of these effects by controlling for rural-urban residence 
clarifies the relationship between industrialization and national inte-
gration. 
The provincial data for 1960 and 1970, respectively, show an in-
crease in the mean percentage living in cities from 25.06 to 48.72 in 
Brazil and from 30.68 to 60.18 in Chile, a decline in the dispersion of 
cases from a standard deviation of 19.54 to 16.34 in Brazil and from 
26.37 to 18.8 in Chile with extreme values of 5.0 and 97.5 per cent in 
1960, 25.1 and 99.9 per cent in 1970 for Brazil and of 0 and 82.8 per 
cent in 1960, 26.3 and 92.6 per cent in 1970 for Chile. When Brastlia 
became the capital of Brazil in 1960, the municipio of Rio de Janeiro 
(the former capital), became the State of Guanabara which accounts for 
the high percentage (100 per cent in all practicality) of the population 
that is urban for the highest value. 
The extreme values for Brazil reflect the rapid growth of the 
urban population as well as the observed decline in provincial differ-
ences. The U.S. provincial data reveal a different pattern; as in 
Brazil and Chile the mean percentage living in cities increases (from 
37.74 in 1960 to 41.24 in 1970) but the standard deviation shows a 
greater dispersion of cases from 15.25 in 1960 to 16.22 in 1970; the ex-
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treme values reflect the contradictory urban-to-rural and/or urban-to-
suburban shift (lowest value of percentage living in cities is 9.1 in 
1960 and 8.7 in 1970) as well as the continuation of urban growth (the 
highest value is 67.9 per cent in 1960 and 76.4 per cent in 1970). The 
data probably also reflect population shifts to different sections (both 
rural and urban) of the nation. In the cross-cultural data combining 
the 100 cases of the three nations, the mean percentage living in cities 
is 32.81 in 1960 and 47.85 in 1970; the standard deviation declines from 
20.12 to 18.47; extreme values are 0 and 97.5 per cent in 1960, 8.7 and 
99.9 per cent in 1970. 
The Expansion of Industrial-Economic 
Functional Linkages 
Industrialization: percentage of the labor force 
employed in industry 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage of 
the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage of 
the labor force employed in industry is significant, positive, and 
increasing 1960-1970 from .517 to .826 in Brazil and from .675 to 
.785 in Chile; the association is insignificant in the U.S. in 1960 
and 1970; and there is a significant, positive association (.554) for 
the combined cross-cultural cases only in 1960 (see table 46 in ap-
pendix C). 
Research Finding: There is a significant association, controlling 
for rural-urban residence, between industrialization as indicated by 
percentage of the labor force employed in industry and the socio-
political set of variables in one or more of the nations in this 
study (refer to tables 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37). 
Population growth in the U.S. in the twentieth century has not in-
fluenced the size and composition of the labor force in the same way as 
in Brazil and Chile. In viewing population data, the specious nature of 
crude birth and death rates should be noted as should the impact of 
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rapidly declining infant mortality rates on the crude death rate and age 
composition of the population. Still, Brazil's 1970 crude birth rate 
(37.8) was higher than the U.S. rate in 1910 (30.1) but the 1970 crude 
death rate (9.5) was the same as the U.S. rate in 1950-1954 and 1960 
(9.5). Chile's 1970 crude birth rate (26.9) was comparable to the U.S. 
rate in 1920 (27.7) and during the post-World War II "boom" (24.5 in 
1950-1954 and 23.7 in 1960) but the crude death rate (8.5) was lower than 
the U.S. rate in 1970 (9.4). Chile's 1960-1970 average annual popula-
tion growth rate (1.5) was close to that of the U.S. (the average annual 
1960-1970 rate was 1.3) while Brazil's was much higher (3.1 average 
1960-1970). The size of the U.S. labor force was not "inflated" 1960-
1970 as it was particularly in Brazil. The population "boom" after 
World \.Jar II in the U.S. occurred after and not during or prior to rapid 
industrialization and economic growth; the growth of the labor force in 
the 1960s was therefore not an "obstacle" to development. 
Agricultural employment continued to decline in the U.S. (from 
11.9 per cent of the labor force in 1950 to 3.5 per cent in 1970) as did 
employment in commerce (from 21.5 per cent in 1950 to 18.7 per cent in 
1970). Typical of the more developed nations, the service sector in-
creased (from 21.7 per cent of the labor force in 1950 to 28.0 per cent 
in 1970) following rapid industrialization; the industrial sector de-
clined from 40.6 per cent of the labor force in 1950 to 40.3 per cent in 
1960 and 37.0 per cent in 1970. Of the Brazilian labor force 10 years 
of age or more, 18.2 per cent were employed in industry in 1940, 17.8 per 
cent in 1950, 17.9 per cent in 1960, and 22.1 per cent in 1970; concom-
itantly, the percentage employed in agriculture declined (67 per cent in 
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1940 and 44.2 per cent in 1970) while there was an increase in employment 
in services (6.5 per cent of the labor force in 1940 and 15.8 per cent in 
1970) and in commerce (5.5 per cent in 1940 and 8.9 per cent in 1970). 
Of the total Chilean labor force 12 years of age or more, 30.2 per 
cent were employed in industry in 1940, 33.7 per cent in 1952, 33.2 per 
cent in 1960, and 31.3 per cent in 1970; the percentage employed in agri-
culture declined (35.7 per cent in 1940 and 21.2 per cent in 1970) while 
there was an increase in employment in services (20.3 per cent in 1940 
and 25.6 per cent in 1970) and in commerce (9.2 per cent of the labor 
force in 1940 and 11.6 per cent in 1970). An additional occupation-
related problem of increasing importance to Chile, similar to many de-
veloping nations, is that of losing high-level manpower through emigra-
tion (which exceeded immigration by 24,905 in 1960-1964) most frequently 
because of aspirations for higher salaries and professional advancement. 
It is a problem that emerges because of the level of development and, in 
turn, inhibits development. It is also a problem of increasing signifi-
cance in Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s for similar reasons although 
highly-trained people still immigrate to Brazil from Europe. 
The provincial data for Brazil in 1960 and 1970 reflect the ex-
treme and increasing regional differences, the population shift from the 
north to the southeastern industrial centers, and the rapid growth of 
the manufacturing sector, in particular, upon approaching 1970. The 
lowest percentage of the labor force employed in industry in 1960 was 
2.3 (Acre in the North) and the highest was 39.0 (Santa Catarina in the 
South followed closely by Rio de Janeiro in the East); the lowest per-
centage in industry was 1.7 (Roraima in the North) and the highest was 
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54.5 (Sao Paulo in the South) in 1970. The mean percentage of the labor 
force employed in industry declined slightly from 1960 (14.54 per cent) 
to 1970 (14.09 per cent); the greater dispersion of cases is shown by the 
standard deviations of 11.58 in 1960 and 13.91 in 1970. 
Contrary to Brazil, the 1960 and 1970 Chilean provincial data show 
an overall but slight increase in the percentage of the labor force em-
ployed in industry; the mean percentage employed in industry was 27.48 
in 1960 and 30.23 in 1970; extreme values were 12.5 and 60.4 per cent in 
1960, 13.5 and 61.3 per cent in 1970. The standard deviation slightly 
declined from 13.59 in 1960 to 13.25 in 1970. The decline in the dis-
persion of cases does not conflict with the decrease shown in national 
data from 1960 to 1970 in spite of the increase indicated by the mean 
values and extreme values for individual provinces. These data substan-
tiate the lower and more stable rate of growth in industrial employment 
than in Brazil in the 1960s. 
The 1960 and 1970 U.S. provincial data reflect the decline in the 
percentage employed in industry with a decline in the mean percentage in 
industry from 35.7 in 1960 to 34.62 in 1970 and in the dispersion of 
cases with a standard deviation of 8.88 in 1960 and 7.96 in 1970 which 
also suggests weaker inter-provincial differences than in Brazil or 
Chile. The extreme values of 13.5 and 52.2 per cent in industry in 1960 
and 16.8 and 48.2 per cent in 1970 illustrate both an increase in indus-
trial employment at the lower extreme and a shift in sectoral employment 
with more rapid growth of non-industrial sectors at the upper extreme. 
In the combination of the 100 cases for cross-cultural analysis, 
there is almost no change in the mean percentage employed in industry 
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(28.35 per cent in 1960 and 28.39 per cent in 1970) or the standard de-
viation (13.85 in 1960 and 13.89 in 1970); extreme values are 2.3 and 
60.4 per cent in industry in 1960, 1.7 and 61.3 per cent in 1970. 
Industrialization: percentage contribution of the 
major economic sectors to the G.N.P. 
Research Finding: There is a significant association, controlling 
for rural-urban residence, between industrialization as indicated 
by contributions of the major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and 
the socio-political set of variables in one or more nations in this 
study (refer to tables 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage 
contribution of industry to the G.N.P. is significant, positive, 
and increasing 1960-1970 from .441 to .645 in Brazil and from .489 
to .535 in Chile; it is significant, positive, and declining 1960-
1970 from .545 to .408 in the U.S.; and it is significant and posi-
tive for the combined cross-cultural cases (.496) only in 1970 (see 
table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage 
contribution of commerce to the G.N.P. is significant, positive, and 
increasing 1960-1970 from .676 to .782 in Brazil; it is significant, 
positive, but declining 1960-1970 from .718 to .547 in Chile, from 
.526 to .429 in the U.S., and from .554 to .510 in the combined 
cross-cultural cases (see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage 
contribution of agriculture to the G.N.P. is negative and signifi-
cant (-.423) only in Chile in 1970 (see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage 
contribution of services to the G.N.P. is significant, positive, and 
increasing 1960-1970 from .491 to .706 in Brazil; it is significant, 
positive, but declining 1960-1970 from .689 to .514 in Chile and 
from .524 to .452 in the U.S.; it is significant (.532) in the com-
bined cross-cultural cases only in 1970 (see table 46 in appendix C). 
The rate of economic growth averaged 4.6 per cent annually in the 
U.S. 1960-1970 and 4.4 per cent in Chile 1960-1970 (yearly rates show a 
decline 1967-1970); the economic stagnation in Brazil 1960-1967 after 
rapid growth in the 1950s was followed by the shift in government plan-
ning towards a "development strategy" and an economic growth rate 1968-
1972 approaching 10 per cent annually, one of the highest in the world. 
The impact of the Industrial Revolution diffused more evenly throughout 
the U.S. than it has in Brazil or Chile. One basic factor affecting 
sectoral (provincial and national) contributions to the G.N.P. as well 
as uneven internal development (regional differences) and sectionalism 
in Brazil and Chile is the emergence and continuation of dual economies 
based on the maintenance of export economies since the sixteenth cen-
tury up to the attempts to move away from this position through import 
substitution industrialization. The dual economy continues to charac-
terize Brazil and Chile as seen in the concentration, e.g., of popula-
tion, educational, and other institutions where the "modern" sector 
(the more mechanized, commercialized, urbanized, and industrialized) 
predominates. In Brazil, this coincides with the region where European 
immigrants and their descendants have concentrated; in Chile, it is 
predominantly in the Santiago-Valpara{so area and the mining region. 
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Percentage contribution of industry to the G~N.P. The average 
annual percentage growth rate of industry 1959-1969 was 6.8 per cent in 
Brazil, 5.9 per cent in Chile, and 4.8 per cent in the U.S. (1960-1970). 
It has been the sector to show the most rapid rate of growth in Brazil 
after 1947. The provincial data for Brazil show a higher mean percent-
age contribution of industry to the G.N.P. in 1970 (1.47) than 1960 
(1.34) but a slightly greater dispersion of cases (standard deviations 
are 3.08 in 1960 and 3.41 in 1970); the extreme values (0.1 and 15.0 per 
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cent in 1960, 0.1 and 16.6 per cent in 1970) do not indicate a rapid in-
crease in industrialization nor a significant increase in provincial 
variations. At the national level, however, there has been an increase 
in the contribution of industry to the G.N.P. from 25 per cent in 1950 
to 33.5 per cent in 1960 and 37 per cent in 1968. At the national level, 
the increase in industry as a percentage of the gross product was greater 
in Chile than Brazil growing from 34.1 per cent in 1950 to 36.6 per cent 
in 1960 and 51.6 per cent in 1970. Similar to Brazil, Chile's provincial 
data for 1960 and 1970 reveal a slight increase in the mean percentage 
contribution of industry to the G.N.P. (from 1.12 to 1.58), in the dis-
persion of cases (from a standard deviation of 1.17 to 1.65), and in the 
extreme values (0.2 and 4.4 per cent in 1960, 0.3 and 6.2 per cent in 
1970). These measures approximate those for the U.S. more so than 
Brazil. However, the U.S. data reveal an opposite trend to that of 
Brazil and Chile. There was a gradual decline in the percentage contri-
bution of industry to the G.N.P. in the U.S. from 46.2 in 1950 to 44.7 
in 1960 and 40.9 in 1970; this is reflected in the provincial data for 
1960 and 1970 which show a decline in the mean percentage contribution 
of industry to the G.N.P. from 0.9 to 0.82; the standard deviation de-
clined from 1.16 to 1.01 and the extreme values declined from 0.1 and 
4.8 per cent in 1960 to 0.04 and 3.8 per cent in 1970. Provincial dif-
ferences are more extreme in Brazil than in the U.S. or Chile. The 
observed trends in the data for the three nations also represent the dif-
ferences between a more developed nation (U.S.) in which the industrial 
sector is tapering off as other sectors increase in importance in con-
trast to industrializing nations (Brazil and Chile) that currently 
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emphasize planning for industrial growth. The mean percentage contribu-
tion of industry to the G.N.P. in 1960 and 1970 for cross-cultural anal-
ysis is 1.06 and 1.17; standard deviations are 1.83 and 2.03; extreme 
values are 0.1 and 15.0 per cent in 1960, 0.04 and 16.6 per cent in 1970. 
Percentage contribution of commerce to the G.N.P. As the most im-
portant sector in the Chilean economy primarily in terms of export earn-
ings, commerce accounted for 21.7 per cent of the gross product in 1950, 
24.2 per cent in 1960, and declined to 18.7 per cent in 1970, reflecting 
in part the drop in mining prices (and thus in the value of exports) in 
1970. The average annual percentage growth in commerce in Chile was 4.1 
per cent 1960-1970; it was 6.1 per cent in 1960-1961 and 9.1 per cent in 
1970 in Brazil. The percentage contribution of commerce to the gross 
product in Brazil was 13.8 in 1950, 15.5 per cent in 1960, and 22.2 per 
cent in 1968. Although the average annual percentage growth rate in com-
merce in the U.S. (4.7 per cent) was close to Chile's between 1960 and 
1970, the percentage contribution of commerce to the gross product was 
higher than in Brazil or Chile, increasing from 28.8 per cent in 1950 to 
30.1 per cent in 1960 and 31.1 per cent in 1970. The provincial data 
for Brazil show the increase in the commercial sector and an increase in 
internal variation; for 1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean percentage 
contribution of commerce to the G.N.P. is 0.62 and 0.90, the standard 
deviation is 1.16 and 1.65, and the extreme values are 0.1 and 4.4 per 
cent in 1960, 0.1 and 6.3 per cent in 1970. The provincial data for 
Chile and the U.S. reflect a decline in commerce as a percentage of the 
G.N.P.; the extreme values for Chile are 0.2 and 3.0 per cent in 1960, 
0.2 and 2.4 per cent in 1970 and, for the U.S., 0.03 and 5.8 per cent in 
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1960, 0.03 and 5.3 per cent in 1970. In both nations, there is less of a 
dispersion of cases in 1970; the standard deviations for 1960 and 1970 
are 0.76 and 0.61 in Chile, 0.96 and 0.93 in the U.S. The mean percent-
age contribution of commerce to the G.N.P. of the Chilean data dropped 
from 0.93 in 1960 to 0.75 in 1970 while it remained about the same in the 
U.S. (0.61 per cent in 1960 and 0.62 per cent in 1970). The mean per-
centage contribution of commerce to the G.N.P. in 1960 and 1970 for 
cross-cultural analysis when the 100 cases are combined is 0.69 and 0.72; 
standard deviations are 0.97 and 1.09; extreme values are 0.03 and 5.8 
per cent in 1960, 0.03 and 6.3 per cent in 1970. 
Percentage contribution of agriculture to the G.N.P. At a national 
level, the agricultural sector had an average annual percentage growth 
rate from 1959 to 1969 of 4.3 per cent in Brazil, 2.6 per cent in Chile, 
and 2.7 per cent in the U.S. (1960-1970). In all three nations, the 
percentage contribution of this sector to the gross product declined but 
for different reasons. In 1950, 1960, and 1970, respectively, the per-
centage contribution of the sector was 31.3, 28.3, and 17.7 (1968) in 
Brazil; 12.5, 12.2, and 9.6 in Chile; and 7.3, 4.3, and 3.2 in the U.S. 
Agriculture in the U.S. has steadily declined in importance after the 
Industrial Revolution in the late nineteenth century; however, agricul-
tural productivity has increased so that national needs are met as is 
generally true of Brazil. Import substitution planning and the growth 
in the manufacturing sector have contributed to the decline in the im-
portance of the agricultural sector in Brazil. In addition, agricul-
tural production in 1970 was affected by drought in the Northeast, a 
30-per-cent decline in coffee production, and a 16-per-cent decline in 
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cocoa production; this decline was offset somewhat by a 10-per-cent in-
crease in agricultural production in central-south Brazil, the most pro-
ductive area in agriculture. In Chile, an estimated two-thirds of the 
population depend on agriculture; at the same time, it has been a stag-
nant sector characterized by low productivity, growing at a slower rate 
than the population from World War II until around 1960 in large part due 
to government policies that do not encourage an increase in production. 
The underlying reasons for the decline in the importance of agriculture 
in the three nations differ but the decline also appears in the provin-
cial data for 1960 and 1970. The mean percentage contribution of agri-
culture to the G.N.P. dropped from 1960 to 1970 from 1.13 to 0.71 for 
Brazil, 0.46 to 0.38 for Chile, and 0.09 to 0.06 for the U.S. The dis-
persion of cases lessened from 1960 to 1970 with standard deviations of 
1.6 and 1.0 in Brazil, 0.26 and 0.21 in Chile, and 0.09 and 0.07 in the 
U.S. Lastly, the extreme values for Brazil were 0.2 and 6.7 in 1960, 
0.1 and 4.2 per cent in 1970; for Chile, they were 0.1 and 1.0 per cent 
in 1960, 0.1 and 0.8 per cent in 1970; and for the U.S., they were 0.004 
and 0.4 in 1960, 0.003 and 0.3 per cent in 1970. The slight provincial 
variations particularly in the U.S. and Chile limit the usefulness of 
this variable in regression and partial correlation analysis (after 
which it was omitted from the study) and as an indicator. The cross-
cultural combination of cases for 1960 and 1970 have a mean percentage 
con~ribution of agriculture to the G.N.P. of 0.44 in 1960 and 0.31 in 
1970, standard deviations of 0.91 and 0.57, and extreme values of 0.004 
and 6.7 per cent in 1960, 0.003 and 4.2 per cent in 1970. 
Percentage contribution of services to the G.N.P. In the provin-
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cial data for 1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean percentage contribu-
tion of services to the G.N.P. was 0.46 and 0.44 in Brazil, 0.39 and 0.43 
in Chile, 0.20 and 0.23 in the U.S., 0.31 and 0.33 for the combined 
cases; standard deviations were 0.79 and 0.74 in Brazil, 0.23 and 0.28 in 
Chile, 0.34 and 0.39 in the u.s.' 0.48 and 0.49 for the combined cases; 
extreme values were 0.1 and 3.5 per cent in 1960 and 0.1 and 3.3 per cent 
in 1970 for Brazil, 0.2 and 1.0 per cent in 1960 and 0.2 and 1.1 per cent 
in 1970 for Chile, 0.01 and 2.0 per cent in 1960 and 0.01 and 2.3 per 
cent in 1970 for the u.s.' 0.01 and 3. 5 per cent in 1960 and 0.01 and 3.3 
per cent in 1970 for the combined cases. In part, these data reflect the 
too rapid growth in services in Brazil and Chile given the level of de-
velopment. 
Communications: radios per capita 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage of 
the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and radios per cap-
ita is insignificant in 1960 and 1970 (see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: There is a significant association, controlling 
for rural-urban residence, between communications as indicated by 
radios per capita and the socio-political set of variables in the 
combined cross-cultural cases with the exception of the (eligible) 
voting-age population registered to vote (refer to tables 7, 13, 19, 
25, 31, 37). 
The rapid spread of communications media such as radio and tele-
vision is a twentieth-century phenomenon. It is only since 1950 that 
access to these media has accelerated in Chile and Brazil. In 1961, 
television sets per 1,000 population increased by 22.1 per cent in 
Brazil and 306.4 per cent in the U.S. but only 0.4 per cent in Chile. 
Other indicators show that there is greater access in Chile than Brazil 
105 
but much less than in the U.S. In 1970, the U.S. had 62.8 telephones per 
100 population, Chile had 4.1, and Brazil had 2.2; newspaper circulation 
(number of copies) per 1,000 population was 297 in the U.S. in 1970 and, 
in 1971, it was 89 in Chile and 37 in Brazil. 
With the expansion of radios in Brazil 1950-1960 and the advent of 
the transistor radio, minimum-wage earners now have access, in terms of 
cost, to radios; therefore, the decline of 66 radios per 1,000 population 
in 1960 to 60 in 1970 reflects in part the more rapid growth of popula-
tion. In comparison, radios per 1,000 population in 1960 and 1970 grew 
from 94 to 143 in Chile and from 941 to 1,412 in the U.S. 
Since provincial data for radios per capita were unavailable, the 
procedure used in this study was to assign the number of radios per cap-
ita at the national level to each province for cross-cultural analysis; 
these values in 1960 and 1970 were, respectively, .07 and .06 for Brazil, 
.09 and .14 for Chile, and .94 and 1.41 for the U.S. By combining the 
cases for cross-cultural analysis, the 1960 and 1970 data have a mean 
number of radios per capita of 0.51 and 0.76, a standard deviation of 
0.43 and 0.66, and extreme values of 0.07 and 0.94 radios per capita in 
1960, 0.06 and 1.41 in 1970. 
Support, in a sense, for this procedure exists in Brazil and Chile. 
By the 1960s, the Chilean communications system was already characterized 
in part by insignificant provincial (and social class) differences in the 
distribution of radios (Silvert, 1965:177-180). In Brazil, both the 
population and the access to radios and television in 1970 were concen-
trated in the Southeast (Weil et al., 1975:274-277) and in the cities and 
towns of the other regions. Government ownership of the major means of 
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communications in the 1960s and the subsequent widespread use of tele-
vision and radio for broadcasting educational programs led to increased 
access to these media throughout Brazil. The distortion of the U.S. data 
by the procedure used would not be due to provincial variations related 
predominantly to having at least one radio or none in a household or per 
person which is more likely to be the case in Brazil and Chile; rather, 
it would be due to variations from the opposite tendency of having one or 
more per household or per person. At any rate, the findings cannot be 
treated as definitive. 
Access to marketing districts: number of ports 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage of 
the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and number of ports 
is insignificant in 1960 and 1970 (see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: There is a significant association, controlling 
for rural-urban residence, between number of ports and the socio-
political set of variables in one or more nations in this study with 
the exception of the secondary-school enrollment ratio, higher edu-
cation, and percentage of the (eligible) voting-age population regis-
tered to vote (refer to tables 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37). 
In this study, shipping was selected as the most important means of 
transporting freight since Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. are maritime na-
tions while recognizing that other means have also been important to 
their development. The most important Brazilian ports are Santos and Rio 
de Janeiro. Maritime access to inland ports is primarily via the Amazon 
River. Similarly, in the U.S. the St. Lawrence Seaway gives access of 
Michigan and Chicago to the Atlantic, the Houston Ship Channel links the 
port of Houston to the Gulf of Mexico, and the Arkansas-Verdigris Navi-
gation System links Tulsa to New Orleans. Chile's ports are all maritime 
107 
locations, the chief ones being Punta Arenas, Valparafso, Talcahuano, 
Antofagasta, and San Antonio, Corral serves as Valdivia's port although 
smaller ships now have access to Valdivia because of changes, e.g., in 
river depth, produced by earthquakes in the 1960s. 
In international trade, total tonnage (in thousand metric tons) 
loaded in 1953, 1964, and 1970, respectively, increased: in Brazil, 
from 4,375 to 14,587 and 39,970; in Chile, from 4,740 to 11,313 and 
21,973; and in the U.S., from 81,116 to 157,251 and 218,256. Total ton-
nage (in thousand metric tons) unloaded in 1953, 1964, and 1970, respec-
tively, also increased: in Brazil, from 11,789 to 18,174 and 28,073; 
in Chile, from 2,311 to 3,186 and 5,255; and in the U.S., from 116,103 
to 225,513 and 292,786. In Brazil and Chile, the total tonnage handled 
in ports for international trade alone far exceeds freight shipped by 
railroads but the opposite is the case in the U.S. (although there is an 
overlap in the three nations of tonnage loaded and unloaded at ports and 
that proportion of railroad freight representing exports taken to ports 
or imports brought from ports); it can be suggested that this is due, in 
part, to the size of the domestic market in the U.S. which has expanded 
much more rapidly than in Brazil or Chile largely because of the more 
extremely uneven distribution of income in these two nations. 
For each nation, the same ports are not necessarily included in 
both periods for which data were collected (1958-1960 and 1968-1970); 
however, only Brazil shows an increase in the number of ports involved. 
In the provincial data for 1960 and 1970, the Brazilian cases have a 
mean number of ports of 3.04 in 1960 and 3.44 in 1970, standard devia-
tions of 2.88 and 3.19, and extreme values of 0 and 12 ports in 1960, 
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0 and 15 in 1970; the Chilean cases have a mean number of ports of 2.8, 
a standard deviation of 3.33, and extreme values of 0 and 14 ports in 
1960 and 1970; and the U.S. cases have a mean number of ports of 3.56, 
a standard deviation of 4.55, and extreme values of 0 and 17 ports in 
1960 and 1970. The combined cross-cultural cases have a mean number 
of ports of 3.24 in 1960 and 3.34 in 1970, a standard deviation of 3.88 
in 1960 and 3.93 in 1970, and extreme values of 0 and 17 ports. 
Average annual income in the major economic sectors 
Research Finding: There is a significant association, controlling 
for rural-urban residence, between average annual income in the ma-
jor economic sectors and the socio-political set of variables in 
one or more nations in this study (refer to tables 7, 13, 19, 25, 
31, 37). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and average 
annual income in agriculture is significant and positive (.458) 
only in Chile in 1970 (see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and average 
annual income in industry is significant, positive, but declining 
1960-1970 from .711 to .629 in Brazil; it is significant, positive, 
and increasing 1960-1970 from .658 to .674 in Chile; it is signifi-
cant and positive in the U.S. only in 1970 (.418); and it is insig-
nificant in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 
(see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and average 
annual income in commerce is significant, positive, but declining 
1960-1970 from .737 to .510 in Brazil; it is significant and posi-
tive only in 1960 in Chile (.507) and the U.S. (.402); it is insig-
nificant in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 
(see table 46 in appendix C). 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and average 
annual income in services is significant, positive, but declining 
1960-1970 from .805 to .612 in Chile and from .508 to .440 in the 
U.S.; it is significant and positive in Brazil only in 1960 (.675); 
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and it is insignificant in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 
and 1970 (see table 46 in appendix C). 
The labor code in effect in Brazil during the 1960s was promul-
gated in 1943; the minimum-wage system establishes a scale designed to 
vary by province (and excludes agricultural laborers). In 1967, a new 
currency unit, the Cruzeiro N8vo (New Cruzeiro) or CrN$ replaced the 
cruzeiro (CrN$1=Cr$1,000 in 1967). In 1964, Goulart doubled the minimum-
wage scale but the increase in the consumer price index in the 1960s 
reached a peak of 87.0 per cent in this year (with an average annual in-
crease of 47.2 per cent 1960-1969). Data for Guanabara show an increase 
in average monthly wages 1964-1966 from CrN$69 to CrN$155 in commerce 
and from CrN$61 to CrN$147 in industry. Yet, in Sao Paulo, e.g., the 
cost-of-living index (1958=100) increased from 189 in December of 1960 
to 3,010 in December of 1966; real minimum monthly wages in Sao Paulo 
declined from CrN$1.54 in 1960 to CrN$1.13 in 1969. The average annual 
increase in real income per capita was 2.5 per cent in the 1950s, 4.1 
per cent in 1960-1961, 2.0 per cent in 1961-1962 (one period during which 
the government had put a stabilization program into effect), and -1.6 per 
cent in 1962-1963; similarly, the real price index for wheat (1948-1952= 
100) of 107 in 1958-1962, 110 in 1963-1967, and 108 in 1968-1969 also 
lends itself to the implication that real gains made in wages during the 
1960s were in all practicality insignificant. 
In Chile, the labor code of the 1960s was put into effect in 1931, 
including the stipulation of "equal pay for equal work" for men and 
women. The minimum- and vital-salary law was passed in 1937 and, as in 
Brazil, establishes a different scale for each province. Minimum pay was 
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determined for employees (salaried labor force) in 1942, for wage earn-
ers (except agricultural workers) in 1957, and for agricultural labor 
(using the same scale as for industry) in 1965. Cost-of-living in-
creases became automatic on January 1 of every year for employees in 
1961 and for wage earners in 1965. The nation-wide cost-of-living in-
dex (1950=100) was 1,388.9 in 1958 and, in Santiago, this index (1958= 
100) increased from 141 in 1960 to 583 in 1966. The annual average con-
sumer price index in Chile (1958=100) was 7.1 in 1950, 154.7 in 1960, 
and 632 in 1966 (later rising to 1,278 in 1972 when 1963=100); there was 
an average annual increase in this index of 26 per cent 1960-1969. The 
percentage growth of real income per capita has fluctuated widely in 
Chile from 4.0 in 1950-1953, -1.9 in 1953-1956, 0.4 in 1956-1959, 3.2 in 
1959-1962, 2.6 in 1961-1962, 0.3 in 1962-1963 to 1.4 in 1970. Wholesale 
prices for wheat (per 100 kilograms) declined slightly from US$7.30 in 
1960 to US$7.10 in 1970. Thus, the apparent increases in wages, e.g., 
average monthly earnings in manufacturing of (escudos) E0 100.05 in 1963 
to E0 1,041.63 in 1970, were largely consumed by inflation. In addition, 
with a rate of inflation of 3D-40 per cent annually, the policy of auto-
matic cost-of-living increases at the first of the year actually signi-
fies a steady decline in wages during the 12 months of the year. 
Income differences in Chile are influenced by two additional fac-
tors: (1) the existence of a mandatory profit-sharing system for em-
ployees, available also to unionized industrial and commercial wage 
earners; (2) the regalfa ~ especie (payment in kind) in the form of 
housing and board which can constitute up to one-half of the wages for 
farm laborers (and up to 70 per cent of the wages of farm laborers in 
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Brazil). 
In the U.S. the consumer price index (1967=100) was 72.1 in 1950, 
88.7 in 1960, and 116.3 in 1970. Producers prices for wheat dropped 
from $6.40 per 100 kilograms in 1960 to $4.90 in 1970. National income 
per capita in current dollar value in 1950, 1960, and 1970, respec-
tively, was $1,501, $2,219, and $3,945; however, in constant dollars 
(1958 value), it was in the same years $1,810, $2,157, and $3,050. The 
impact on wages can be seen, e.g., in the data on earnings in manufac-
turing. Average gross weekly earnings in manufacturing were, in current 
dollar value, $89.70 in 1960, $107.50 in 1965, $122.50 in 1968, and 
$133.70 in 1970; stated in terms of constant (1967) dollar value these 
earnings become $101.20 in 1960, $113.80 in 1965, $117.60 in 1968, and 
$115.00 in 1970. By taking inflation into account, wages were actually 
declining between 1968 and 1970. 
Labor legislation in the twentieth-century U.S. has included state 
workmen's compensation laws and minimum-wage and maximum-hour legisla-
tion as well as a guarantee of collective bargaining. Only in Alaska 
are women and men guaranteed "equal pay for equal work." In contrast to 
Brazil and Chile, minimum wages do not vary provincially in the U.S. 
Average annual income in agriculture. In the provincial data for 
1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean income in agriculture is $498.28 
and $1,066.40 for Brazil, $103.88 and $919.92 for Chile, $1,919.16 and 
$2,418.20 for the U.S., and $1,110.12 and $1,705.68 for the combined 
cases. The standard deviations are 158.47 and 264.48 for Brazil, 8.85 
and 406.05 for Chile, 771.42 and 972.00 for the U.S., and 990.68 and 
1019.84 for the combined cases. The extreme values are: $296.67 and 
$670.78 in 1960, $661.11 and $1,651.56 in 1970 for Brazil; $83.95 and 
$118.52 in 1960, $646.91 and $2,249.38 for Chile in 1970; $579.86 and 
$3,667.97 in 1960, $730.62 and $4,621.64 in 1970 for the U.S.; $83.95 
and $3,667.97 in 1960, $646.91 and $4,621.64 in 1970 for the combined 
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cases. In the three nations, there was an overall increase in income 
but also an increase in provincial variations. The drastic change in 
income between 1960 and 1970 in Chile reflects the 1965 legislation to 
establish minimum wages for agricultural labor at the same level as in 
industry. Still, the data illustrate differences in Brazil and Chile 
based on a scale of minimum wages that varies by province as well as 
provincial variations in the degree of adherence by employers to the 
minimum-wage legislation. 
Average annual income in industry. In the provincial data for 
1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean income in industry is $588.28 and 
$1,154.04 for Brazil, $310.04 and $1,761.76 for Chile, $4,254.18 and 
$6,410.82 for the U.S., and $2,351.67 and $3,934.36 for the combined 
cases. The Brazilian cases showed a decline in the standard deviation 
from 245.50 to 226.68 whereas there was in increase from 96.39 to 367.53 
for the Chilean cases, from 685.96 to 901.81 for the U.S. cases, and 
from 1978.80 to 2586.34 for the combined cases. An overall increase in 
income is shown by the extreme values that range from $231.22 and 
$1,252.22 in 1960 to $954.56 and $1,729.11 in 1970 in Brazil, from 
$150.62 and $481.48 in 1960 to $1,345.68 and $2,607.41 in 1970 in Chile, 
from $2,905.54 and $5,676.20 in 1960 to $4,625.00 and $8,281.69 in 1970 
in the U.S., from $150.62 and $5,676.20 in 1960 to $954.56 and $8,281.69 
in 1970 in the combined cases. 
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Average annual income in commerce. In the provincial data there 
was a decline in the standard deviation from 181.66 in 1960 to 123.19 in 
1970 for Brazil but an increase from 74.95 to 460.14 for Chile, from 
591.07 to 822.71 for the U.S., and from 2034.20 to 2559.15 for the com-
bined cases. In all three nations there was an overall increase in in-
come in commerce. The mean income in commerce for 1960 and 1970 is 
$761.84 and $1,626.32 for Brazil, $196.12 and $1,208.36 for Chile, 
$4,416.56 and $6,347.18 for the U.S., $2,447.77 and $3,882.26 for the 
combined cases. Extreme values are: $515.56 and $1,244.44 in 1960, 
$1,429.78 and $2,041.78 in 1970 for Brazil; $83.95 and $367.90 in 1960, 
$520.99 and $2,271.60 in 1970 for Chile; $3,054.53 and $6,167.05 in 1960, 
$4,830.51 and $8,800.00 in 1970 for the U.S.; $83.95 and $6,167.05 in 
1960, $520.99 and $8,800.00 in 1970 for the combined cases. 
Average annual income in services. Provincial data show an in-
crease in income in this sector and an increase in the dispersion of 
cases. For 1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean income in services is 
$608.68 and $1,459.52 in Brazil, $88.72 and $512.80 in Chile, $2,735.52 
and $4,099.56 in the U.S., $1,542.11 and $2,542.86 for the combined 
cases. Standard deviations are 170.76 and 387.71 in Brazil, 9.44 and 
54.27 in Chile, 474.17 and 686.40 in the U.S., 1261.40 and 1682.65 for 
the combined cases. Extreme values are: $367.11 and $1,009.89 in 1960, 
$867.33 and $2,061.11 in 1970 for Brazil; $74.07 and $111.11 in 1960, 
$427.16 and $641.98 in 1970 for Chile; $1,962.25 and $4,027.35 in 1960, 
$2,982.46 and $5,945.95 in 1970 for the U.S.; $74.07 and $4,027.35 in 
1960, $427.16 and $5,945.95 in 1970 for the combined cases. 
The Relationship Between Trends in Socio-Political 
Linkages and the Expansion of Industrial-
Economic Linkages 
Social linkages: school enrollment 
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The training of skilled industrial workers, the growth of the in-
dividual's opportunities for a higher income, and the increase in mass 
participation in the political process not only expand the linkages of 
individuals and groups but, in turn, increase the nation's potential for 
more rapid development. Both Brazil and Chile have begun to reform 
their educational systems but in the 1960s they remained in a situation 
in which the effects of rapid population growth in the past counter-
balanced efforts to expand the number of, and access to, educational 
facilities. Of recent basic legislative reforms in the U.S., two that 
have had a far-reaching impact were desegregation acts to expand access 
to all educational levels and the 1965 Higher Education Act which ex-
panded access to university education by making federal aid available 
to undergraduates. 
Education is both free and compulsory in Brazil and Chile up to 
age 15. Provincial variations within the U.S. range, in the case of 
free education, from 4 to 6 years of age at one extreme to 16-21 years 
of age at the other extreme; in the case of compulsory education, the 
variations are from 6 to 7 and from 14 to 18 years of age except in 
Louisiana and Mississippi where compulsory education laws were repealed 
after desegregation policies were put into effect by the national govern-
ment. 
Primary education in the 1960s lasted for four years beginning at 
age 7 in Brazil, for six years beginning at age 6 in Chile, and for eight 
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years beginning at age 6 in the U.S. In Brazil, primary schools in 
cities had already added a fifth grade in the 1960s and, as part of 
educational reform, compulsory primary education nation-wide became a 
six-year program in the 1970s. In Chile, educational reform included 
the addition of a seventh year to primary education in 1966 and an 
eighth year in 1967 in an attempt to improve the retention rate over a 
longer period of time and to delay specialization (technical education). 
In spite of compulsory primary-education legislation, participa-
tion rates in Brazil and Chile are low and dropout rates are high. 
Among those with little or no schooling, the rural--particularly the 
lower class--population is disproportionately represented in both na-
tions; they also have a disproportionately high dropout rate, a higher 
illiteracy rate, and less opportunity since rural schools not unusually 
offer only 2-4 years of education in Chile and 3 years in Brazil. High-
er dropout rates have also been associated with lower-income groups 
which, in the case of Chile, reform has attempted to change. 
Of the population aged 5-14, 26 per cent were enrolled in primary 
school in 1950 and 51.3 per cent in 1970 in Brazil; the respective fig-
ures for Chile were 66 and 88.6 per cent and, for the U.S., 96.3 per 
cent in 1960 (97.1 per cent for ages 5-13 in 1950) and 99.2 per cent in 
1970. Between 1965 and 1968 the primary retention rate (completion of 
the four years) in Brazil was 21.5 per cent (of students entering first 
grade) in contrast to 34.1 per cent in Chile (those completing six 
years) for 1961-1968 and 1963-1970. Retention rates in primary educa-
tion for the U.S. were 91.0 per cent between 1960-1961 and 1967-1968 and 
93.4 per cent between 1962-1963 and 1969-1970. 
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Secondary-level education (~ntil the 1970s) in Brazil consisted 
in a four-year cycle of basic academic education followed by a three-
year cycle of either academic or technical-vocational. Prior to edu-
cational reform in Chile, secondary education consisted in six years in 
academic or seven years in technical schools; since the reforms in the 
late 1960s, it customarily begins at age 15 and lasts four years (three 
years of basic and one year of college preparatory education) similar 
to the U.S. system and normal education (since 1970) is incorporated 
into higher rather than secondary education. 
Estimates of the secondary-age population enrolled in secondary 
school for Brazil were 10 per cent in 1950 and 12 per cent in 1960, for 
Chile 18 per cent in 1952 and 26.4 per cent in 1960, and for the U.S. 
80.9 per cent in 1960 (91.8 per cent of those aged 14-17 were in school 
at some level). The higher participation rates in Chile, in contrast to 
Brazil, are partly due to the greater access of (urban) students to both 
public and private (tuition and tuition-free) secondary schools; how-
ever, dropout rates at the secondary level are high. While Brazil has 
maintained relatively low tuition rates for university students, the 
cost of secondary education (most schools charge tuition) has been the 
major factor to limit access to secondary schools and, consequently, to 
universities; to alleviate this problem, a scholarship program for 
lower-income students was initiated in 1966 and, in the same year, about 
24,000 secondary students benefited from the program. 
A second obstacle to secondary education in Brazil for the lower-
income and rural student in particular (who does not receive special 
preparation, e.g., by tutors, for financial reasons) is the examination 
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used as a selection criterion by secondary schools and given after com-
pletion of four years of primary education; after primary schools in 
cities added a fifth year in the 1960s, the examination was used as a 
selection criterion only when secondary schools could not absorb all 
students who would otherwise be admitted by having completed primary 
school. The lower-income student does have one alternative--other than 
government assistance through scholarships--which is widely used, i.e., 
daytime employment and school attendance at night. It is not uncommon 
for the evening classes offered by many secondary schools to have more 
students than secondary-education programs during the day; this also ac-
counts for the wider age distribution (including individuals in their 
mid-20s) in secondary-school enrollment figures for Brazil. 
All three nations have a system of technical-vocational schools. 
The bias against technical-vocational education in Brazil and Chile is 
declining (although less so in Chile) through governmental encourage-
ment as one aspect of industrialization policies except in one area--
agriculture--mainly because agricultural occupations in Brazil continue 
to be associated with low social status as is the case in Chile. This 
has contributed to the failure in both nations to realize agricultural 
potential (and agricultural self-sufficiency in Chile) as well as the 
continuation of a dual economy in which agriculture falls predominantly 
in the traditional sector. 
Vocational-education facilities (junior colleges) increased from 
528 in 1950 to 827 in 1970 in the U.S. after a slight decline to 521 in 
1960 but, in contrast to Brazil and Chile, this growth did not repre-
sent an aspect or direct consequence of national development planning 
although the end result might be the same in all three nations, i.e., 
the redefinition of economic functional linkages by means of expanding 
social (educational) linkages. 
118 
The relatively recent expansion of the university system in Chile 
has been in the direction of meeting national educational planning goals 
to increase access (by establishing university branches) to a university 
education throughout the length of the nation. Public universities in 
Chile are tuition-free, private universities charge low tuition (about 
US$35 a year), and some scholarships are available to university stu-
dents. However, lower-income students in Chile who are working to 
financially assist their families find that the costs of, e.g., room 
and board, in many cases make a university education impossible to ac-
quire; as a consequence, students from upper-class families are dis-
proportionately represented among the student body. The situation is 
different in the case of the Technical University in Valparat;o founded 
by Federico Santa Marfa for students from lower-income families; these 
students receive free tuition, free room and board, clothing, and a 
stipend. The degree of access that women have to university education 
in Chile is uniquely high; women represented almost 40 per cent of uni-
versity enrollments by 1956 compared to 36.1 per cent in the U.S. in 
1960 and 41 per cent in 1970. 
Universities emerged more slowly in Brazil than in Chile or the 
U.S. Forms of higher education existed in Brazil prior to the twen-
tieth century but it was not until 1920 that the first actual university 
was established (in Rio de Janeiro). University enrollment in Brazil 
per 100,000 population was 98 in 1950 (290 in Chile and about 2,300 in 
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the U.S.) and 132 in 1960 (257 in Chile and about 1,900 in the U.S.). 
The 1960 and 1970 provincial data for Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. at 
all three educational levels refer to combined public and private en-
rollment. 
Primary-school enrollment ratio 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and the pri-
mary-school enrollment ratio is significant and positive (.447) 
only in Brazil in 1960 (see tables 2-5). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and the primary-school enrollment 
ratio in Brazil only in 1960 (.651) and in the combined cross-
cultural cases in 1960 (.629) and 1970 (.436); the association is 
insignificant in Chile and the U.S. in 1960 and 1970 (see table 7). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, negative association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between contributions of the 
major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and the primary-school enroll-
ment ratio in Chile only in 1970 (commerce, -.437; services, -.571); 
the association is insignificant in Brazil, the U.S., and the com-
bined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 7). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive (.737) associa-
tion, controlling for rural-urban residence, between radios per 
capita and the primary-school enrollment ratio in the combined 
cross-cultural cases only in 1960 (see table 7). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between number of ports and 
the primary-school enrollment ratio in Chile only in 1960 (.521); 
the association is insignificant in Brazil, the u.s., and the com-
bined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 7). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between average annual in-
come in the major economic sectors and the primary-school enroll-
ment ratio in Brazil in 1960 (agriculture, .478; industry, .629) 
and 1970 (services, .446) and in the combined cross-cultural cases 
in 1960 (agriculture, .511; industry, .682; commerce, .663; serv-
ices, .609); the association is negative and significant in Chile 
only in 1970 (agriculture, -.413; industry, -.550; services, -.523) 
and the association is insignificant in the U.S. in 1960 and 1970 
(see table 7). 
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For the provincial data in 1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean 
primary-school enrollment ratios were 29.06 and 34.79 for Brazil, 51.98 
and 59.89 for Chile, 66.46 and 53.01 for the U.S. The standard devia-
tions for 1960 and 1970 were 8.38 and 8.88 in Brazil, 5.96 and 4.61 in 
Chile, 9.68 and 7.86 in the U.S. Extreme values of these ratios ranged 
from 13.4 to 50.0 in Brazil in 1960 and from 20.6 to 60.0 in 1970; in 
Chile, they ranged from 40.0 to 69.2 in 1960 and from 50.0 to 66.7 in 
1970; and in the U.S., the ratios ranged from 55.0 to 82.0 in 1960 and 
from 40.0 to 90.0 in 1970. These results reflect, in part, the impact 
on the primary-school enrollment ratio of changes in population growth 
in the three nations with the corresponding variations in the age struc-
ture of the nation and by province. The standard deviations show less 
provincial variation in the ratio in Chile and the U.S. while it re-
mains about the same with a slight increase between 1960 and 1970 in 
Brazil. Chilean data for 1970 are affected by the inclusion of two 
additional years of schooling that were part of secondary education in 
1960. The combination of the cases from the three nations for cross-
cultural analysis has a mean primary-school enrollment ratio of 53.49 
for 1960 and 50.18 for 1970, a standard deviation of 17.56 in 1960 and 
11.94 in 1970, and a range in ratios from 13.4 to 82.0 in 1960 and from 
20.6 to 90.0 in 1970. 
Regression and correlation results. Table 1 presents the abbre-
viations of variables used in regression and correlation tables as well 
as symbols used in the subsequent causal analysis. In the regression 
equations for the individual nations and for all cases combined, the F 
test (referring here and in subsequent tables to the overall F test at 
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TABLE 1 
ABBREVIATIONS OF VARIABLES IN REGRESSION AND 
CORRELATION TABLES AND NOTATION 
IN CAUSAL MODELS 
Variable Name 
Industrial-economic set: 
Labor force in industry 
Where gC:X, contributions to 
G.N.P. of: 
Agricultural sector 
Industrial sector 
Commercial sector 
Service sector 
Radios per capita 
Average annual income, where 
wCX, in: 
Agricultural sector 
Industrial sector 
Commercial sector 
Service sector 
Number of ports 
Socio-political set: 
Voter registration as percentage 
of those eligible 
School enrollment, where 
eCY, at: 
Primary level 
Secondary level 
College level 
Illiteracy rates 
Social security coverage 
Control variables: 
Rural-urban residence 
Ethnicity 
Tables 
PIN 
AGG 
ING 
COG 
SEG 
RAD 
lAG 
liN 
ICO 
ISE 
POR 
VOT 
PRI 
SND 
COL 
ILL 
SSE 
POP 
ETH 
Diagrams 
X= £i,g,r,w,pJ 
i 
g=fgl,g2,g3,g4j 
gl 
g2 
g3 
g4 
r 
w=fwl • wz • w3 'w4J 
wl 
wz 
w3 
w4 
p 
Y=tv,e,l,sl 
v 
e=fe1 ,e2 ,e3l 
el 
Z= fa, b~ 
ez 
e3 
1 
s 
a 
b 
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each step of the expansion of the equation) indicates that R is signi-
ficant at the .05 level: in Brazil's cases (see table 2) for all steps 
in the 1960 equation and through the inclusion of income in agriculture 
(lAG) in the 1970 equation; in the Chilean cases (see table 3) for all 
steps in the 1960 equation and through the inclusion of rural-urban 
residence (POP) in the 1970 equation; in the U.S. cases (see table 4) 
through the inclusion of the percentage of the labor force employed in 
industry (PIN) in the 1960 equation and through the percentage contri-
bution of agriculture to the G.N.P. (AGG) in the 1970 equation; and, in 
all cases combined (see table 5), for all steps in the 1960 and 1970 
equations. Where R is significant, the percentage of variance explained 
in 1960 and 1970, respectively, is 75.1 and 55.7 per cent in Brazil, 
80.6 and 57.1 per cent in Chile, 15.9 and 35.6 per cent in the U.S., 
and 74.5 and 45.0 per cent in all cases combined. The trend is appar-
ently for some linear relationships to decline while new linear rela-
tionships appear possibly including variables not in this study. There 
is also the suggestion that the indicators of these relationships vary 
by nation which is evidenced in the final selection of those variables 
to be included in partial correlation analysis. Variables excluded on 
the basis of regression analysis are those at the steps in the expansion 
of the equation where R is not significant and those which contribute 
less than one per cent to the variance explained. Table 6 presents the 
procedure followed in the selection of variables--from those remaining 
after regression analysis--for causal analysis; this and similar tables 
for each socio-political variable are set up to illustrate that the 
elimination of ethnicity as a control variable has little impact on the 
PIN 
lAG 
ISE 
POP 
COG 
AGG 
ING 
liN 
SEG 
POR 
ETH 
ICO 
ISE 
PIN 
COG 
liN 
SEG 
ING 
lAG 
POR 
AGG 
POP 
ETH 
reo 
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF PRIMARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.729 
.787 
.810 
.837 
.842 
.853 
.856 
.858 
.862 
.863 
.864 
.867 
.460 
.553 
.699 
.715 
.727 
.743 
.746 
.748 
.750 
.752 
.754 
.754 
.532 
.620 
.656 
.701 
.710 
.728 
.734 
.737 
.743 
.746 
.748 
.751 
. 211 
.306 
.489 
.512 
.528 
.553 
.557 
. 560 
.562 
.565 
.569 
.569 
1960 
1970 
.088 
.036 
.045 
.009 
• 018 
.006 
.003 
.006 
.003 
.002 
.003 
.095 
.183 
.023 
.016 
• 025 
.004 
.003 
.002 
.003 
.004 
• 000 
26.235 
17.975 
13.394 
11.767 
9.328 
8.049 
6.705 
5.610 
4.824 
4.116 
3.508 
3.028 
6.173 
4.870 
6.717 
5.251 
4.261 
3. 718 
3.056 
2.549 
2.147 
1.823 
1.561 
1.323 
.729 
.515 
.363 
.447 
.196 
.186 
.233 
.714 
.215 
.174 
-.338 
.379 
.460 
.377 
.024 
.323 
.067 
.076 
-.080 
.111 
.144 
.271 
-.267 
.098 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=1268.374, and SSres=418.867; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=1077.725, and SSres=814.021. DF=23 for simple 
r. ETH= ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in com-
merce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; 
ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce 
to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
POR 
SEG 
ICO 
ING 
PIN 
POP 
lAG 
liN 
COG 
ETH 
AGG 
ISE 
SEG 
AGG 
ISE 
PIN 
liN 
lAG 
ING 
POP 
ETH 
ICO 
COG 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF PRIMARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
124 
R R2 Change F Simple r 
.485 
.616 
.675 
.704 
.775 
.834 
.855 
.875 
.883 
.893 
.896 
.897 
.569 
.660 
.699 
.721 
.741 
.749 
.753 
.755 
.758 
.762 
.766 
.235 
.379 
.456 
.496 
.601 
.696 
.732 
.766 
.780 
.797 
• 803· 
.806 
.324 
.436 
.489 
.520 
.549 
.561 
.567 
• 571 
.574 
.581 
.586 
1960 
1970 
.144 
.077 
.040 
.105 
.095 
.036 
.034 
.014 
.017 
.006 
.003 
.112 
.053 
.031 
.029 
.012 
.006 
.004 
.003 
• 007 
.005 
7.096 
6.731 
5.879 
4.923 
5. 725 
6.887 
6.647 
6.552 
5.910 
5.523 
4.822 
4.155 
11.051 
8.516 
6. 723 
5.428 
4.630 
3.837 
3.190 
2.662 
2.251 
1. 945 
1. 678 
.485 
-.323 
.140 
-.133 
-.093 
-.128 
.139 
-.152 
-.170 
.185 
-.123 
-.242 
-.569 
-.224 
-.510 
-.179 
-.514 
-.439 
-.294 
-.168 
.173 
-.135 
-.452 
NOTE: N=25. Due to insufficient tolerance and F value, POR 
(r=.039) was excluded from the 1970 equation. In the final step of the 
expansion of the 1960 equation, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=686.941, and 
SSres=165.297; in the 1970 equation, DF=11 and 13, SSreg=298.755, and 
SSres=210.411. DF=23 for simple r. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban 
residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income 
in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contri-
butions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to 
G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of 
services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF PRIMARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
POP .284 .080 4.226 -.284 
ETH .341 .116 .036 3.099 .199 
PIN .398 .159 .043 2.900 .083 
liN .430 .185 .026 2.558 -.054 
ING .437 .191 .006 2.086 -.127 
COG .449 .202 .011 1.818 -.144 
AGG .453 .205 .003 1.553 -.109 
reo .455 .207 • 002 1.340 .008 
ISE .457 .209 .002 1.177 -.122 
POR .458 .210 . 001 1.038 -.059 
1970 
reo .312 . 097 5.181 .312 
SEG .416 .173 .076 4.938 -.129 
PIN .458 .210 . 037 4.083 -.164 
liN .500 .250 .040 3.755 .111 
ING .536 .287 .037 3.558 -.054 
POP .561 .315 .028 3.302 -.135 
ISE .579 .335 .020 3.026 .273 
COG .585 .343 .008 2.676 -.111 
POR .593 .352 • 009 2.415 -.058 
AGG .597 .356 .004 2.162 -.182 
ETH .597 .357 .001 1. 922 .067 
NOTE: N=50. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, SEG 
(r=-.153) and lAG (r=-.077) were excluded from the 1960 equation and lAG 
(r=.225) from the 1970 equation. In the final step of the expansion of 
the 1960 equation, DF=10 and 39, SSreg=965.276, and SSres=3625.805; in 
the 1970 equation, DF=11 and 38, SSreg=1081.790, and SSres=1943.649. 
DF=48 for simple r. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor 
in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=in-
come in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contribu-
tions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; 
POR=ports. 
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TABLE 5 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF PRIMARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, CHILE, A~~ UNITED STATES, 
1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
RAD .749 .562 125.942 .749 
PIN .795 • 632 .070 83.542 . 627 
ISE .833 . 695 .063 73.106 .630 
ETH .845 .715 .020 59.611 -.485 
liN .850 .724 . 009 49.339 .698 
POP .855 .732 .008 42.339 .206 
COG .857 .735 .003 36.463 -.034 
ING .858 .737 .002 31.928 -.071 
AGG .861 .742 .005 28.899 -.380 
lAG .862 .744 .002 25.952 .536 
SEG .863 .745 . 001 23.423 -.198 
reo .863 .745 .000 21.241 • 681 
1970 
PIN .437 .191 23.210 .437 
COG .522 .273 .082 18.227 -.108 
ETH .554 .307 .034 14.212 -.008 
liN .627 .393 .086 15.390 .303 
reo .642 .412 .019 13.225 . . 219 
AGG .651 .424 .012 11.414 -.219 
ING .660 .435 .011 10.151 -.035 
lAG .666 .444 .009 9.083 .179 
POR .669 .448 .004 8.120 -.032 
POP .670 .449 . 001 7.267 .067 
ISE . 671 .450 • 001 6.555 .126 
RAD .671 .450 .000 5.950 .270 
NOTE: N=100. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, POR 
(r=.081) was excluded from the 1960 equation and SEG (r=-.102) from the 
1970 equation. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=l2 and 87, SSreg=22754.906, and SSres=7766.621; in the 1970 
equation, DF=l2 and 87, SSre =6358.984, and SSres=7747.918. DF=98 for 
simple r. ETH=ethnicity; PO~=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in in-
dustry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO= income 
in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture 
to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions 
of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR= 
ports; RAD=radios per capita. 
TABLE 6 
VARIABLE SELECTION FROM SETS X AND Z FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGRESSION AND PARTIAL CORRELATION WITH 
SET Y: PRIMARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO (PRI) 
Selection Proced~re 
Step #1. Variables excluded because of associations less than ~.400 
with PRI when controlling for POP or POP and ETH: 
1. Using first-order partials (by POP): None in 1960 or 1970. 
2. Using second-order partials (by POP, ETH): IAG in the cross-
cultural combination of cases in 1960. 
Step #2. Remaining variables with significant partials of at least 
±. 400 where p < . 05: 
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1. Using either first- or second-order partials: PIN, IAG, IIN for 
Brazil in 1960 and ISE in 1970; POR for Chile in 1960 and COG, 
IIN, SEG, IAG, ISE in 1970; none in the U.S. in 1960 or 1970; 
PIN, RAD, ICO, IIN, ISE for the cross-cultural combination of 
cases in 1960 and PIN in 1970. 
2. 
3. 
Additional variables by using first-order partials: 
the cross-cultural cases in 1960.* 
Additional variables by using second-order partials: 
Brazil in 1960; RAD,* IIN in the cross-cultural cases 
IAG for 
coG* in 
in 1970. 
Step #3. Variables with insignificant r but significant partials: 
1. First-order: None. 
2. Second-order: COG* in Brazil in 1960; RAD,* IIN in the cross-
cultural cases in 1970. 
Step #4. Remaining variables (with significant partials) from sub-
sets g or w excluded because of ties to a variable with a stronger 
partial in the same subset using either first- or second-order 
partials: none in Brazil, U.S., or the cross-cultural cases in 
1960 or 1970; none in Chile in 1960, ISE and IAG (tied to IIN) in 
1970. 
Step #5. Variables from set X selected for causal analysis: PIN, IAG 
for Brazil in 1960, ISE in 1970; POR for Chile in 1960, SEG and IIN 
in 1970; none for the U.S. in 1960 or 1970; RAD, PIN, ISE for the 
cross-cultural cases in 1960, PIN in 1970. POP remains as a control 
variable. 
*variables already excluded in regression analysis. ETH=ethni-
city; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in 
agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income 
in services; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions 
of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports; RAD=radios per capita. 
PIN 
ING 
COG 
AGG 
SEG 
IAG 
IIN 
ICO 
ISE 
POR 
PIN 
ING 
COG 
AGG 
SEG 
IAG 
IIN 
!CO 
ISE 
POR 
PIN 
!NG 
COG 
AGG 
SEG 
IAG 
IIN 
!CO 
ISE 
POR 
PIN 
ING 
COG 
AGG 
SEG 
RAD 
IAG 
In! 
!CO 
ISE 
POR 
TABLE 7 
ZERD-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PRIMARY-
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO AND THE INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC VARIABLES, 1960 AND 1970* 
Zero-Order 
1960 1970 
.729 
.233 
.196 
.186 
.215 
.515 
.714 
.379 
.363 
.174 
-.093 
-.133 
-.170 
-.123 
-.323 
.139 
-.152 
.140 
-.242 
.485 
.083 
-.127 
-.144 
-.109 
-.153 
-. C77 
-.054 
.008 
-.122 
-.059 
• 37i 
.076 
.024 
.144 
.067 
-.080 
.323 
.098 
.460 
.111 
-.179 
-.294 
-.452 
-.224 
-.569 
-.439 
-.514 
-.135 
-.510 
.039 
-.164 
-.054 
-.111 
-.182 
-.129 
.225 
.111 
.312 
.273 
-. 058 
First-Order by POP 
1960 1970 
A. Brazil 
• 651 
.044 
-.162 
.198 
-.006 
.478 
• 629 
.081 
.093 
.270 
-.009 
-.081 
-.113 
-.174 
-.327 
.138 
-.091 
.240 
-.237 
• 521 
.281 
-.134 
-.314 
.065 
-.183 
-.178 
.203 
-.048 
.446 
.171 
B. Chile 
-.077 
-.245 
-.437 
-.331 
-.571 
-.413 
-.550 
-.096 
-.523 
.084 
C. United States 
.192 
.034 
.006 
-.066 
-.005 
-.013 
.016 
.139 
• 026 
.051 
-.179 
.001 
-.059 
-.165 
-.077 
.268 
.187 
.381 
.374 
-.019 
Second-Order by POP, ETH 
1960 1970 
.597 
-.137 
-.434 
-.012 
-.217 
.440 
• 601 
-.163 
-.033 
.214 
.004 
-.060 
-.123 
-.170 
-.311 
.142 
-.075 
.zoo 
-.223 
.573 
.219 
.051 
.017 
-.037 
.005 
.035 
.156 
.177 
.092 
.006 
.222 
-.210 
-.396 
-.055 
-.273 
-.303 
.106 
-.147 
.466 
.104 
-.044 
-.225 
-.436 
-.325 
-.558 
-.409 
-.536 
-.135 
-.508 
.ll8 
-.184 
.000 
-.062 
-. 161 
-.081 
.291 
.222 
.382 
.373 
-.036 
D. Brazil, Chile, and United States 
.627 
-.on 
-.034 
-.380 
-.198 
• 749 
.536 
.698 
• 681 
.630 
.081 
.437 
-.035 
-.108 
-.219 
-.102 
.270 
.179 
.303 
.219 
.126 
-.032 
.629 
-.165 
-.182 
-.363 
-.302 
.737 
.511 
. 682 
.663 
.609 
.040 
.436 
-.079 
-.166 
-.238 
-.163 
.315 
.187 
.328 
.251 
.153 
-.042 
.545 
-.194 
-.140 
-.396 
-.284 
.702 
.278 
.628 
.577 
.467 
.039 
.482 
-.085 
-.180 
-.237 
-.169 
.492 
.226 
.514 
.393 
.225 
-.045 
*PIN•labor in industry; INc-contributions of industry to G.N.P.; 
COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; SEc-contributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG-income in 
agricultur2; !IN•income in industry; ICO•income in ~ommerc~; !SE•income 
in services; POR•ports; POP•rural-urban residence; ETH•ethnicity; RAD• 
radios per capita. 
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selection of variables for causal analysis. Similarly, zero-order, 
first-order, and second-order correlations appear in table 7. First-
order partials refer only to correlations when controlling for rural-
urban residence. 
Secondary-school enrollment ratio 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage of 
the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and the secondary-
school enrollment ratio is significant, positive, and increasing 
196Q-1970 from .779 to .856 in Brazil; it is significant, positive, 
and declining 1960-1970 from .849 to .697 in Chile; it is insignifi-
cant in the U.S. and in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 
and 1970 (see tables 8-11). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and the secondary-school enrollment 
ratio in Brazil only in 1970 (.706) and in the combined cross-
cultural cases in 1960 (.580) and 1970 (.569); the association is 
negative and signficant in the U.S. only in 1970 (-.568); it is in-
significant in Chile in 1960 and 1970 (see table 13). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between contributions of the 
major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and the secondary-school en-
rollment ratio in Brazil only in 1960 (commerce, .796; industry, 
.641; agriculture, .679; services, .734); the association is insig-
nificant in Chile, the U.S., and the combined cross-cultural cases 
in 1960 and 1970 (see table 13). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between radios per capita 
and the secondary-school enrollment ratio in the combined cross-
cultural cases in 1960 (.942) and 1970 (.942). (see table 13). 
Research Finding: The association, controlling for rural-urban 
residence, between number of ports and the secondary-school enroll-
ment ratio is insignificant in Brazil, Chile, the U.S., and the 
combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 13). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between average annual income 
in the major economic sectors and the secondary-school enrollment 
ratio in Brazil in 1960 (commerce, .650; services, .505) and 1970 
(industry, .580; commerce, .429), in Chile only in 1970 (agricul-
ture, .428), and in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 
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(agriculture, .702; industry, .889; commerce, .876; services, .828) 
and 1970 (agriculture, .718; industry, .921; commerce, .911; serv-
ices, .885); the association is insignificant in the U.S. in 1960 and 
1970 (see table 13). 
Provincial data for 1960 and 1970 show an increase in the mean 
secondary-school enrollment ratio for Brazil (from 5.78 to 10.79) and 
the U.S. (from 32.54 to 51.38) but a decline in Chile (from 13.51 to 
11.01); provincial variations increased as indicated by the standard 
deviation in Brazil (from 3.14 in 1960 to 5.60 in 1970) and the U.S. 
(from 2.79 in 1960 to 8.71 in 1970) but decreased in Chile (from 4.32 
in 1960 to 3.16 in 1970). Extreme values correspondingly show an overall 
increase in the secondary-school enrollment ratio for Brazil (ranging 
from 2.0 to 17.0 in 1960, from 4.2 to 28.4 in 1970) and the U.S. (ranging 
from 25 to 40 in 1960, from 36 to 70 in 1970) but an overall decline in 
Chile (ranging from 5.8 to 21.8 in 1960, from 4.6 to 16.4 in 1970). The 
combination of cases for cross-cultural analysis shows an increase in 
the mean secondary-school enrollment ratio (from 21.09 in 1960 to 31.14 
in 1970), in the standard deviation (from 12.28 in 1960 to 21.48 in 1970), 
and in extreme values (ranging from ratios of 2 to 40 in 1960, from 4.2 
to 70 in 1970). For Brazil and Chile, the secondary ratio is substan-
tially lower than the primary ratio with less of a difference in the 
U.S. data. Again it reflects different age structures as well as dif-
ferences in retaining students in school and the intervention of another 
variable, i.e., the age at which compulsory education ends. The trend 
suggested in the Chilean data, in direct contrast to Brazil and the U.S., 
is accounted for by the change in the Chilean educational system between 
1960 and 1970 which decreased the size of the secondary-school population. 
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Regression and correlation results. In the regression of the 
secondary-school enrollment ratio on the industrial-economic variables, 
ethnicity, and rural-urban residence, the F test shows R to be signi-
ficant at the .05 level at all steps of the expansion of the 1960 and 
1970 regression equations in Brazil, Chile, the U.S., and the combined 
cross-cultural cases. Again with the exception of the U.S. cases, the 
percentage of variance explained by using this particular set of vari-
ables in a linear equation declines (although slightly) between 1960 
and 1970, respectively, from 96.9 to 94.9 in Brazil (see table 8), 
from 84.3 to 80.3 in Chile (see table 9), and from 95.6 to 90.8 in the 
cross-cultural combination of cases (see table 11); in the U.S. (see 
table 10), the percentage of variance explained increased from 45 to 
49.4 per cent. After eliminating all variables that contribute less 
than one per cent to the explanation of variance, the procedure of selec-
tion for causal analysis is given in table 12. Zero-order and partial 
correlations appear in table 13. 
Higher education 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and higher 
education is significant, positive, and increasing 1960-1970 from 
.603 to .674 in Brazil; it is significant, positive, and declining 
1960-1970 from .596 to .526 in Chile; it is significant and posi-
tive in the U.S. only in 1960 (.479); it is insignificant in the 
combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see tables 14-17). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and higher education in the com-
bined cross-cultural cases only in 1970 (.502); the association is 
insignificant in Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. in 1960 and 1970 (see 
table 19). 
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TABLE 8 
S~~RY OF REGRESSION OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple. r 
1960 
COG .894 .800 92.550 .894 
ISE . 929 .864 .064 70.112 .760 
ING .941 .887 .023 55.125 .705 
ETH .957 . 917 .030 55.612 -.575 
POP . 970 . 942 .025 62.415 .779 
lAG . 974 .948 .006 55.731 .174 
IIN . 976 .953 .005 49.405 . 613 
AGG . 977 • 955 .002 42.771 .441 
SEG . 982 . 965 • 010 46.061 .783 
PIN .984 . 968 .003 42.838 .604 
ICO . 984 . 969 .001 37.540 .850 
POR . 984 .969 .000 31.819 .015 
1970 
PIN .913 .833 115.526 . 913 
ING .933 .872 .039 74.967 .598 
SEG .954 . 911 .039 71.651 . 664 
POP .960 .922 . 011 59.679 .856 
IIN • 962 .927 .005 48.303 .772 
ETH .967 . 935 .008 43.226 -.497 
AGG . 968 . 938 • 003 37.277 .371 
COG . 972 . 946 .008 35.519 .764 
ISE .973 .947 .001 30.132 .193 
POR .973 . 948 .001 25.766 .018 
lAG .974 . 948 .000 21.940 .333 
reo .974 .949 .001 18.609 .627 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=228.853, and SSres=7.192; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=713.181, and SSres=38.324. DF=23 for simple 
r. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in com-
merce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
POP 
AGG 
PIN 
liN 
lAG 
reo 
ETH 
COG 
ING 
ISE 
POR 
SEG 
POP 
lAG 
POR 
liN 
ISE 
PIN 
!CO 
ING 
SEG 
AGG 
ETH 
COG 
TABLE 9 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.849 
.857 
.867 
.876 
.883 
.888 
.895 
.900 
.916 
• 917 
.917 
.918 
.697 
.761 
.781 
.803 
.827 
.840 
.857 
.871 
• 877 
.891 
.894 
.896 
.721 
.734 
.752 
.769 
.780 
.789 
.802 
.809 
.840 
.841 
.842 
.843 
.486 
.580 
.610 
.645 
• 685 
.706 
.734 
.759 
.769 
.794 
.799 
.803 
1960 
1970 
.013 
.018 
• 017 
• 011 
.009 
.013 
.007 
.031 
.001 
.001 
. 001 
.094 
.030 
.035 
.040 
.021 
.028 
.025 
. 010 
.025 
.005 
.004 
59.500 
30.481 
21.325 
16.652 
13.473 
11.245 
9.840 
8.526 
8.761 
7.457 
6.320 
5.371 
21.751 
15.216 
10.950 
9.092 
8.273 
7.227 
6.732 
6.332 
5.571 
5.416 
4. 717 
4.084 
.849 
-.380 
.504 
.601 
.018 
.346 
-.132 
.573 
.347 
.723 
.138 
.571 
.697 
.592 
.069 
.539 
. 637 
.636 
.356 
.394 
.528 
-.351 
-.089 
.562 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=377.985, and SSres=70.372; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=192.766, and SSres=47.200. DF=23 for simple 
r. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in com-
merce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 10 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
ISE .440 .193 11.533 -.440 
ETH .514 .264 • 071 8.454 -.132 
PIN .544 .296 .032 6.467 .056 
POP .582 .339 .043 5. 772 -.390 
liN .601 .361 .022 4.991 -.071 
ING .624 .389 .028 4.576 -.357 
COG .655 .430 .041 4.526 -.348 
lAG .661 . 437 .007 3.986 -.140 
POR .669 .448 . 011 3.613 -.345 
!CO . 670 .449 .001 3.184 -.237 
AGG .670 .450 .001 2.827 -.137 
1970 
PIN .544 .296 20.248 -.544 
POP .582 .339 . 043 12.075 -.155 
ISE . 608 .369 .030 8.997 .143 
COG .626 .392 .023 7.260 -.235 
lAG . 642 .412 .020 6.180 .178 
liN .673 .453 .041 5.935 .088 
SEG . 692 .479 .026 5.532 -.165 
POR .701 .491 .012 4.959 -.019 
ING • 703 .494 .003 4.349 -.318 
!CO .703 .494 .000 3.820 -.024 
NOTE: N=50. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, SEG 
(r=-.373) was excluded from the 1960 equation and AGG (r=-.044) and ETH 
(r=-.016) from the 1970 equation. In the final step of the expansion of 
the 1960 equation, DF=11 and 38, SSreg=171.491, and SSres=209.490; in 
the 1970 equation, DF=10 and 39, SSreg=1839.315, and SSres=1877.830. 
DF=48 for simple r. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN= 
labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; 
ICQ=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of 
agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG= 
contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to 
G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 11 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 
1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
RAD .940 .885 755.679 .940 
PIN .956 .914 .029 520.240 .651 
ISE .966 . 934 .020 459.587 .846 
POP • 972 . 944 .010 407.338 .361 
liN .973 . 947 .003 338.795 .898 
SEG . 974 . 949 .002 293.937 -.156 
ING .976 .953 .004 270.152 -.029 
POR • 977 .955 .002 241.818 .038 
lAG .978 .956 .001 220.966 .727 
AGG .978 .956 .000 197.554 -.388 
COG .978 .956 .000 177.698 .010 
1970 
RAD .946 .895 839.985 .946 
lAG .949 .900 .005 439.584 .712 
ETH .950 . 903 .003 298.334 -.818 
POP .950 . 903 .000 223.474 -.293 
ISE .951 .904 .001 178.001 .895 
reo . 951 .906 .002 149.604 . 919 
POR .952 .906 .000 127.628 .051 
COG .952 .907 .001 111.225 -.044 
liN .952 . 907 .000 98.327 .924 
AGG .952 .907 .000 87.720 -.365 
SEG .952 .907 .000 78.951 -.149 
PIN .952 .908 .001 71.660 .445 
ING .952 .908 .000 65.416 -.123 
NOTE: N=100. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, !CO 
(r=.887) and ETH (r=-.748) were excluded from the 1960 equation. In the 
final step of the expansion of the 1960 equation, DF=11 and 88, SSreg= 
14280.041, and SSres=642.888; in the 1970 equation, DF=13 and 86, ssreg= 
41476.526, and SSres=4194.424. DF=98 for simple r. ETH=ethnicity; POP= 
rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; 
IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; 
AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of indus-
try to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contribu-
tions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports; RAD=radios per capita. 
TABLE 12 
VARIABLE SELECTION FROM SETS X AND Z FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGRESSION AND PARTIAL CORRELATION WITH 
SET Y: SECONDARY-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO (SND) 
Selection Procedure 
Step #1. Variables excluded because of associations less than !.400 
with SND when controlling for POP or POP and ETH: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials (by POP or 
ETH): PIN, liN for Brazil in 1960 and SEG, ING, COG in 
PIN, COG, ISE, SEG, IIN for Chile in 1960 and 1970; ISE 
U.S. in 1960. 
by POP, 
1970; 
for the 
2. Additional variables by using second-order partials: AGG,* 
ICo,* ISE for Brazil in 1960 and Ico• in 1970; IAG* for the 
cross-cultural cases in 1960 and PIN in 1970. 
Step #2. Remaining variables with significant partials of at least 
::.400 where p< • 05: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials: ING, COG, SEG 
for Brazil in 1960 and PIN, liN in 1970; IAG for Chile in 1970; 
PIN for the U.S. in 1970; PIN, RAD, liN, ICO, ISE for the cross-
cultural cases in 1960 and RAD, IAG, liN, lCO, ISE in 1970. 
2. Additional variables by using first-order partials: AGG,* lCO, 
lSE for Brazil in 1960 and ICO* in 1970; IAG* for the cr~ss­
3. 
cultural cases in 1960 and PIN* in 1970. 
Additional variables by using second-order partials: 
the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970. 
AGG* for 
~· Variables with insignificant r but significant partials: 
1. First-order: None. 
2. Second-order: AGG* for cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970. 
St~p #4. Remaining variables (with significant partials) from sub-
sets g or w excluded because of ties to a variable with a stronger 
partial in the same subset using either first- or second-order 
partials: SEG, lNG (both tied to COG) for Brazil in 1960. 
Step #5. Variables from set X selected for causal analysis: COG, 
lSE (first-order) for Brazil in 1960 and PIN in 1970; POP (set Z) 
as only variable associated with SND for Chile in 1960, IAG in 
1970; none for the U.S. in 1960 and PIN in 1970; RAD, PIN, ISE 
for the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and RAD, IAG in 1970. POP 
remains as a control variable. 
*variables already excluded in regression analysis. ETH•ethni-
city; POP•rural-urban residence; PlN•labor in industry; IAG•income in 
agriculture; IIN•income in industry; ICD-income in commerce; ISE•income 
in services; AGG•contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING-contribu-
tions of industry to G.N.P.; COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.: 
SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; ~~radios per capita. 
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TABLE 13 
ZER0-0RDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SECONDARY-
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIO AND THE INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC VARIABLES, 1960 AND 1970* 
Zero-Order First-Order by POP Second-Order by POP, ETH 
1960 1970 
.604 
.705 
. 894 
.441 
.783 
.174 
• 613 
.850 
• 760 
.015 
• 504 
.347 
• .573 
-.380 
.5il 
. 018 
.601 
. 346 
• 723 
.138 
.056 
-.357 
-.348 
-.137 
-.373 
-.140 
-.071 
-.237 
-.440 
-.345 
. 913 
. 598 
• 764 
.371 
.664 
.333 
. 772 
• 627 
.193 
.018 
.636 
.394 
.562 
-.351 
.528 
.592 
.539 
.356 
.637 
.069 
-.544 
-.318 
-.235 
-.044 
-.165 
• 178 
.088 
-.024 
.143 
-.019 
1960 1970 
A. Brazil 
.374 
. 641 
.796 
.679 
• 734 
. 004 
.134 
.650 
.505 
.207 
-. 179 
-.146 
-.101 
-. 220 
-.037 
.060 
.106 
-.187 
.124 
-. 027 
.706 
.117 
.293 
.211 
.163 
.142 
.580 
.429 
.169 
.350 
B. Chile 
.199 
.034 
.302 
-.087 
• 276 
.428 
.130 
.255 
• 371 
-. 145 
c. United States 
.208 
-.187 
-.181 
-.080 
-.214 
-.056 
.026 
-.095 
-.304 
-.234 
-.568 
-.282 
-.188 
-.022 
-.107 
.226 
.170 
.028 
.239 
.029 
1960 
-.077 
.480 
. 701 
.374 
.614 
-.281 
-.086 
.332 
.366 
.051 
-.169 
-.130 
-.108 
-.217 
-. 017 
.063 
.122 
-.251 
.142 
.000 
.194 
-.203 
-.192 
-.107 
-.225 
-.098 
-.077 
-.124 
-.375 
-.205 
D. Brazil, Chile, and United States 
.651 
-.029 
.010 
-.388 
-.156 
.940 
.727 
.898 
.887 
.846 
.038 
.445 
-.123 
-.044 
-.365 
-.149 
.946 
.712 
.. 924 
.919 
.!!95 
.051 
.580 
-.192 
-.245 
-.367 
-.335 
.942 
.702 
. 889 
.876 
.828 
-.039 
.569 
.026 
.128 
-.328 
.008 
.942 
.718 
.921 
• 911 
.885 
.096 
.458 
-.301 
-.225 
-.516 
-.377 
.872 
.326 
. 740 
.702 
. 563 
-.073 
1970 
.655 
.000 
.208 
.004 
.041 
-.023 
.504 
.327 
.204 
.237 
.215 
.042 
.304 
-.085 
.293 
.432 
.149 
.253 
.389 
-.140 
-.568 
-.282 
-.188 
-.023 
-.106 
.227 
.174 
.028 
.239 
.034 
.348 
-.189 
-.139 
-.493 
-.187 
.836 
.403 
.778 
.744 
.666 
.013 
*PIN•labor in industry; INc-contributions of industry to G.N.P.; 
COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG•income in 
agriculture; IIN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income 
in services; POR•ports; POP•rural-urban residence; ETH•ethnicity; RAD• 
radios per capita. 
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Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between contributions of the 
major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and higher education in Brazil 
in 1960 (commerce, .663; services, .455) and 1970 (commerce, .595); 
the association is insignificant in Chile, the U.S., and the com-
bined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 19). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between radios per capita 
and higher education in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 
(.915) and 1970 (.945). (see table 19). 
Research Finding: The association, controlling for rural-urban 
residence, between number of ports and higher education is insig-
nificant in Brazil, Chile, the U.S., and the combined cross-
cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 19). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between average annual in-
come in the major economic sectors and higher education in Brazil 
only in 1970 (agriculture, .568; commerce, .604), in the U.S. only 
in 1970 (agriculture, .463), and in the combined cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 (agriculture, .789; industry, .903; commerce, .897; 
services, .883) and in 1970 (agriculture, .775; industry, .934; 
commerce, .921; services, .875); the association is insignificant 
in Chile in 1960 and 1970 (see table 19). 
Whether university enrollment is defined in terms of total popu-
lation or school population, there is a distortion of university en-
rollment data (and to a lesser degree of primary and secondary enroll-
ment data) that must be taken into account and which is based on the 
type of census taken in the three nations in this study. The censuses 
of the U.S. in 1960 and 1970 and of Brazil in 1970 were de jure; those 
of Brazil in 1960 and Chile in 1960 and 1970 were de facto. One re-
sult is, e.g., that a university population appears in Chilean prov-
inces where there are no universities although most provinces now have 
a university or a branch of a university and, in this case (where no 
university exists), university enrollment as a percentage of primary 
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and secondary enrollments is extremely small. Provincial university 
enrollment figures in both de jure and de facto censuses also depend on 
whether a province has one or more (or no) universities, the size and 
prestige of these universities, and whether or not they are located in 
large cities, i.e., their "drawing power" for prospective students both 
within and from outside the province. These factors contribute to an 
understanding of the 1960 and 1970 provincial data. 
In the provincial data for 1960 and 1970, respectively, the mean 
enrollment in higher education as a percentage of primary and secondary 
enrollment was 0.69 and 0.75 per cent in Brazil, 0.47 and 0.69 per cent 
in Chile, 7.32 and 16.23 per cent in the U.S.; these figures reflect 
not only lower university enrollments in Brazil and Chile than the U.S. 
but also the very uneven distribution of universities among provinces. 
This characteristic also appears in the extreme values which ranged 
from 0.14 to 3.56 per cent in 1960 and 0.29 and 3.48 per cent in 1970 
in Brazil, 0.02 and 4.11 per cent in 1960 and 0.02 and 6.07 per cent in 
1970 in Chile, 3.5 and 12.9 per cent in 1960 and 10.0 and 25.7 per cent 
in 1970 in the U.S. The dispersion of cases increased between 1960 and 
1970 in the three nations although insignificantly so in Brazil; the 
standard deviations for 1960 and 1970 were, respectively, 0.74 and 0.76 
in Brazil, 0.95 and 1.41 in Chile, 1.97 and 3.73 in the U.S. By com-
bining the cases of the three nations for cross-cultural analysis, the 
mean enrollment in higher education as a percentage of primary and 
secondary enrollment increased from 3.95 in 1960 to 8.48 per cent in 
1970, the standard deviation increased from 3.71 in 1960 to 8.26 in 
1970, and extreme values of 0.02 and 12.9 per cent in 1960 became 0.02 
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and 25.7 per cent in 1970. 
Regression and correlation results. In the 1960 and 1970 re-
gression equations, R is significant at the .05 level as determined by 
the F test at each step of the expansion of the equations for Brazil 
(see table 14), the U.S. (see table 16), the combined cross-cultural 
cases (see table 17), and for Chile in 1970 (see table 15). In the 
1960 equation for Chile, R is significant through the inclusion of per-
centage contribution of industry to the G.N.P. (ING) so the remaining 
two variables are excluded. The percentage of variance explained by 
including all variables where R is significant declines 1960-1970 from 
92.3 to 90.7 per cent for Brazil but increases from 62.4 to 84.1 per 
cent for Chile, from 54.2 to 58.1 per cent for the U.S., and from 89.7 
to 93.9 per cent for the combined cross-cultural cases. For the com-
bined cross-cultural cases in 1960, three variables were temporarily 
included (PIN or percentage of labor force in industry, ISE and lAG or 
average income in services and agriculture) since the usefulness of 
radios per capita (RAD) is questionable, although they each contribute 
less than one per cent to explaining variance. For each of these three 
variables, simple r indicates a strong association and is significant 
at the .001 level. After eliminating variables on the basis of regres-
sion analysis, the procedure used for variable selection for causal 
analysis appears in table 18. Zero-order and partial correlations are 
found in table 19. 
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TABLE 14 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F. Simple r 
1960 
COG .797 .636 40.261 .797 
ING .904 .817 .181 49.309 .484 
ETH .912 .832 .015 34.669 -.431 
IAG .922 .850 .018 28.546 -.167 
ISE .931 .867 . 017 24.845 .514 
POR .933 .870 . 003 20.213 -.025 
AGG .936 .876 .006 17.230 .290 
SEG .944 . 891 .015 16.419 . 612 
IIN .948 .899 .008 14.952 .314 
POP .953 . 909 .010 14.092 .603 
reo .959 . 921 .012 13.797 .628 
PIN .961 .923 .002 12.109 .293 
1970 
COG .801 . 643 41.440 .801 
ING .893 .798 .155 43.526 .504 
lAG .921 . 849 .051 39.438 .606 
ISE • 931 .866 .017 32.558 -.201 
ETH .938 .880 .014 28.014 -.485 
POP .941 .885 .005 23.205 .674 
POR .945 .894 .009 20.489 .056 
PIN . 947 .897 .003 17.466 .608 
SEG .947 .898 .001 14.694 .640 
AGG .951 .906 • 008 13.508 .336 
liN .952 . 906 .000 11.518 .649 
ICO .952 .907 .001 9.767 .727 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=11.988, and SSres=.990; i~ the 1970 equation, 
DF=12 and 12, ssreg=12.4ll, and ssres=1_.270. For sLmple r, DF=23. ETH= 
ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income 
in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=in-
come in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=con-
tributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to 
G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 15 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.596 
. 650 
.697 
.723 
.758 
.768 
.776 
.779 
.790 
.792 
.794 
.565 
.751 
.804 
.835 
.863 
.885 
.900 
.907 
.912 
.915 
.916 
.917 
.355 
.423 
.486 
.523 
.574 
. 591 
. 603 
.608 
. 624 
.627 
.630 
.319 
.564 
• 647 
• 698 
.745 
.783 
.810 
.823 
.832 
.837 
.840 
.841 
1960 
1970 
• 068 
.063 
.037 
.051 
.017 
.012 
.005 
.016 
.003 
.003 
.245 
.083 
. 051 
.047 
.038 
• 027 
. 013 
.009 
.005 
.003 
.001 
12.669 
8.066 
6.634 
5.491 
5.140 
4.335 
3.695 
3.102 
2.767 
2.362 
2.018 
10.814 
14.231 
12.856 
11.587 
11.132 
10.880 
10.363 
9.321 
8.261 
7.227 
6.230 
5.327 
.596 
.247 
.562 
-.424 
.208 
.312 
.333 
• 203 
.102 
-.124 
.272 
.565 
-.028 
.526 
.102 
.259 
.413 
.193 
-.410 
-.124 
.232 
.104 
.267 
NOTE: N=25. Due to insufficient tolerance and F value, POR 
(r=.098) was excluded from the 1960 equation. In the final step of the 
expansi~n of the 1960 eq~ation, DF=11 and 13, SSreg=l3.680, and SSres= 
8.009; ~n the 1970 equat1on, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=40.328, and SSres= 
7.569. For simpler, DF=23. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; 
PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in indus-
try; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions 
of agricultu~e to G.N.P.; ING;contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG= 
contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to 
G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 16 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 
1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
POP .479 .229 14.310 .479 
ETH .629 .396 .167 15.457 -.426 
PIN .680 .462 .066 13.200 -.045 
ISE .697 . 486 .024 10.664 .198 
IAG .707 .501 .015 8.839 .256 
SEG .723 .523 .022 7.882 .272 
reo .727 .529 .006 6.743 .143 
IIN .731 .535 .006 5.896 .252 
COG .735 .540 .005 5.222 .262 
AGG .736 .541 .001 4.611 .230 
POR .736 .542 .001 4.093 .082 
1970 
IAG .508 .258 16.762 .508 
POP .576 .332 .074 11.724 .387 
ISE . 668 .446 .114 12.391 .054 
ETH .699 .489 .043 10.806 -.338 
SEG .724 .524 .035 9. 716 .197 
ING .751 .564 .040 9.275 .037 
COG .755 .570 . 006 7.963 .140 
reo .759 .577 .007 7.000 .125 
PIN .761 .579 .002 6.137 -.347 
POR .762 • 581 .002 5.420 .143 
IIN .762 .581 .000 4.805 .350 
AGG .762 .581 .000 4.291 .077 
NOTE: N=50. Due to insufficient tolerance and F value, ING 
(r=.203) was excluded from the 1960 equation. In the final step of the 
expansio~ of the 1960 equ~tion, DF=11 and 38, SSreg=103.564, and SSres= 
87.389; 1n the 1970 equat1on, DF=12 and 37, SSreg=397.105, and SSres= 
285.302. For simple r, DF=48. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; 
PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in indus-
try; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions 
of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG= 
contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to 
G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 17 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
BRAZIL, CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.912 
.929 
.938 
• 942 
.943 
. 945 
• 945 
.946 
. 947 
. 947 
.947 
.947 
. 947 
.942 
.955 
.958 
.961 
.963 
.966 
.966 
. 968 
.968 
. 968 
.969 
.969 
.969 
.832 
.863 
.881 
.889 
.890 
.893 
.894 
.896 
.897 
.897 
. 897 
.897 
.897 
.888 
. 913 
. 919 
.924 
.928 
.934 
.934 
.937 
. 938 
.938 
.939 
.939 
.939 
1960 
1970 
.031 
.018 
.008 
.001 
.003 
.001 
.002 
• 001 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.025 
.006 
.005 
.004 
.006 
.000 
.003 
.001 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.000 
488.361 
306.336 
237.984 
190.654 
152.591 
129.595 
111.609 
98.841 
87.145 
78.053 
70.302 
63.762 
58.206 
777.607 
514.926 
366.077 
289.879 
244.741 
219.471 
188.403 
170.169 
151.640 
136.672 
124.057 
112.534 
102.715 
.912 
.395 
-.830 
.502 
.894 
.803 
.045 
-.329 
-.105 
-.006 
.909 
.105 
.904 
.942 
.773 
-.227 
.409 
-.831 
.882 
-.389 
-.133 
-.028 
-.139 
.924 
.937 
.094 
NOTE: N=100. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=13 and 86, SSreg=l221.716, and SSres=138.853; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=13 and 86, SSreg=6350.571, and SSres=409.008. For simpler, 
DF=98. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in com-
merce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports; 
RAD=radios per capita. 
TABLE 18 
VARIABLE SELECTION FROM SETS X AND Z FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGRESSION A.\~ PARTIAL CORRELATION WITH 
SET Y: HIGHER EDUCATION (COL) 
Selection Procedure 
Step #1. Variables excluded because of associations less than :.400 
with COL controlling for POP or POP and ETH: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials (by POP or by POP, 
E!rl): ING, ICO, ISE for Brazil in 1960 and PIN, lNG, SEG, IlN 
in 1970; AGG, ISE for Chile in 1960 and AGG, ISE, PIN in 1970; 
PIN for the cross-cultural cases in 1960. 
2. Additional variables by using second-order partials: SEG for 
Brazil in 1960; PIN* for the cross-cultural cases in 1970. 
Steo #2. Remaining variables with significant partials of at least 
~o where p<.os: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials: 
in 1960 and COG, IAG, ICO in 1970; lAG for the 
RAD, lAG, liN, ICO, ISE for the cross-cultural 
and 1970. 
COG for Brazil 
U.S. in 1970; 
cases in 1960 
3. 
Add~tional variables by using first-order partials: SEG for 
Brazil in 1960; PIN* for the cross-cultural cases in 1970. 
Additional variables by using second-order partials: lAG for 
Brazil in 1960; AGG* for the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 
1970. 
Step #3. Variables with insignificant r but significant partials: 
1. First-order: None. 
2. Second-order: IAG for 
cultural cases in 1960 
* Brazil in 1960; AGG for the cross-
and 1970. 
Step ~4. Remaining variables (with significant partials) from sub-
sets g or w excluded because of ties to a variable with a stronger 
partial in the same subset using either first- or second-order 
partials: SEG (tied to COG) for Brazil in 1960; IAG (tied to lSE) 
for the cross-cult~ral cases in 1960. 
Step qs. Variables from set X selected for causal analysis: COG, lAG 
(second-order) for Brazil in 1960 and COG, IAG in 1970; POP (set Z) 
as only variable associated with COL for Chile in 1960 and 1970; 
similarly, POP (set Z) for the U.S. in 1960 and lAG in 1970; RAD, 
ISE for the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and RAD, lAG in 1970. 
POP remains as a control variable; therefore, IAG is excluded for 
Brazil in 1960 since second-order partials will not be used. 
* Variables already excluded in regression analysis. ETH•ethnicity; 
POP•rural-urban residence; PIN•labor in industry; IAG•income in agricul-
ture; IlN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income in 
services; AGG•contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING•contributions 
of industry to G.N.P.; COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEc-con-
tributions of services to G.N.P.; RAD•radios per capita. 
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TABLE 19 
ZERQ-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HIGHER EDUCATION 
AND THE lSDUSTRIAL-ECONOMlC VARIABLES, 1960 Ah~ 1970* 
Zero-Order First-Order by POP Second-Order by POP, ETH 
1960 1970 
0 293 
o484 
o797 
o290 
o612 
-o167 
o314 
o628 
0514 
-o025 
o312 
o102 
o247 
-0424 
o272 
o208 
o333 
o203 
o562 
o098 
-o045 
.203 
.262 
.230 
.272 
o256 
.252 
.143 
o198 
.082 
.608 
.504 
.801 
.336 
. 640 
.606 
.649 
.727 
-o201 
o056 
o413 
.102 
.259 
-.410 
. 267 
-.028 
.232 
.193 
.565 
o104 
-.347 
.037 
.140 
.077 
.197 
.508 
.350 
.125 
.054 
.143 
1960 1970 
A. Brazil 
-.027 
.304 
. 663 
.349 
. 455 
-.385 
-.204 
.340 
.182 
.078 
.122 
.122 
.595 
.179 
.313 . 
.568 
.392 
.604 
-.389 
o250 
B. Chile 
-0151 
-o269 
-.324 
-.308 
-.238 
.270 
-o098 
-.143 
o172 
-. 011 
-.001 
-.249 
-.040 
-.244 
-.005 
-.356 
-.196 
.070 
.361 
-.029 
C. United States 
-0239 
-.079 
.013 
o173 
o027 
. 171 
.159 
-o061 
-.060 
-.117 
-o339 
-.144 
-.031 
.024 
.026 
.463 
.224 
-o002 
-o140 
.031 
D. Brazil, Chile, and United States 
.502 
-o006 
o045 
-.329 
-.105 
• 912 
.803 
.909 
.904 
o894 
.105 
.409 
-0 139 
-.028 
-.389 
-ol33 
. 942 
o773 
• 937 
.924 
.882 
• 094 
.370 
-.183 
-0227 
-.302 
-. 291. 
.915 
.789 
.903 
.897 
.883 
• 027 
.502 
-o031 
.104 
-.361 
-.011. 
.945 
.775 
.934 
.921 
.875 
.130 
1960 
-.358 
.103 
.552 
.082 
.284 
-o563 
-.363 
.076 
o010 
-.028 
-o150 
-.269 
-.326 
-.307 
-.237 
o270 
-o096 
-.161 
.176 
-.007 
-.330 
-0132 
-.011 
.118 
.004 
.Oil 
-.140 
-.156 
-.238 
-.012 
o070 
-.353 
-.219 
-o507 
-o367 
o736 
.440 
• 662 
.653 
.593 
.029 
1970 
-.057 
.013 
.550 
-0022 
.219 
.496 
. 238 
• 541 
-.391 
.129 
-.011 
-. 261 
-o042 
-.247 
-.014 
-.360 
-.219 
.081 
.361 
-.039 
-.337 
-.149 
-.020 
-.002 
.052 
o422 
.117 
-.004 
-.141 
.131 
.211 
-.309 
-0198 
-.573 
-.243 
.839 
.525 
.805 
.762 
. 618 
.070 
*PIN•labor in industry; ING-contributions of industry to GoN.P.; 
COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to GoN.P.; lAG•income in 
agriculture; llN•income in industry; lCO•income in commerce; lSE•income 
in services; POR-ports; POP•rural-urban residence; ETH•ethnicity; RADa 
radios per capita. 
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Social linkages: illiteracy rates 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and illiteracy 
rates is significant, negative, and increasing 1960-1970 from -.538 
to -.618 in Brazil; it is significant, negative, and declining 1960-
1970 from -.803 to -.723 in Chile; it is significant and negative 
in the combined cross-cultural cases only in 1960 (-.469); it is 
insignificant in the U.S. in 1960 and 1970 (see tables 20-23). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, negative association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and illiteracy rates in Brazil 
only in 1970 (-.449), in Chile in 1960 (-.534) and 1970 (-.443), 
and in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 (-.629) and 1970 
(-.745); the association is insignificant in the U.S. in 1960 and 
1970 (see table 25). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, negative association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between contributions of the 
major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and illiteracy rates in Brazil 
only in 1960 (agriculture, -.444) and in Chile in 1960 (industry, 
-.461; commerce, -.530; services, -.566) and 1970 (industry, -.423; 
commerce, -.703; services, -.709); the association is insignifi-
cant in the U.S. and the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 
1970 (see table 25). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, negative association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between radios per capita 
and illiteracy rates in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 
(-.717) and 1970 (-.841). (see table 25). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, negative association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between number of ports and 
illiteracy rates in Brazil only in 1970 (-.501) and in Chile in 
1960 (-.550) and 1970 (-.433); the association is insignificant in 
the U.S. and the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 
(see table 25) . 
Research Finding: There is a significant, negative association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between average annual in-
come in the major economic sectors and illiteracy rates in Brazil 
in 1960 (agriculture, -.764; industry, -.425; commerce, -.612; serv-
ices, -.573) and 1970 (industry, -.632), in Chile in 1960 (agri-
culture, -.455; services, -.444) and 1970 (agriculture, -.603; in-
dustry, -.551; commerce, -.457; services, -.668), in the U.S. in 
1960 (agriculture, -.635; industry, -.590; services, -.414) and 1970 
(agriculture, -.638; industry, -.527), and in the combined cross-
cultural cases in 1960 (agriculture, -.592; industry, -.696; com-
merce, -.650; services, -.614) and 1970 (agriculture, -.619; indus-
try, -.841; commerce, -.780; services, -.687). (see table 25). 
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A high rate of illiteracy has been one of the major obstacles in 
Brazil to the expansion of functional linkages particularly in terms of 
mass participation in the political process. Of the Brazilian popula-
tion aged 15 years and over, illiterates--defined by the national cen-
sus as not knowing how to read or write--represented 56.2 per cent in 
1940, 50.7 per cent in 1950, 39.5 per cent in 1960, and 33.1 per cent 
in 1970. Rural-urban differences in illiteracy are sharp. In 1950, 
the illiterate population represented 15.6 per cent of the urban popu-
lation in contrast to 63.5 per cent of the rural population; in 1960, 
the illiteracy rate was 39.5 per cent for the nation but 66 per cent in 
rural areas and, in 1970, the more urban-industrial areas (Guanabara, 
Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and the Federal District) had an illiteracy 
rate of 18-19 per cent in contrast to 33.1 per cent for the nation. High 
but declining illiteracy and provincial variations appear in the 1960 
and 1970 provincial data for Brazil in which the mean percentage illit-
erate declines from 42.42 to 38.86 per cent, the standard deviation in-
creases from 12.73 to 13.17, and extreme values range from 17 to 60 per 
cent illiterate in 1960 and from 17 to 56.5 per cent in 1970. 
Chile has high literacy rates while functional illiteracy rates 
are comparable to illiteracy rates in Brazil. Illiteracy among the 
Chilean population--defined as not knowing how to read or write as in 
Brazil--aged 15 years and over declined from 21.3 per cent in 1940 to 
19.7 per cent in 1950, 16.4 per cent in 1960, and 11.7 per cent in 1970. 
For the same population, functional illiteracy (three years of schooling 
or less) was, e.g., in 1960, 37 per cent with a rate of 24.8 per cent 
in urban areas in contrast to 66 per cent in rural areas. Partly 
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because of rural-urban differences, illiteracy rates in Chile--although 
much lower than in Brazil and although continuing to decline--vary 
widely by province which is illustrated by the provincial data for 1960 
and 1970. The mean percentage illiterate declines from 21.15 to 20.16 
per cent, the standard deviation declines from 8.41 to 8.01, and ex-
treme values range from 6.1 to 32.2 per cent illiterate in 1960 and 
from 5.9 to 30.7 per cent in 1970. In Brazil and Chile, illiteracy 
rates have declined not only as a result of expanding opportunities for 
formal schooling. Both nations have had active literacy campaigns con-
ducted by the government as well as private organizations. 
The indicator of illiteracy used for the U.S. in this study was 
functional illiteracy rates (population 25 years of age and over with 
less than five years of schooling). These rates were 13.7 per cent in 
1940, 11.1 per cent in 1950, 8.3 per cent in 1960, and 5.3 per cent in 
1970. The mean percentage functionally illiterate in the provincial 
data was 8.36 in 1960 and 5.38 in 1970; the standard deviation declined 
from 5.13 to 3.24; extreme values ranged from 2.9 to 21.3 per cent func-
tionally illiterate in 1960 and from 1.9 to 13.1 per cent in 1970. The 
use of a different indicator for the U.S. means that data for the 50 
U.S. cases are not strictly comparable to the data for Brazil and Chile 
which must be considered in the cross-cultural analysis combining the 
cases from the three nations; in the cross-cultural combination of cases 
for 1960 and 1970, the mean percentage illiterate was 20.07 in 1960 and 
17.45 in 1970, the standard deviation declined from 16.29 in 1960 to 
15.94 in 1970, and extreme values ranged from 2.9 to 60.0 per cent 
illiterate in 1960 and from 1.9 to 56.5 per cent in 1970. 
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Regression and correlation results. In the summary regression 
tables, R, as determined by the F test, is significant at the .05 level 
for all steps of the expansion of the equations in 1960 and 1970 for 
Brazil (see table 20), Chile (see table 21), the U.S. (see table 22), 
and the cross-cultural combination of cases (see table 23). The per-
centage of variance in illiteracy rates explained by the 1960 and 1970 
equations declines slightly from 90.8 to 81.2 per cent for Brazil, from 
95.7 to 94.2 per cent for Chile, and from 87.0 to 82.7 per cent for the 
U.S. (functional illiteracy); it, however, increases from 80.5 to 84.9 
per cent in the cross-cultural combination of cases. Table 24 shows the 
procedure of selecting variables for causal analysis following the elim-
ination of variables in regression that explain less than one per cent 
of the variance. Zero-order and partial correlations are found ic 
table 25. 
Social linkages: percentage of the economically-
active covered by social security 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage 
of the economically-active population covered by social security is 
significant, positive, and increasing 1960-1970 from .650 to .712 
in Brazil; it is significant, positive, but declining 1960-1970 from 
.584 to .480 in the U.S.; it is significant and positive in the com-
bined cross-cultural cases only in 1960 (.447); it is insignificant 
in Chile in 1960 and 1970 (see tables 26-29). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and percentage of the economically-
active covered by social security in Brazil in 1960 (.951) and 1970 
(.607), in the U.S. in 1960 (.888) and 1970 (,748), and in the com-
bined cross-cultural cases in 1960 (.777) and 1970 (.756); the asso-
ciation is insignificant in Chile in 1960 and 1970 (see table 31). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between contributions of the 
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TABLE 20 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF ILLITERACY RATES ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.746 
.888 
.922 
.938 
• 945 
.949 
.952 
.952 
.952 
.952 
. 952 
. 953 
.775 
.836 
.856 
.874 
.886 
.893 
.896 
.899 
.900 
.900 
.901 
.557 
.788 
.850 
.881 
.893 
.902 
. 906 
.907 
.907 
. 907 
. 908 
.908 
. 600 
.699 
.734 
.765 
.786 
.798 
.804 
.808 
.810 
.811 
.812 
1960 
1970 
.231 
.062 
.031 
.012 
. 009 
.004 
.001 
. 000 
. 000 
.001 
.000 
.099 
.035 
.031 
.021 
.012 
.006 
.004 
.002 
.001 
.001 
28.934 
41.092 
39.953 
37.189 
31.741 
27.761 
23.569 
19.640 
16.398 
13.800 
11.675 
9.902 
34.643 
25.557 
19.339 
16.318 
14.005 
11.879 
9.997 
8.455 
7.117 
6.036 
5.118 
-. 746 
-.531 
-.440 
.531 
-.553 
-.466 
-.634 
-.205 
-.385 
-. 720 
-.538 
-.745 
-. 775 
-.081 
-.318 
-.435 
-.618 
-.525 
-. 272 
.543 
-.709 
-.426 
-.522 
NOTE: N=25. Due to insufficient tolerance and F value, ING 
(r=-.511) was excluded from the 1970 equation. In the final step of the 
expansion of the 1960 equation, DF=l2 and 12, SSreg=3534.055, and SSres= 
356.891; in the 1970 equation, DF=l1 and 13, SSreg=3382.038, and SSres~ 
780.840. For simple r, DF=23. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban resi-
dence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in 
industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contribu-
tions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; 
COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services 
to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 21 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF ILLITERACY RATES ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
. 804 
.888 
.933 
.951 
.956 
.962 
. 965 
.969 
• 971 
.975 
• 977 
.978 
.807 
.891 
.929 
.948 
. 964 
.966 
.967 
. 969 
.970 
.970 
.970 
.970 
• 646 
.789 
.870 
.905 
.915 
.926 
.932 
.939 
.943 
.951 
. 955 
.957 
.652 
.794 
. 863 
.899 
.930 
.934 
.936 
. 940 
. 941 
.941 
. 941 
.942 
1960 
1970 
.143 
.081 
.035 
.010 
.011 
.006 
.007 
.004 
.008 
.004 
.002 
.142 
.069 
.036 
.031 
.004 
.002 
. 004 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.001 
42.075 
41.309 
47.102 
48.150 
40.931 
37.664 
33.405 
31. 180 
27.689 
27.738 
25.506 
22.674 
43.146 
42.415 
44.422 
44.750 
50.693 
42.603 
35.904 
31.433 
26.674 
22.516 
19.050 
16.301 
-.804 
-.467 
-.655 
-.798 
-.258 
-.803 
-. 777 
.155 
-.494 
.262 
-.796 
-.632 
-.807 
-.467 
-.792 
-. 723 
.130 
.264 
-.757 
-.634 
-.701 
-.768 
-.491 
-.802 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=1626.316, and SSres=71.724; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSre =1449.916, and SSres=88.942. For simple r, 
DF=23. ETH=ethnicity; PBP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in indus-
try; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in 
commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 22 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF ILLITERACY RATES ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.779 
.909 
.917 
.921 
.923 
.925 
.927 
.929 
. 931 
.933 
.933 
.712 
.872 
.884 
.893 
.897 
.898 
.901 
.904 
.909 
.909 
.909 
.607 
.826 
.841 
.849 
.852 
.856 
.859 
.863 
.867 
.870 
.870 
.508 
.761 
.783 
.799 
.805 
.808 
• 811 
.818 
.827 
.827 
.827 
1960 
1970 
.219 
.015 
.008 
.003 
.004 
. 003 
.004 
.004 
.003 
.000 
.253 
.022 
.016 
.006 
.003 
.003 
.007 
.009 
.000 
.000 
74.143 
112.171 
81.460 
63.545 
50.995 
42.785 
36.736 
32.443 
29.199 
26.211 
23.235 
49.585 
75.191 
55.358 
44.738 
36.445 
30.182 
25.899 
23.169 
21.266 
18.735 
16.604 
.779 
-.641 
.088 
-.115 
-.093 
-.596 
-.331 
-.413 
-.004 
-.059 
-.117 
.712 
-.644 
.102 
-.528 
.012 
.346 
-.015 
-.185 
-.279 
-.015 
-.124 
NOTE: N=50. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, COG 
(r=-.051) was excluded from the 1960 equation and SEG (r=-.002) from the 
1970 equation. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equation, 
DF=11 and 38, SSreg=ll22.838, and SSres=166.940; in the 1970 equation, 
DF=Ll and 38, SSreg=426.240, and SSres=88.679. For simple r, DF=48. 
ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; lAG= 
income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; 
ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; 
ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce 
to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 23 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF ILLITERACY RATES ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
BRAZIL, CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.730 
.828 
.836 
.852 
.867 
.877 
.885 
.890 
.892 
.895 
.896 
.897 
.897 
.812 
.891 
.904 
.908 
.916 
.917 
.917 
.919 
.920 
.921 
.921 
.533 
.686 
.699 
.727 
.752 
.769 
.783 
.792 
.796 
.802 
.804 
.805 
.805 
. 660 
.795 
.818 
.826 
.839 
.841 
.842 
.845 
.848 
.848 
.849 
1960 
1970 
.153 
.013 
.028 
.025 
.017 
.014 
.009 
.004 
• 006 
.002 
.001 
. 000 
.135 
.023 
.008 
.013 
.002 
.001 
.003 
.003 
.000 
.001 
ll2.059 
106.196 
74.403 
63.334 
57.146 
51.661 
47.575 
43.382 
39.176 
36.072 
32.879 
29.991 
27.394 
190.341 
188.192 
144.270 
112.758 
98.292 
82.164 
70.177 
62.412 
55.810 
49.952 
45.027 
-.730 
-. 722 
-.687 
-.628 
-.196 
-.662 
-. 726 
-.ll4 
.280 
-.ll2 
-.469 
-.006 
.599 
-.812 
-. 725 
-.736 
-.613 
-. 778 
-.028 
.258 
-.llO 
-.051 
-.649 
.630 
NOTE: N=100. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, COG 
(r=-.123) and FOR (r=-.099) were excluded from the 1970 equation. In 
the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equation, DF=13 and 86, 
SSreg=21149.263, and SSres=5107.289; in the 1970 equation, DF=11 and 88, 
SSreg=21354.448, and SSres=3794.033. For simple r, DF=98. ETH=ethni-
city; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in 
agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income 
in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contribu-
tions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; 
SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports; RAD=radios per 
capita. 
TABLE 24 
VARIABLE SELECTION FROM SETS X AND Z FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGRESSION AND PARTIAL CORRELATION WITH 
SET Y: ILLITERACY RATES (ILL) 
Selection Pro=edure 
Steo #1. Variables excluded because of associations less than !.400 
~ ILL when controlling for POP or POP and ETH: 
1. 
2. 
Using either first- or second-order partials (by POP or by POP, 
ETH): PIN, ING, COG, SEG for Brazil in 1960 and ING, COG, AGG, 
SEG, reo in 1970; liN, reo for Chile in 1960. * 
Additional variables by using second-order partials: liN for 
Brazil in 1960 and ?INx in 1970; liN,* ISE* for the U.S. in 
1960~ IAG* reo, ISE for the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 
lAG, ISE in 1970. 
Step #2. Remaining variables with significant partials of at least 
:.-+00 where p< .05: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials: IAG, ICO, ISE 
for Brazil in 1960 and liN in 1970; PIN, lNG, COG, POR, SEG, 
IAG, lSE for Chile in 1960 and PIN, lNG, COG, SEG, POR, IAG, 
liN, lCO, lSE in 1970; lAG for the G.S. in 1960 and lAG, liN 
in 1970; PIN, RAD, IIN for cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 
PIN, RAD, liN, ICO in !970. 
2. Additional variables by using first-order partials: liN,* 
AGG* for Brazil in 1960 and PIN,* POR* in 1970; liN,* ISE* for 
the u.s. in 1960; IAG, ICO, ISE for cross-cultural cases in 
1960 and ISE,* IAG* in 1970. 
3. Additional variables by using second-order partials: IAG* for 
Brazil in 1970; PIN* for the U.S. in 1970. 
Step ff3. Variables with insignificant r but significant partials: 
1. First-order: AGG* for Brazil in 1960 and POR* in 1970; IAG 
for Chile in 1960. 
2. Second-order: IAG for Brazil in 1970; lAG for Chile in 1960; 
PIN* for the U.S. in 1960 and 1970. 
Step fl4. Remaining variables (with significant partials) from sub-
sets g or w excluded because of ties to a variable with a stronger 
partial in the same subset using either first- or second-order 
partials: IAG, reo, lSE (all tied to IIN) for the cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 and reo (tied to IIN) in 1970. 
Steo #5. Variables from set X selected for causal analysis: IAG for 
~il in 1960 and liN, IAG (second-order) in 1970; ISE, POR, SEG, 
lAG for Chile in 1960 and ISE, POR, SEG in 1970; lAG for the U.S. 
in 1960 and lAG, IIN in 1970; RAD, PIN, liN for the cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 and liN, PIN, RAD in 1970. POP remains as a control 
variable. Therefore, IAG is excluded for Brazil in 1970 since 
second-order partials will not be used. 
*variables already excluded in regression analysis. ETH•ethnicity; 
POP•rural-urban residence; PIN•labor in industry; IAG•income in agricul-
ture; IIN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income in 
services; AGG•contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING-contributions 
of industry to G .N .P.; COG•contributions of commerce to G .N. P. ;, SEG•con-
tributions of services to G.N.P.; POR•ports; RAD•radios per capita. 
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TABLE 25 
ZERD-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ILLITERACY RATES 
AND THE INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC VARIABLES, 1960 AND 1970* 
Zero-Order First-Order by POP 
1960 1970 1960 1970 
-.553 -.709 
-.440 -.511 
-.531 -.525 
-.385 -.435 
-.466 -.522 
-.746 -.081 
-.634 -.775 
-.745 -.426 
-.720 -.318 
-.205 -.272 
-. 777 
-.632 
-. 796 
.155 
-.798 
-.258 
-.655 
-.494 
-.804 
-.467 
-.004 
-.093 
-.051 
-.115 
-.059 
-. 641 
-.596 
-.331 
-.413 
.088 
-. 757 
-. 634 
-. 802 
.130 
-.792 
-.701 
-. 768 
-.491 
-.807 
-.467 
.346 
-.015 
-.015 
.012 
-.002 
-.644 
-.528 
-.279 
-.185 
.102 
A. Brazil 
-.381 
-.268 
-.269 
-.444 
-.275 
-. 764 
-.425 
-.612 
-.573 
-.340 
-.449 
-.187 
-.085 
-.324 
-.154 
.144 
-.632 
-.164 
-.309 
-.501 
B. Chile 
-.534 -.443 
-.461 -.423 
-.530 -.703 
-.176 -.280 
-.566 -. 709 
-.455 -.603 
-. 281 -.551 
-. 167 -.457 
-.444 -.668 
-.550 -.433 
C. United States 
• 035 
-.035 
.011 
-.098 
.002 
-.635 
-.590 
-.312 
-.414 
.142 
.339 
.039 
.042 
.031 
.060 
-.638 
-.527 
-.254 
-.146 
.147 
Second-order by POP, ETH 
1960 1970 
-.119 
.008 
.062 
-.134 
.026 
-.793 
-.363 
-.405 
-.472 
-.264 
-.529 
-.452 
-.541 
-.172 
-.558 
-.457 
-.271 
-.226 
-.436 
-.540 
.194 
• 045 
.082 
.032 
.068 
-. 742 
-.291 
-.303 
-.298 
-.061 
-.300 
-.055 
.050 
-.101 
-.001 
.422 
-.522 
.026 
-.370 
-.393 
-.415 
-.401 
-.710 
-.273 
-.695 
-.604 
-.524 
-.528 
-.652 
-.408 
.416 
.041 
.026 
.118 
. 025 
-. 707 
-.440 
-.361 
-.237 
-.034 
D. Brazil, Chile, and United States 
-.722 
-.114 
-.196 
.280 
-.006 
-.730 
-. 628 
-. 726 
-.687 
-.662 
-.112 
-.725 
-.110 
-.123 
.258 
-.051 
-. 778 
-.613 
-.812 
-.736 
-. 649 
-.099 
-.629 
.077 
• 086 
.247 
.203 
-. 717 
-.592 
-.696 
-. 650 
-. 614 
-.019 
-.745 
-.110 
-.126 
.269 
-.043 
-.841 
-.619 
-.841 
-.780 
-.687 
-.096 
-.531 
.105 
.015 
.284 
.171 
-.520 
-. 289 
-.477 
-.368 
-.280 
-.013 
-.649 
.007 
.067 
.325 
.077 
-.686 
-.305 
-.686 
-.545 
-.324 
-.030 
*PIN•labor in industry; INc-contributions of industry to G.N.P.; 
COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; lAG-income in 
agriculture; IIN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income 
in services; POR-ports; POP•rural-urban residence; ETH•ethnicity; RAD• 
radios per capita. 
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major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and percentage of the economi-
cally-active population covered by social security in Chile only in 
1960 (industry, .403) and in the U.S. in 1960 (industry, .424) and 
1970 (industry, .516); the association is insignificant in Brazil 
and in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see 
table 31). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between radios per capita 
and percentage of the economically-active covered by social secur-
ity in the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 (.600) and 1970 
(.687). (see table 31). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between number of ports and 
percentage of the economically-active covered by social security 
in Brazil in 1960 (.412) and 1970 (.553); the association is insig-
nificant in Chile, the U.S., and the combined cross-cultural cases 
in 1960 and 1970 (see table 31). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between average annual in-
come in the major economic sectors and percentage of the economi-
cally-active covered by social security in Brazil in 1960 (indus-
try, .669; services, .436) and 1970 (industry, .441), in the U.S. 
only in 1970 (commerce, .435), and in the combined cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 (industry, .564; commerce, .547; services, .516) and 
1970 (agriculture, .408; industry, .705; commerce, .646; services, 
.534); the association is insignificant in Chile in 1960 and 1970 
(see table 31). 
The 1960 and 1970 provincial data in this study refer only to the 
estimated percentage of the labor force covered by the main system in 
each nation. The Brazilian social security system was revised by legis-
lation in 1966; the main system covers all wage and salary earners 
(primarily in urban areas) in industry, commerce, and domestic services. 
Coverage was extended to agricultural workers in 1971 and continues to 
be on a voluntary basis for clergy and self-employed fishermen. Nation-
wide the percentage of the labor force covered by social security sys-
tems was 18.5 in 1960 and 36.4 per cent in 1970. Provincial variations 
were extensive in the 1960s because of greater coverage in urban areas 
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and the omission of rural workers until 1971. For the 1960 and 1970 
provincial data the mean percentage of social security coverage in-
creased from 21.34 to 27.55, the standard deviation shows a greater dis-
persion of cases by increasing from 14.51 to 18.73, and extreme values 
ranged from 6.0 to 48.2 per cent coverage in 1960 and from 7.7 to 62.2 
per cent in 1970. The data tend to support Roett's (1972:49-50) asser-
tion that the military regimes in the 1960s accomplished little in the 
area of social welfare legislation; indications are that the greatest 
increases in the percentage of the labor force covered by the main 
social security system occurred where coverage was already most exten-
sive, i.e., in the most urban-industrial areas since rural workers con-
tinued to be excluded during the 1960s. 
The Chilean social security system established in 1924 was ex-
panded by each subsequent government including those after 1952 when 
the current system came into effect. Originally established to reduce 
economic instability, the system has instead become an obstacle to de-
velopment largely because of over-expansion; this has occurred in res-
ponse to internal demands to transform the system into a means of 
counteracting rising inflation and acquiring personal loans. In 1961-
1962, 65.7 per cent of the Chilean labor force was covered by social 
security schemes and by 1971 when an additional system was created to 
cover wholesalers, retailers, small businessmen, farmers, and carriers, 
almost the entire labor force was covered. The impact on the economy 
in the 1960s was to further increase the difficulties in accumulating 
capital for industrialization. Provincial variations did continue to 
exist, however, during the 1960s. This is seen in the data for Chilean 
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provinces in 1960 and 1970, respectively, with a mean percentage of 
social security coverage of 51.85 and 63.14 per cent, standard deviations 
of 12.84 and 15.64, and extreme values ranging from 33.2 to 72.3 per cent 
coverage in 1960 and from 40.4 to 88.1 per cent in 1970. 
The basic system in the U.S. was established by the 1935 Social 
Security Act. The main system covers all employed and self-employed 
members of the labor force except those temporarily employed in agri-
culture and domestic services and the self-employed who have a yearly 
income of less than $400; voluntary coverage is available to persons 
employed in non-profit institutions, some clergy, and most government 
employees except at the federal level. About 72,700,000 persons were 
covered by the main social security system in 1970. Provincial data 
for 1960 and 1970, respectively, have a mean percentage of social secur-
ity coverage of 63.04 and 71.16 per cent, standard deviations of 11.86 
and 13.40, and extreme values ranging from 36.3 to 81.1 per cent cover-
age in 1960 and from 41.0 to 91.6 per cent in 1970. The combination of 
the cases from the three nations for cross-cultural analysis has a mean 
percentage of social security coverage of 49.82 per cent in 1960 and 
58.26 per cent in 1970. The standard deviation increases slightly from 
21.33 to 23.69. Values for 1960 range from 6.0 to 81.1 per cent cover-
age and for 1970 from 7.7 to 91.6 per cent. 
Regression and correlation results. The F test shows R to be 
significant at the .05 level for all steps of the expansion of the 
equations in 1960 and 1970 for Brazil (see table 26), the U.S. (see 
table 28), and the cross-cultural combination of cases (see table 29) 
whereas no R is significant in the equations for Chile (see table 27) 
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TABLE 26 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-
URBAN RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
PIN .955 .912 239.608 .955 
ISE .974 . 949 .037 207.898 .684 
POP .978 .958 . 009 160.482 .650 
lAG .981 .962 .004 129.113 .425 
AGG .982 .965 .003 106.847 .275 
reo .984 .969 .004 96.106 .613 
COG .985 .971 .002 81.597 .527 
POR . 985 .971 .000 69.383 .215 
SEG .986 • 972 .001 58.649 .483 
ING .986 .973 .001 51.027 .495 
liN .986 .974 .001 44.497 .820 
ETH .987 .974 .000 38.001 -.465 
1970 
PIN .828 .687 50.524 .828 
COG .878 . 771 .084 37.109 .524 
POR .894 .800 .029 28.057 .249 
POP .921 .848 .048 28.050 .712 
ETH .924 .854 .006 22.291 -.465 
liN .929 .863 .009 18.994 .689 
ISE .931 .868 .005 15.970 .153 
reo .935 .875 .007 14.102 .448 
ING .940 .884 .009 12.716 .498 
lAG .942 .888 .004 11.192 .153 
AGG .943 .889 .001 9.491 .284 
SEG .944 .892 .003 8.281 .487 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=4920.926, and SSres=129.493; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSre =7509.159, and SSres=906.781. For simpler, 
DF=23. ETH=ethnicity; PBP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=incorne in com-
merce; ISE=incorne in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 27 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-
URBAN RESIDENCE: CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 Change F Simple r 
1960 
ING .392 .154 4.201 .392 
POR .486 .236 .082 3.403 .339 
PIN .513 .263 .027 2.508 .285 
IIN .562 .316 .053 2.316 .316 
SEG .603 .364 .048 2.179 .254 
lAG .613 .376 .012 1.813 .000 
ETH .620 .384 .008 1.520 -.254 
AGG .624 . 389 .005 1. 275 -.155 
POP .631 .398 .009 1.103 .086 
reo .632 .399 .001 .932 .086 
ISE .632 .400 .001 .789 .134 
1970 
ING .388 .150 4.077 .388 
POR .482 .233 .083 3.342 .339 
lAG .508 .258 .025 2.439 .132 
PIN .525 .276 .018 1.908 .272 
ETH .538 .289 .013 1.548 -.254 
SEG .550 .303 .014 1.305 .237 
ISE .554 .307 .004 1.077 .120 
COG .555 .308 .001 .893 .234 
AGG .557 .310 .002 .750 -.124 
NOTE: N=25. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, COG 
(r=.238) was excluded from the 1960 equation and POP (r=.134), IIN 
(r=.216), and ICO (r=.084) from the 1970 equation. In the final step of 
the expansion of the 1960 equation, DF=11 and 13, SSreg=1585.104, and 
SSres=2372.098; in the 1970 equation, DF=9 and 15, SSreg=1821.460, and 
SSres=4045.879. For simple r, DF=23. ETH=ethnici~y; POP=rural-urban 
residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income 
in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=incorne in services; AGG=con-
tributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to 
G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of 
services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 28 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-
URBAN RESIDENCE: UNITED STATES, 
1960 AND 1970 
R R2 Change F Simple r 
.870 
.928 
.931 
. 933 
. 934 
.936 
.938 
.939 
.939 
.940 
.940 
.940 
.609 
.733 
.830 
.876 
.901 
.907 
.916 
.917 
. 917 
.918 
.918 
.918 
.757 
.861 
.868 
.870 
.873 
.877 
.881 
.881 
.883 
.884 
.884 
.884 
.371 
.537 
.690 
.768 
.812 
.824 
.839 
.841 
.842 
.842 
.843 
.843 
1960 
1970 
.104 
.007 
.002 
.003 
.004 
.004 
. 000 
.002 
. 001 
.000 
.000 
.166 
.153 
.078 
.044 
.012 
.015 
. 002 
• 001 
.000 
.001 
.000 
149.958 
146.005 
101.164 
75.942 
60.533 
51.493 
44.481 
38.268 
33.649 
29.769 
26.433 
23.617 
28.349 
27.327 
34.215 
37.396 
38.211 
33.633 
31.406 
27.107 
23.732 
20.921 
18.601 
16.647 
.870 
.584 
.442 
-.154 
.297 
.030 
.441 
.194 
-.078 
.431 
.607 
.458 
.609 
. 609 
.480 
.472 
-.041 
.298 
-.104 
.030 
.359 
.470 
.427 
.518 
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NOTE: N=50. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=l2 and 37, SSreg=6101.119, and SSres=796.522; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 37, SSreg=7422.878, and SSres=1374.794. For simpler, 
DF=48. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in com-
merce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 29 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOHIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
BRAZIL, CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
R 
.826 
.855 
.864 
.870 
.872 
.875 
.877 
• 877 
.878 
.878 
.878 
.878 
.878 
.765 
.818 
.837 
.847 
.854 
.855 
.856 
.856 
.857 
.857 
.857 
.857 
.857 
.683 
.732 
.748 
.757 
.761 
.766 
.769 
.770 
.771 
. 771 
.771 
. 772 
.772 
.586 
. 669 
.701 
.718 
.729 
.731 
.733 
.734 
.734 
.735 
.735 
.735 
.735 
R2 Change 
1960 
1970 
.049 
.016 
.009 
. 004 
.005 
.003 
.001 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.083 
.032 
.017 
• 011 
.002 
. 002 
.001 
.000 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.000 
F 
211.794 
132.900 
94.994 
74.060 
60.105 
50.920 
43.828 
38.269 
33.776 
30.089 
27.068 
24.562 
22.422 
138.800 
98.269 
75.297 
60.477 
50.707 
42.183 
36.135 
31.425 
27.724 
24.693 
22.202 
20.133 
18.379 
Simple r 
.826 
.631 
-.452 
.259 
.600 
.614 
.447 
.202 
.205 
.457 
-.306 
. 062 
.579 
.765 
.634 
-.387 
.552 
.180 
.381 
.181 
.209 
.140 
.570 
.206 
-.251 
.450 
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NOTE: N=lOO. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 
equation, DF=l3 and 86, SSreg=34764.447, and SSres=10256.760; in the 
1970 equation, DF=13 and 86, SSreg=40867.099, and SSres=14709.400. For 
simple r, DF=98. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor 
in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO= 
income in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agri-
culture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contri-
butions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; 
POR=ports; RAD=radios per capita. 
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in 1960 or 1970. The percentage of variance explained by the particular 
sets of variables included in the equations declines between 1960 and 
1970 from 97.4 to 89.2 per cent in Brazil, from 88.4 to 84.3 per cent in 
the U.S., and from 77.2 to 73.5 per cent in the cross-cultural combina-
tion of cases. After removing variables that contribute less than one 
per cent to explaining variance, variable selection for causal analysis 
is by the procedure shown in table 30 with zero-order and partial corre-
lations appearing in table 31. 
Political linkages: percentage of the (eligible) 
voting-age population registered to vote 
Research Finding: The association (zero-order) between percentage 
of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more and percentage 
of the (eligible) voting-age population registered to vote is sig-
nificant and positive in Brazil only in 1970 (.418) and in Chile 
only in 1960 (.591); it is insignificant in the U.S. and the com-
bined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (refer to tables 32-35). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and percentage of the (eligible) 
voting-age population registered to vote in Chile only in 1960 
(.400); the association is insignificant in Brazil, the U.S., and 
the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 37). 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between contributions of the 
major economic sectors to the G.N.P. and percentage of the (eli-
gible) voting-age population registered to vote in Chile in 1960 
(industry, .651; commerce, .689; services, .766) and in 1970 (in-
dustry, .539; commerce, .433; services, .629); the association is 
insignificant in Brazil, the U.S., and the combined cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 37). 
Research Finding: The association, controlling for rural-urban res-
idence, between radios per capita and percentage of the (eligible) 
voting-age population registered to vote is insignificant in the 
combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 1970 (see table 37). 
Research Finding: The association, controlling for rural-urban res-
idence, between number of ports and percentage of the (eligible) 
voting-age population registered to vote is insignificant in Brazil, 
TABLE 30 
VARIABLE SELECTION FROM SETS X ~~ Z FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGRESSION AND PARTIAL CORRELATION WITH 
SET Y: SOCIAL SECURITY COv~RAGE (SSE) 
Seleccion Procedure 
~· Variables excluded because of associacions less than !.400 
with SSE when concrolling for POP or POP and ETH: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials (by POP or by POP, 
ETH): ING, COG, SEG, IAG, ICO for Brazil in 1960 and ING, COG, 
SEG, reo in 1970; COG, SEG, reo, ISE for the u.s. in 1960 and 
COG, SEG, liN in 1970; lAG for the cross-cultural cases in 1960. 
2. Additional variables by using second-order partials: ISE for 
Brazil in 1960 and IIN~ in 1970; ISE* for the cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 and 1970. 
Step #2. Remaining variables with significant partials of at least 
:!:.400 where p<: .05: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials: PIN, liN for 
Brazil in 1960 and PIN, POR in 1970; PIN, ING for the U.S. in 
1960 and PIN, ING, ICO in 1970; PIN, RAD, IIN, ICO for the 
cross-cultural cases in 1960 and PIN, RAD, liN, reo in 1970. 
2. Additional variables by using first-order partials: POR,* ISE 
for Brazil in 1960 and liN* in 1970; ING~ for Chile in 1960; ISE* 
for the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and ISE,* IAG* in 1970. 
Sten 113. Variables with insignificant r but significant partials: 
~First-order: POR for Brazil in 1960* and 1970; ING* for Chile 
in 1960; lAG* for the cross-cultural cases in 1970. 
2. Second-order: POR for Brazil in 1970. 
~· Remaining variables (with significant partials) from sub-
sets g or w excluded because of ties to a variable with a stronger 
partial in the same subset using either first- or second-order 
partials: ICO (tied to liN) for the cross-cultural cases in 1970. 
Step #5. Variables from set X selected for causal analysis: PIN, ISE 
(firsc-order) for Brazil in 1960 and PIN, POR in 1970; none for 
Chile in 1960 or 1970; PIN for the U.S. in 1960 and ING, PIN in 
1970; PIN, RAD for the cross-cultural cases in 1960 and PIN, liN 
in 1970. POP remains as a control variable. 
*variables already axcluded in regression analysis. ETH•ethnicity; 
POP•rural-urban residence; PIN•labor in industry; IAG•income in agricul-
ture; IIN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income in serv-
ices; ING•contributions of industry tc G.N.P.; COG•contributions of com-
merce co G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR-ports; RAD• 
radios per capita. 
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TABLE 31 
ZERG-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORREk\TIONS BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY 
COVERAGE P~D THE IXDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC VARIABLES, 
1960 AND 1970* 
Zero-Order First-Order by POP Second-Order by POP, ETH 
1960 1970 
.955 
.495 
.527 
.275 
.483 
.425 
.820 
. 613 
• 684 
.215 
. 818 
. .:.98 
.524 
.284 
.487 
.153 
.689 
.448 
.153 
.249 
• 285 . 272 
.392 .388 
.238 .234 
-.155 -.124 
.254 .237 
.ooo .132 
.316 .216 
.086 .084 
. 134 . 120 
.339 . 339 
.870 
.607 
.458 
-.078 
.442 
.030 
.194 
.431 
.441 
.297 
.609 
.609 
.470 
-.041 
.427 
.030 
.472 
.518 
.359 
.298 
1960 1970 
A. Brazil 
.951 
.304 
.155 
. 346 
.248 
.381 
.669 
.260 
.436 
.412 
.607 
.071 
-.076 
.092 
-.032 
-.097 
.441 
.140 
.093 
.553 
B. Chile 
.309 
.403 
.254 
-.135 
.269 
.002 
.345 
. 049 
.110 
.330 
.272 
. 377 
.193 
-.075 
.198 
.080 
. 171 
.051 
.048 
.319 
c. United States 
.888 
.424 
.218 
-.220 
.197 
-.130 
.066 
.264 
.207 
.107 
.748 
.516 
.332 
-.127 
.268 
-.101 
.340 
.435 
. 187 
.183 
D. Brazil. Chile, and United States 
.826 
.202 
.259 
-.306 
. 062 
.631 
.457 
. 614 
.600 
.579 
.205 
.765 
.209 
.206 
-.251 
.140 
.570 
.381 
. 634 
.552 
.450 
.180 
. 777 
.039 
. 016 
-.276 
-.123 
.600 
.393 
.564 
.547 
. 516 
.129 
.756 
.140 
.134 
-.297 
.052 
.687 
.408 
.705 
• 646 
.534 
.160 
1960 
.933 
.067 
-.188 
.020 
-.032 
.319 
.658 
-.095 
.304 
.354 
.298 
.385 
.274 
-.150 
.243' 
-.001 
.330 
.146 
. 085 
.295 
.887 
.418 
.212 
-.251 
.191 
-.176 
-.032 
.244 
.167 
.151 
.734 
.036 
.075 
-.291 
-.086 
.506 
.141 
.456 
.415 
.354 
.136 
1970 
.556 
-.029 
-.182 
-.107 
-.157 
-.276 
.346 
.011 
.116 
.495 
.230 
.351 
.189 
-.093 
.153 
.067 
.109 
.110 
-.000 
.284 
.763 
.521 
.339 
-.137 
.277 
-. 131 
.322 
.437 
.191 
.219 
. 685 
.067 
.013 
-.315 
-.020 
.590 
.140 
.625 
.513 
.294 
.123 
*PIN=labor in industry; ING•contributions of industry to G.N.P.; 
COG-contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG•income in 
agriculture; IIN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income 
in services; POR-ports; POP•rural-urban residence; ETH•ethnicity; RAD• 
radios per capita. 
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Chile, the U.S., and the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 
1970 (see table 37). 
167 
Research Finding: There is a significant, positive association, 
controlling for rural-urban residence, between average annual in-
come in the major economic sectors and percentage of the (eligible) 
voting-age population registered to vote in Brazil only in 1960 
(commerce, .431) and in Chile in 1960 (services, .563) and in 1970 
(services, .474; agriculture, .403); the association is insignifi-
cant in the U.S. and the combined cross-cultural cases in 1960 and 
1970 (see table 37). 
Suffrage is defined by legislative decree as universal in Brazil, 
Chile, and the U.S. However, the size of the electorate and the number 
of registered voters in the three nations have been affected both by 
the legislative restriction and expansion of functional linkages on the 
basis of age, sex, literacy, compulsory registration and voting, and 
related legislation. The minimum voting age was 18 in Brazil by 1960, 
in Chile by 1970, and in the U.S. by 1971. In Brazil, only employed 
women are included under compulsory voting legislation; women gained 
the right to vote in national elections in the U.S. in 1920 and in Chile 
in 1949. Illiterates are disenfranchised in Brazil and Chile, repre-
senting about 40 per cent of the eligible age group in Brazil and about 
25 per cent in Chile; in the U.S., the 1965 Voting Rights Act eliminated 
requirements of the ability to read (in 20 of the cases and to read 
English in Alaska, English or Hawaiian in Hawaii, English or the person's 
native language in Louisiana). It is compulsory in Brazil and Chile for 
the eligible population to register and for the registered population to 
vote. In Brazil, suffrage has not been extended to persons who are en-
listed in the military (excert sergeants and NCOs since 1964), have lost 
their political rights, or cannot speak Portuguese. In Chile, the right 
to vote is not given to persons who are NCOs or enlisted in the military 
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and police force, have had political rights suspended for physical or 
mental reasons, have been charged or convicted of crimes that carry a 
prison sentence of three years and one day or more, and, lastly, those 
men who have not served the compulsory military term of duty and are 
under the age of 25. Reform in Chile removed party influence over 
voter registration and contributed to the increase in votes from 1958 
(1,250,350 total votes or 83.5 per cent of those registered) to 1964 
(2,530,697 total votes or 87.4 per cent of those registered). Addi-
tional restrictions in the U.S. are residence requirements in some of 
the 50 cases from six months to two years in length and the disen-
franchisement of convicts in most of the 50 cases; on the other hand, 
suffrage was extended for national elections to residents (U.S. citi-
zens) of the District of Columbia in 1961. 
Of the eligible voting-age population in 1960, 34.4 per cent were 
registered to vote in Brazil, 37.4 per cent in Chile (1961), and 64.4 
per cent in the U.S. There are indications that a larger base for a 
potentially more rapid expansion of political functional linkages exists 
in Chile than in Brazil. Prior to the military regime of the 1970s in 
Chile, mass parties and a mass electorate already existed as well as 
higher literacy rates than in Brazil. The 1946-1964 period in Brazil 
was too short a span of time for the expansion of politico-economic 
linkages to peasants and workers to the extent that they would become a 
political force; this one factor contributed most to the failure of 
Goulart's appeal to popular support in 1964. Following the 1964 coup, 
mass parties were abolished, the emergence of a mass electorate has 
consistently been blocked, and political apathy has increased. The 
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percentage of registered voters who voted in presidential elections in 
Brazil was 72.1 in 1950, 59.7 in 1955, and 81 in 1960; in the 1970 par-
liamentary elections, 77.5 per cent of those registered voted but of 
those eligible to vote (given that registration and voting are compul-
sory) an estimated 50 per cent did not vote or invalidated their ballots 
in many cases by leaving them blank. 
Voter participation in Chile is disproportionately greater in 
urban areas and among upper- and middle-income groups; the lowest par-
ticipation is found among lower-income groups in rural areas. In spite 
of compulsory registration and voting, voter turnout declined prior to 
the 1964 election; the percentage of registered voters who voted in 
presidential elections was 88.1 in 1938, 80.3 in 1942, 75.9 in 1946, 
86.6 in 1952 (when women first voted), 83.5 in 1958, 87.4 in 1964, and 
83.7 in 1970. 
In the U.S., voter turnout is much lower than in Brazil or Chile 
possibly, in part, because it is not compulsory to register and/or vote. 
Of the voting-age population eligible to vote, the percentage voting in 
presidential elections was 55.4 in 1940, 52.7 in 1944, 48.1 in 1948, 
57.6 in 1952, 55.9 in 1956, 58.5 in 1960, 58.1 in 1964, 55.2 in 1968, 
and 51.0 in 1972. 
The variable for the provincial analysis in this study is speci-
fically the percentage of the eligible (including literacy requirements 
where these prevail) voting-age population registered to vote as esti-
mated in election years. The restricted definition of this variable 
limits its usefulness as an indicator of political participation. 
However, to increase the comparability of the provincial data within 
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nations and cross-culturally, the years selected for the data are limited 
to presidential election years since 1960 covering the longest time span 
possible up to and including 10 years; cross-time analysis is conse-
quently weakened nationally and in the cross-cultural comparison. Data 
pertain to 1960 and 1966 for Brazil, 1964 and 1970 for Chile, 1962 and 
1972 for the U.S. 
The provincial data for Brazil reflect the expected slight changes 
although there is an overall increase in voter registration. The mean 
percentage of the eligible registered is 72.06 in 1960 and 74.37 in 1966 
with values ranging from 37.2 to 91.9 per cent in 1960 and from 38.5 to 
89.7 per cent registered in 1966. Provincial variations, taking into 
consideration the compulsory registration legislation, are wide but de-
clining as indicated by the decline in the standard deviation from 
16.62 in 1960 to 11.42 in 1966. 
The Chilean provincial data reflect the higher nation-wide parti-
cipation level in Chile than in Brazil but, similar to Brazil, a decline 
in provincial variations. In 1964 and 1970, respectively, the mean per-
centage of the eligible registered increased from 60.84 to 82.14 per 
cent, the standard deviation declined from 8.55 to 6.39, and values that 
ranged from 48.0 to 78.0 per cent registered in 1964 increased to 67.9 
and 92.7 per cent in 1970. 
Voter registration in the U.S. varies. Registration was not re-
quired or not reported for 15 cases in 1962 and 8 in 1972. In these 
cases, a zero value was assigned for the voter registration variable 
but the cases were kept in the study in order to benefit from their in-
clusion for the rest of the variables; this, however, weakens the voter 
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registration data. The 1962 and 1972 provincial data show the same but 
stronger trends in the U.S. as were observed in the Brazilian data with 
an increase in the mean percentage of the eligible registered from 
52.29 to 63.91 per cent, a decline in the standard deviation from 36.46 
to 29.20, and a change in extreme values ranging from 42.0 to 97.8 per 
cent registered in 1962 and from 60.3 to 92.5 per cent in 1972. The 
combination of the cases from the three nations for cross-cultural anal-
ysis results in an increase in the mean percentage registered from 59.37 
to 71.08 per cent, a decline in the standard deviation from 28.45 to 
22.87, and values ranging from 37.2 to 97.8 per cent registered in the 
first time period and from 38.5 to 92.7 per cent in the second time 
period. 
Regression and correlation results. R is significant at the .05 
level as determined by the F test for all steps in the expansion of the 
equations for Chile (see table 33) in 1960 and 1970, the U.S. (see table 
34) in 1960, and the cross-cultural combination of cases (see table 35) 
in 1960 and 1970. 
(table 34) in 1970. 
No R is significant at the .05 level for the U.S. 
In Brazil (table 32) in 1960 and 1970 R is signi-
ficant at the .05 level through the inclusion of average annual income 
in agriculture (IAG). Where R is significant at the .05 level, the 
percentage of variance explained is 38.4 in the U.S. in 1960; it de-
clines in Brazil between the two time periods from 47.6 to 36.6 per cent 
and in the combination of cases from 29.5 to 21.0 per cent in contrast 
to a very slight increase from 87.3 to 88.8 per cent in Chile. After 
excluding variables in those steps where R is not significant and/or 
variables which contribute less than one per cent to explaining variance, 
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TABLE 32 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION ON 
INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-
URBAN RESIDENCE: BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
R 
.617 
.647 
. 669 
.678 
. 688 
.690 
.691 
.692 
.708 
.715 
.518 
.570 
. 601 
. 605 
.609 
.612 
.617 
.620 
. 623 
.629 
.633 
.634 
.380 
.419 
.448 
.460 
.473 
.476 
.478 
.479 
.502 
.511 
.269 
.324 
.361 
.366 
. 371 
.375 
. 380 
.385 
.388 
.396 
.401 
.402 
R2 Change 
1960 
1970 
.039 
.029 
.012 
• 013 
.003 
.002 
.001 
.023 
. 009 
.055 
.037 
.005 
.005 
.004 
.005 
.005 
.003 
.008 
• 005 
.001 
F 
14.150 
7.952 
5. 700 
4.274 
3.417 
2,735 
2.230 
1.842 
1.680 
1.466 
8.473 
5.295 
3.962 
2.897 
2.243 
1.804 
1.494 
1.254 
1.058 
.918 
.791 
.672 
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Simple r 
-.617 
-.065 
.144 
.224 
-.023 
.047 
.349 
.320 
.313 
.287 
-.518 
.418 
.365 
.387 
.314 
.100 
.422 
.323 
.337 
.313 
.282 
-.071 
NOTE: N=25. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, POP 
(r=.043) and ICO (r=.323) were excluded from the 1960 equation. In the 
final step of the expansion of the 1960 equation, DF=10 and 14, SSreg= 
3390.634, and SSres=3237.107; in the 1970 equation, DF=12 and 12, SSreg= 
1258.470, and SSres=1870.003. DF=23 for simple r. ETH=ethnicity; POP= 
rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in agriculture; 
IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; 
AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contributions of indus-
try to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contribu-
tions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 33 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE: CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.855 
.872 
.886 
.894 
.906 
.926 
.930 
.933 
.933 
.933 
.934 
.934 
. 694 
.764 
.802 
.863 
• 909 
.918 
.922 
.927 
.934 
. 939 
.942 
.942 
.732 
.760 
.785 
.800 
.822 
.859 
.864 
.870 
.871 
.872 
.872 
.873 
.482 
.584 
. 643 
.746 
.826 
.843 
.850 
.860 
.873 
.883 
.888 
.888 
1960 
1970 
.028 
.025 
.015 
.022 
.037 
.005 
.006 
.001 
.001 
.000 
.001 
.102 
.059 
.103 
.080 
. 017 
. 007 
.010 
.013 
.010 
.005 
.000 
62.870 
34.925 
25.629 
20.067 
17.609 
18.300 
15.557 
13.499 
11.315 
9.564 
8.114 
6.885 
21.479 
15.502 
12.641 
14.690 
18.074 
16.126 
13.824 
12.378 
11.492 
10.591 
9.407 
7.999 
.855 
.260 
.632 
-.271 
.591 
.745 
-.223 
.637 
.469 
.747 
• 811 
.118 
.694 
-.441 
.543 
.506 
.502 
-.121 
.416 
.625 
.380 
.579 
.188 
-.037 
NOTE: N=25. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=12 and 12, SSreg=l531.019, and SSres=222.340; in the 1970 equa-
tion, DF=l2 and 12, SSreg=871.532, and SSres=108.948. For simple r, DF= 
23. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; 
IAG=dncome in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in com-
merce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N,P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 34 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
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R R2 Change F Simple r 
.419 
.475 
.513 
.540 
.582 
.591 
.600 
.615 
. 617 
.619 
.619 
.262 
.372 
.397 
• 407 
.426 
.445 
.468 
.469 
.476 
.478 
.479 
.175 
.226 
. 263 
.292 
.339 
.349 
.360 
.378 
.380 
.383 
. 384 
.069 
.138 
.158 
.165 
.181 
.198 
.219 
.220 
.227 
.228 
.229 
1960 
1970 
.051 
.037 
.029 
. 047 
.010 
.Oll 
.018 
.002 
.003 
.001 
.069 
• 020 
.007 
.016 
• 017 
.021 
.001 
.007 
.001 
. 001 
10.248 
6.880 
5.483 
4.654 
4.519 
3.849 
3.375 
3.121 
2.734 
2.424 
2.155 
3.557 
3.785 
2.880 
2.237 
1. 957 
1. 771 
1.688 
1.450 
1.305 
1.155 
1. 031 
.419 
.215 
.096 
-.286 
.290 
.235 
.103 
.090 
.069 
-.052 
.000 
-.262 
.098 
.llO 
.190 
.113 
.130 
.234 
.058 
.085 
-.007 
.068 
NOTE: N=50. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, SEG 
(r=.102) was excluded from the 1960 equation and liN (r=.073) from the 
1970 equation. In the final step of the expansion of the 1960 equa-
tion, DF=11 and 38, SSre =25034.283, and SSres=40117.154; in the 1970 
equation, DF=11 and 38, §sreg=9605.869, and SSres=32168.339. DF=48 for 
simple r. ETH=ethnicity; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in in-
dustry; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income 
in commerce; ISE=income in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N,P.; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports. 
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TABLE 35 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION ON INDUSTRIAL-
ECONOMIC SET, ETHNICITY, AND RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE: 
BRAZIL, CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
R R2 R2 
1960 
.252 .063 
.363 .131 
.428 .183 
.463 .214 
.489 .239 
.516 .266 
.527 .278 
.536 .287 
.538 .290 
.541 .292 
.543 .295 
1970 
.309 .095 
.365 .133 
.421 .178 
.425 .181 
.438 .192 
.443 .196 
.445 .198 
.452 .204 
.455 .207 
.458 .210 
Change 
.068 
.052 
.031 
.025 
.027 
.012 
.009 
.003 
.002 
.003 
• 038 
. 045 
.003 
.Oll 
.004 
.002 
.006 
.003 
.003 
F 
6.662 
7.370 
7.186 
6.488 
5.934 
5.643 
5.066 
4.593 
4.086 
3.685 
3.350 
10.400 
7.474 
6.930 
5.260 
4.484 
3.785 
3.259 
2.925 
2.612 
2.370 
Simple r 
-.252 
-.156 
.053 
-.232 
-.077 
.087 
.043 
-.206 
.126 
.174 
.198 
-.309 
.026 
-.087 
-.257 
-.284 
.180 
.194 
.137 
.145 
.249 
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NOTE: N=100. Due to insufficient tolerance and F values, COG 
(r=.161) and SEG (r=.215) were excluded from the 1960 equation and liN 
(r=-.267), POR (r=.063), and ETH (r=.251) from the 1970 equation. In 
the final step of the expansion of the equation in 1960, DF=l1 and 88, 
SSreg=23648.617, and SSres=56464.798; in the 1970 equa~ion, DF=lO and 
89, SSreg=l0890.559, and SSres=40895.060. DF=98 for s1mple r. ETH= 
ethn~city; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income 
in agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=in-
come in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=con-
tributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to 
G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; POR=ports; RAD=radios 
per capita. 
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the procedure to select variables for causal analysis is shown in table 
36 and zero-order and partial correlations appear in table 37. 
Additional findings based on regression analysis may be summarized 
as follows: 
Research Finding: Linear combinations of the industrial-economic 
and socio-political sets of variables based on zero-order correla-
tions are possible for research at single points in time except in 
the case of social security coverage in Chile (1960 and 1970) and 
voter registration in the U.S. (1970). 
Research Finding: The set of variables on which the socio-political 
set was regressed was: (1) most useful for Brazilian cases where 
over 80 per cent of the variance in the socio-political variables 
was explained in 1960 and 1970 except for primary education (over 50 
per cent of the variance was explained) and voter registration (less 
than 50 per cent of the variance was explained); (2) less useful in 
Chile (than in Brazil) where over 80 per cent of the variance was 
explained in 1960 and 1970 except for higher education in 1960 
(over 50 per cent of the variance was explained), social security 
coverage in 1960 and 1970 (less than 50 per cent of the variance 
was explained), and primary education in 1970 (over 50 per cent of 
the variance was explained); (3) even less useful for cross-cultural 
analysis (than in Brazil and Chile) where variance explained was 
less than 80 per cent for primary education (but over 50 per cent), 
social security coverage (over 50 per cent was explained), and voter 
registration (less than 50 per cent was explained); and (4) least 
useful in the U.S. where over 80 per cent of the variance was ex-
plained only in the case of illiteracy rates and social security 
coverage (over 50 but less than 80 per cent of the variance in 
higher education was explained). 
TABLE 36 
VARIABLE SELECTION FROM SETS X AND Z FOR CAUSAL ANALYSIS 
BASED ON REGRESSION AND PARTIAL CORRELATION WITH 
SET Y: VOTER REGISTRATION (VOT) 
Selection Procedure 
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Step #1. Variables excluded because of associations less than :.400 
with VOT when controlling for POP or POP and ETH: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials (by POP or by POP, 
ETH): liN for Brazil in 1970; liN, ICO for Chile in 1960 and 
PIN, AGG, liN in 1970; PIN for the U.S. in 1960. * 
2. Additional variables by using second-order partials: PIN for 
Chile in 1960. 
Ste¥ #2. Remaining variables with significant partials of at least 
_.400 where p~.05: 
1. Using either first- or second-order partials: ING, COG, SEG, 
ISE for Chile in 1960 and ING, COG, SEG, lAG, ISE in 1970. 
2. Additional variables by using first-order partials: ICO* for 
Brazil in 1960. 
Step #3. Variables with insignificant r but significant partials: 
1. First-order: reo* for Brazil in 1960. 
2. Second-order: None. 
Step #4. Remaining variables (with significant partials) from sub-
sets g or w excluded because of ties to a variable with a stronger 
partial in the same subset using either first- or second-order 
partials: COG (tied to SEG), ING (tied to SEG), lAG (tied to ISE) 
for Chile in 1970. 
Step #5. Variables from set X selected for causal analysis: none for 
Brazil in 1960 and POP (set Z) as only variable associated in 1970; 
SEG, ISE for Chile in 1960 and 1970; none for the U.S. or the 
cross-cultural cases in 1960 or 1970. POP remains as a control 
variable. 
* Variables already excluded in regression analysis. ETH=ethnici-
ty; POP=rural-urban residence; PIN=labor in industry; IAG=income in 
agriculture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income 
in services; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; ING=contribu-
tions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; 
SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P. 
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TABLE 37 
ZERD-OFDER Ah~ P.~TIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VOTER REGISTRATION 
AND THE INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC VARIABLES, 1960 AND 1970* 
Zero-Order First-Order by POP Second-Order by POP, ETH 
1960 1970 
.144 
.287 
.313 
.349 
.320 
.047 
-.023 
.323 
. 224 
-. 065 
.637 
.747 
.811 
-.271 
.855 
.118 
• 632 
.469 
.745 
.260 
.419 
.103 
.090 
-.286 
.102 
.215 
.000 
.096 
.235 
.069 
.365 
.282 
.337 
.313 
.323 
.387 
.422 
.314 
-.071 
.100 
.416 
.625 
.543 
-.441 
.694 
.506 
.502 
.188 
.579 
-. 037 
.130 
.098 
.058 
-.262 
.085 
.190 
.073 
• 113 
.234 
.110 
1960 1970 
A. Brazil 
.142 
.298 
.386 
.349 
.343 
. 038 
-.077 
.431 
.265 
-.060 
.400 
.651 
• 689 
-.109 
. 766 
.158 
.399 
.242 
• 563 
.194 
.038 
.017 
.016 
. 211 
.044 
.299 
. 225 
.128 
-. 137 
.199 
B. Chile 
.205 
.539 
.433 
-.334 
.629 
.403 
.360 
.101 
.474 
-.145 
C. United States 
• 360 
-.067 
-.076 
-. 354 
-.060 
.160 
-.075 
-.023 
.106 
-.043 
.138 
.076 
.032 
-.276 
.060 
• 179 
.049 
.096 
• 227 
.094 
1960 
-.273 
-.001 
• 068 
-.071 
.032 
-.127 
-.292 
.076 
.045 
-.259 
.394 
. 646 
.699 
-.114 
.763 
.157 
.392 
.299 
.557 
.177 
.357 
-. 071 
-.078 
-.365 
-.063 
.154 
-.120 
-.030 
.098 
-. 034 
D. Brazil, Chile, and United States 
. 053 
.174 
.161 
.198 
.215 
-. 252 
-.077 
-.232 
-.206 
-.156 
.043 
. 026 
.180 
.137 
.145 
.194 
-.309 
-.087 
-.267 
-.284 
-.257 
.063 
-.019 
.137 
.111 
.220 
. 182 
-.295 
-.115 
-.285 
-.257 
-. 208 
.018 
-.043 
.067 
.012 
.102 
.074 
-.245 
-.064 
-.223 
-.228 
-. 200 
.030 
.030 
.140 
.097 
.218 
. 171 
-.346 
-.040 
-.361 
-.297 
-.209 
.019 
1970 
-.232 
-.146 
-.132 
-.059 
-.132 
.126 
-.121 
-.074 
-.123 
.022 
.196 
.537 
.431 
-.339 
.632 
.401 
.358 
.119 
.472 
-.162 
.138 
.077 
.032 
-.277 
.061 
.182 
.050 
.096 
.228 
.098 
.056 
.104 
.065 
.095 
.106 
-.157 
.088 
-.119 
-.126 
-.077 
.053 
*PIN&labor in industry; ING•contributions of industry to G.N.P.; 
COG•contributions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributions of agricul-
ture to G.N.P.; SEG•contributions of services to G.N.P.; LAG-income in 
agriculture; IIN•income in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE•income 
in services; POR•ports; POP•rural-urban residence; ETH•ethnicity; RADa 
radios per capita. 
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Causal Analysis of the Changing Relationship Between 
Socio-Political and Industrial-Economic Functional 
Linkages in 1960 and 1970: Brazil, Chile, and 
the United States 
The difficulties presented by multicollinearity and/or the need 
to find more adequate indicators than many of those used in this study 
place limits on generalization. However, the simplification procedure 
of selecting variables to represent the two subsets that caused the 
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greatest difficulty and of using the notation for mathematical sets and 
subsets in the causal models makes trends in the nations more easily 
observable. 
In spite of the methodological problems in this study which make 
the findings suggestive rather than finally definitive, it has been 
shown that (1) rural-urban residence needs to be controlled in the in-
vestigation of industrialization and national integration, (2) the 
industrial-economic and socio-political variables in many cases do co-
vary, (3) theoretical propositions concerning the relationship between 
industrialization and national integration can be formulated for future 
research, and (4) the usefulness of the social indicators used in this 
project can be evaluated. Inconclusive findings can be clarified in 
future research that hopefully avoids the methodological problems re-
lated to social indicators encountered in this study. 
Of the variables in set X (industrial-economic), two have been 
excluded from the study, i.e., contributions of the agricultural sec-
tor to the G.N.P. (g1) and average annual income in commerce (w3). Of 
set Z (control variables), ethnicity (b) has been excluded. Radios 
per capita (r) is included only for the cross-cultural analysis. It 
180 
should be noted that several variables excluded by regression or be-
cause of ties do have significant partials with the socio-political set. 
First-order partial correlations (controlling for rural-urban residence) 
appear in the causal models for the association between elements of set 
X (the strongest and in some cases the only significant associations) 
and between sets X and Y; rural-urban residence (a) is included only 
when no industrial-economic variable is significantly associated with 
the particular socio-political variable (in this case, rural-urban res-
idence appears for both time 1 and time 2 if it is significantly associ-
ated with the socio-political variable at both time periods). Notation 
for partial correlation coefficients is C; for zero-order correlations, 
it is zC. As already stated, the discussion of, and conclusions reached 
on the basis of, the causal models is in general terms, e.g., "industri-
alization" and "income"; however, the notation appearing in parentheses 
in the models indicates the specific variables involved, e.g., (Ciwz) 
signifies the partial correlation between percentage of the labor force 
employed in industry and average annual income in industry. 
Given the size of the first-order partials, there are clearly other 
variables not included in this study that influence socio-political link-
ages. Still, the examination of partials for the three nations shows 
that, in spite of there being multiple causation of socio-political link-
ages, one pattern appears in all cases; i.e., an increase in income is 
the first functional linkage established by industrialization and as such 
intervenes in the association between industrialization and socio-polit-
ical integration. It was on the basis of this conclusion that the 
causal models were constructed. 
181 
Research Finding: Causal analysis based on partial correlations con-
trolling for rural-urban residence indicates that the industrial-
economic and socio-political sets co-vary in many, but not all, 
instances. 
Brazil 
Standard deviations indicated an increase between 1960 and 1970 
in provincial variations in the industrial-economic set except for in-
come in industry (w2) and, in the socio-political set, with the excep-
tion of voter registration (v) and two variables for which variations 
remained relatively stable, i.e., primary (e1) and higher (e3) educa-
tion. This increase or stability of provincial variations reflects the 
continuing over-concentration of industrial-economic and socio-political 
linkages in a few provinces. 
In Brazil, income intervenes in the association of industrializa-
tion with educational linkages basically at the primary level. Causal 
analysis (see figure 2) at single points in time illustrates the pat-
tern of co-variation of industrial-economic and socio-political linkages; 
regression analysis has indicated that a linear equation would explain 
at least 50 per cent of the variance in the socio-political variables 
except in the case of voter registration. In general terms (1) educa-
tional linkages (e1 , e2 , e3) have a positive association with industrial-
economic linkages and specifically with industrialization (i, g3) and/or 
income (w1 , w4); (2) illiteracy (1) has a negative association with 
industrial-economic linkages and specifically with income (w1, w2); 
(3) social security coverage (s) has a positive association with indus-
trial-economic linkages and specifically with industrialization (i), 
number of ports (p), and income Cw4); (4) voter registration (v) is not 
Fig. 2. Causal model, selected variables from sets X, Y, 
and Z: Brazil, 1960 (Tl) and 1970 (T2) 
i or 
i=Labor force in industry 
g=Contributions of the major economic sectors to the G.N.P. 
g3=Percentage contribution of commerce to the G.N.P. 
w=Average annual income 
w1=Average annual income in agriculture 
w2=Average annual income in industry 
w4=Average annual income in services 
p=Number of ports 
e1=Primary-school enrollment ratio 
e2=Secondary-school enrollment ratio 
e3=College enrollment 
l=Illiteracy rates 
s=Social security coverage 
v=Voter registration as percentage of those eligible 
a=Rural-urban residence 
ul, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6=Error terms 
C=First-order partial controlling for rural-urban residence 
zC=Zero-order correlation coefficient 
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significantly associated with industrial-economic linkages. Cross-time 
analysis based on the causal model suggests (1) curvilinear relation-
ships over time between the industrial-economic and socio-political 
variables and (2) if attention is focused on selecting predictors of 
socio-political variables, a shift in the most adequate predictor pri-
marily because of interaction between, and changes in the association 
of, income and industrialization. 
The suggestion of cross-time curvilinearity is supported by ob-
serving that, in general, there was a decline in the strength of associ-
ations between industrial-economic and socio-political linkages with the 
exception of the selection of income (w1) as a predictor of higher edu-
cation (e3) and ports (p) as a predictor of social security coverage (s) 
in 1970. Declining associations occurred concomitantly with a 1960-1970 
increase in the mean values of all variables in the model except that 
labor force in industry (i) remained stable and illiteracy (1) declined. 
In relation to the suggestion concerning the shift in the most 
adequate predictors, it is necessary to discuss each variable separately: 
1. Education. Industrialization (i, g3) first appears as the best pre-
dictor of education (e1 , e2, e3) for analysis at a single point in 
time. A different conclusion is reached, however, after cross-time 
analysis of the different educational levels. 
a. Primary education. The cross-time stability of industrializa-
tion (i) and the increase in primary education (e1) and income 
(w) was accompanied by a decline in the association of industri-
alization (i) with income (w2). Since industrialization (i) was 
not selected as a predictor in 1970 and income (w) maintains a 
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(weak) association with primary education, it is concluded that 
(1) the association of industrialization is in part direct and 
in part indirect (through income) with primary education and 
(2) income is a more adequate single predictor of primary educa-
tion for cross-time analysis. 
b. Secondary education. It is concluded that the most adequate 
predictor of this educational level for analysis at one or more 
points in time is industrialization (i or g3). The selection 
of income (w4) in 1960 and its exclusion in 1970 first appears 
to be based on the association of income to industrialization 
in 1960 which declined by 1970 (the association of tied income 
variables with g3 remained relatively stable as shown in table 
38 in appendix C). There are, however, two intervening factors 
as noted in the background literature: (1) the major obstacle 
to higher education in Brazil was the cost of secondary educa-
tion--thus its association with income in 1960--which the Bra-
zilian government attempted to resolve in the mid-1960s by offer-
ing financial assistance to low-income students, a policy that 
apparently had an effect on the 1970 data; (2) secondary students 
are disproportionately concentrated in the more industrialized 
region of Brazil which contributes to the strong association in 
1960 and 1970 with industrialization (i, g3) particularly when 
recalling that this variable is a ratio representing each prov-
ince's relative share of secondary students. 
c. Higher education. The conclusions here are that (1) for the 
time period studied, industrialization (g3) is the best pre-
185 
dieter of higher education (e3) at one or more points in time 
in part because of the tendency for institutions of higher edu-
cation to be over-concentrated in more industrialized regions 
but (2) where income is removed as an obstacle to secondary 
education, as in Brazil, it becomes more closely associated with 
higher education. The suggestion does appear in the model that 
industrialization is declining as a determinant of educational 
linkages at this level while income is emerging as an equally 
adequate predictor. 
2. Illiteracy rates. Causal analysis shows income (w1 , w2) as the 
best predictor of illiteracy (1) at one or more points in time. 
The decline in the strength of association is due, it is suggested, 
to the impact of widespread literacy campaigns in Brazil. 
3. Social security coverage. The best predictor of social security 
coverage (s) at one or more points in time is industrialization (i) 
since the association with income is weaker and only occurs at one 
point in time. The decline in the strength of this association can 
be explained by the relative stability in industrialization (i) 
1960-1970 while social security coverage (s) increased as did pro-
vincial variations. This association as well as the association of 
ports (p) with social security coverage (s) probably stems, it is 
suggested here, from the over-concentration of population in addi-
tion to socio-political and industrial-economic linkages--and 
specifically the concentration of the labor force (especially union-
ized labor)--in areas (the more urban-industrial) covered to a 
greater degree by labor legislation (given that agricultural labor 
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was not yet covered by social security in 1970) and where less avoid-
ance of adhering to this legislation occurs. 
4. Voter registration. The 1960 and 1970 mean values indicate an in-
crease in voter registration (v); in addition, provincial variations 
declined. The lack of an association with the industrial-economic 
variables may be due to (1) it is an inadequate indicator of polit-
ical linkages or (2) industrial-economic linkages in reality are not 
directly associated with political linkages. There is some evidence 
in the data collected to support the second explanation. As shown 
in the causal model, a weak association exists between voter regis-
tration (v) and the control variable, rural-urban residence (a), in 
1970. However, in the regression analysis less than 50 per cent of 
the variance in voter registration was explained in the Brazilian 
data. Another possibility is to investigate associations within 
the socio-political set (see table 42 in appendix C) in which case 
voter registration has a first-order partial of .610 with the 
secondary-school enrollment ratio in 1960. The implication is that 
political linkages are more closely related to educational linkages 
than to the industrial-economic set. The background literature on 
Brazil would support this suggestion given the observation that high 
illiteracy rates have disenfranchised about half of the adult popu-
lation. Conclusions cannot, however, be reached until the patterns 
of associations in Chile and the U.S. have been analyzed. 
187 
Chile 
Of the variables included in the causal model (figure 3) for the 
Chilean cases, standard deviations indicated an increase in provincial 
variations for industrialization (g4), income (w), higher education 
(e3), and social security coverage (s). Provincial differences con-
tinue to exist in relation to these linkages but, generally speaking, 
this is less of a characteristic of Chile than it is of Brazil. The 
consistent selection of percentage contributions of services to the 
G.N.P. (g4) as the indicator of the level of industrialization in Chile 
concurs with the over-emphasis on the service sector as noted in the 
background discussion. 
Causal analysis of the Chilean cases shows a pattern of co-
variation between the industrial-economic and socio-political linkages 
differing from that in the Brazilian cases in many instances. Income 
(w) clearly intervenes in the association of industrialization (g4) 
with the socio-political variables only in the case of secondary edu-
cation (e2). Analysis at single points in time shows that (1) the 
association of educational linkages (e1 , e2) to industrial-economic 
linkages (specifically number of ports or p, industrialization or g4 , 
and income or w1 , w2) does not reveal a consistent pattern; (2) similar 
to Brazil, illiteracy (1) has a negative association with the indus-
trial-economic set and specifically industrialization (g4), ports (p), 
and income (w1 , w4); (3) voter registration (v) has a positive asso-
ciation with industrial-economic linkages and specifically industri-
alization (g4) and income (w4); and (4) social security coverage (s) 
is not significantly associated with industrial-economic linkages. 
Fig. 3. Causal model, selected variables from sets X, Y, 
and Z: Chile, 1960 (T1) and 1970 (Tz) 
i or ~-.~-~G. (C 94 1) 
Tl -. ?aq (C 94 J) 
uz\ u3\ 
1 
w 
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Regression analysis at single points in time indicated that linear 
equations would explain at least 50 per cent of the variance in the 
socio-political variables with the exception of social security cover-
age. The suggestion was made that cross-time analysis implies curvi-
linear relations between the two sets of variables which is supported by 
the Chilean data only in the case of voter registration (v) and in the 
association of ports (p) with primary education (e1) and illiteracy (1). 
Concomitantly, the 1960 and 1970 mean values showed an overall increase 
in all variables except illiteracy and secondary education which de-
clined and number of ports which remained stable. 
The use of cross-time analysis to determine the most adequate pre-
dictors of the socio-political variables leads to different conclusions 
from the analysis of Brazilian cases. In the Chilean cases, the strong 
interaction between income (w) and industrialization (g4) makes it dif• 
ficult to determine, in the association with illiteracy (1) and voter 
registration (v), whether or not income (1) is acting as an intervening 
variable or (2) is associated with these two variables only because of 
its association with industrialization. At any rate, industrialization 
is the more adequate predictor of illiteracy (1) and voter registration 
(v) in 1960 and 1970. Similar to Brazil in 1960, voter registration is 
significantly associated (.434) with secondary education (see table 43 
in appendix C) as well as in 1970 (.440) in Chile. 
The association of ports (p) with illiteracy (1) is significant 
but declining and it does not serve as a predictor of primary education 
(el) in 1970. More so than in Brazil, Chilean ports tend to be located 
unevenly within the nation and at points of heavy (urban) concentration 
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(which is also very unevenly distributed) which probably accounts for 
the association with illiteracy rates (given that these rates are sig-
nificantly lower in urban than rural areas in Chile) and with primary 
education (e1) which refers in this study to a province's relative 
share of primary students. This observation in combination with the 
negative rather than positive association of industrialization (g4) and 
income (w2) with primary education (e1) illustrates the basic problem 
encountered in using the primary-school enrollment ratio as an indica-
tor of education; i.e., it is not only a reflection of increasing edu-
cational linkages but is also strongly affected by population growth 
rates (as determined by in-migration and out-migration as well as birth 
and death rates). The usefulness of this ratio as an indicator is 
therefore greatly reduced. 
Of the industrial-economic variables, only income (w1) serves as 
an indicator of secondary education (e2) in Chile and only in 1970. In 
regression analysis, rural-urban residence (control variable) explained 
72.1 per cent of the variance in secondary education in 1960 and 48.6 
per cent in 1970. The implication is not so much that income becomes 
associated with secondary education as industrialization increases; 
rather, since this variable is the province's relative share of secon-
dary students and secondary schools in Chile are located only in urban 
centers, the implications are that (1) level of urbanization is the 
most adequate predictor and (2) income is associated in 1970 probably as 
a function of its association with level of urbanization. Doubt is 
cast, at any rate, on the usefulness of the secondary-school enrollment 
ratio for the same reason as the primary-school enrollment ratio. 
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No industrial-economic variable serves as a predictor of higher 
education (e3). Only the control variable, rural-urban residence (a), 
is significantly associated in 1960 and 1970. Likewise, there is no 
industrial-economic variable associated with social security coverage 
(s) in Chile. As noted in the background literature, social security 
coverage has become so extensive in Chile that it has become more of 
an obstacle to, rather than a concomitant of, industrialization given 
the level of industrialization. 
The United States 
Provincial variations increased 1960-1970 in the U.S. cases for 
industrialization (g4), income (w), social security coverage (s), 
secondary (ez) and higher (e3) education. In part, this reflects the 
concentration of population and industrial activities in certain regions 
of the nation, a historical trend similar, but in a lesser degree, to 
what has been characteristic in Brazil and Chile. 
The co-variation of the industrial-economic and socio-political 
variables follows a more clear-cut pattern in the U.S. than in Brazil 
or Chile. Causal analysis (see figure 4) at single points in time in-
dicates that: (1) educational linkages (e1 , e2 , e3) are inconsistently 
associated with industrial-economic linkages as in Chile; (2) illiteracy 
(1) has a negative association with industrial-economic linkages and 
specifically income (w1 , w2); (3) social security coverage (s) has a 
positive association with industrial-economic linkages and specifi-
cally industrialization (i, g2); (4) voter registration (v) is not sig-
nificantly associated with industrial-economic linkages as in Brazil. 
Fig. 4. Causal model, selected variables from sets X, Y, 
and Z: United States, 1960 CT1) and 1970 (Tz) 
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Regression analysis indicated that linear equations were possible 
except for voter registration (v) but 50 per cent or more of the vari-
ance was explained only in the case of social security coverage (s), 
illiteracy (1), and higher education (e3). Implied cross-time curvi-
linear relations based on the causal model appear as possible only in 
the case of social security coverage (s) concomitant to a 1960-1970 
increase in social security coverage and a decline in industrialization 
(i or g2). All other variables included in the model showed a 1960-
1970 increase except for a decline in the primary education ratio (e1) 
and illiteracy (1) while number of ports (p) remained stable. 
Income does not appear to intervene in the association of indus-
trialization and socio-political linkages since (1) income and indus-
trialization are associated with different variables and (2) income and 
industrialization are weakly associated and have become dissociated in 
terms of a positive relationship. It can be suggested at this point, 
however, that once a more advanced level of industrialization has been 
attained, income (1) becomes dissociated from industrialization and 
(2) operates independently to establish socio-political linkages. 
On the basis of the causal model, it is concluded that income 
(w1, w2) is the most adequate predictor of higher education (e3) and 
illiteracy rates (1) while industrialization (i, g2) is the most ade-
quate predictor of social security coverage (s) at one or more points 
in time in the U.S. The indicators of educational linkages present 
problems in analysis similar to those encountered in Chile. The primary 
education ratio has been excluded for lack of a significant association 
with any variable. As was the case of primary education in Chile, in-
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dustrialization (i) is negatively associated with secondary education 
(e2) in the U.S. and, similar to Chile, higher education (e3) is asso-
ciated with income (w1) in 1970. Rural-urban residence (a), the con-
trol variable, is weakly associated with higher education in 1960 but 
becomes dissociated in 1970. 
A final comment on the causal model for the U.S. cases prior to 
analysis of the combined cross-cultural cases and the synthesis of con-
clusions based on these models is related to number of ports (p). The 
lack of association between access to marketing districts and the socio-
political variables supports implications made concerning this variable 
in Brazil and Chile; i.e., its association with socio-political linkages 
in these nations may be due to its association with some industrial-
economic linkage included or not included in this study. In the case 
of the U.S., an association--although weak--does appear with industri-
alization (g4). 
Brazil, Chile, and the U.S.: cross-cultural analysis 
In the combined cross-cultural cases, there was an increase in 
provincial variations observed in all industrial-economic variables ex-
cept percentage of the labor force in industry which remained relatively 
stable. Of the socio-political set, only secondary and higher education 
and social security coverage showed an increase in provincial variations 
cross-culturally. 
By combining the cases of the three nations, the pattern of co-
variation of i~dustrial-economic and socio-political variables at single 
points in time (see figure 5) is characterized by the following: 
1. Educational linkages (e1, e2 , e3) have a positive association with 
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industrial-economic linkages and specifically industrialization (i), 
income (w1 , w4), and radios per capita (r). Therefore, 
Research Finding: Co-variation of educational with industrial-
economic linkages is substantiated by a positive association with 
industrialization and income in Brazil and cross-culturally (and 
with radios per capita cross-culturally); this association is in-
consistent in Chile and the U.S. 
2. Illiteracy (1) has a negative association with industrial-economic 
linkages and specifically industrialization (i), income (w2), and 
radios per capita (r). Therefore, 
Research Finding: Co-variation of illiteracy rates with industrial-
economic linkages is substantiated by a negative association with: 
income in Brazil, Chile, the U.S., and cross-culturally; industri-
alization in Chile and cross-culturally; access to marketing dis-
tricts in Chile; and radios per capita cross-culturally. 
3. Social security coverage (s) has a positive association with 
industrial-economic linkages and specifically industrialization 
(i), income (wz), and radios per capita (r). Therefore, 
Research Finding: Co-variation of social security coverage with 
industrial-economic linkages is substantiated by a positive associ-
ation with: industrialization in Brazil, the U.S., and cross-
culturally; income in Brazil and cross-culturally; access to market-
ing districts in Brazil; and radios per capita cross-culturally. 
This co-variation was not observed in Chile. 
4. Voter registration (v) is not significantly associated with indus-
trial-economic linkages. Therefore, 
Research Finding: Co-variation of voter registration with indus-
trial-economic linkages occurs only in Chile where it has a posi-
tive association with industrialization and income. 
\ 
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Regression analysis of the cross-cultural data at single points 
in time determined that linear equations were possible in the associa-
tion of industrial-economic linkages with all socio-political linkages 
except voter registration. The mean values for the two sets of varia-
bles indicated a 1960-1970 increase in all but illiteracy rates (1) and 
the primary education ratio Ce1) which declined and industrialization 
(i) which remained relatively stable. Given these trends, it is sug-
gested on the basis of the causal model that cross-time curvilinearity 
appears in relation to educational Ce1, ez, e3) linkages and to a lesser 
extent in the case of social security coverage (s). 
Research Finding: In no case did direct examination of the residu-
als on scatterplots reveal any other type of linear relationship 
(i.e., a non-linear association). Although the effects of rural-
urban residence were removed in causal analysis but were not in 
regression analysis, the effects of this control variable were 
strongest in relation to the association of educational with indus-
trial-economic linkages in Chile and the U.S. It was also demon-
strated that second-order partials controlling for ethnicity and 
rural-urban residence did not vary significantly from controlling 
only for rural-urban residence in the selection of variables for 
causal analysis. Therefore, on the basis of the observed decline 
in strength of association and/or a lack of association between the 
industrial-economic and socio-political linkages, the possibility 
is suggested that, where cases are provinces, the association be-
tween the two sets of variables within a nation may be linear at 
single points in time but curvilinear in cross-time analysis. 
In the causal model for combined cross-cultural cases, the inter-
action between income (w1, wz, w4) and industrialization (i) is again 
observed as is, in cross-time analysis, the role of income as an inter-
vening variable in the association between industrialization and socio-
political linkages, particularly in relation to education (ez) and 
illiteracy (1). Omitting radios per capita (r) momentarily, at one or 
more points in time industrialization (i) is the most adequate predic-
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tor cross-culturally of primary education (e1) and social security 
coverage (s); income appears as the most adequate predictor of secon-
dary (e2) and higher (e3) education and illiteracy (1). Referring to 
tables 13 and 19 (pages 151 and 161), industrialization (i) has first-
order partials in 1970 of .569 with secondary education (e2) and .502 
with higher education (e3). Given the comparison of these partials 
with the strength of association of income with each level of educa-
tion, the tendency for industrialization--as it increases in level--to 
be most strongly associated with a higher level of education, and: 
Research Finding: Interaction between income and industrialization 
is observed in association with primary education in Brazil, secon-
dary education as well as illiteracy and voter registration in Chile, 
and education and illiteracy cross-culturally. This interaction 
does not appear in the causal analysis for the U.?. 
Research Finding: Income is the most adequate single predictor of: 
primary education and illiteracy in Brazil; secondary education 
(1970) in Chile; higher education (1970), illiteracy in the U.S.; 
secondary and higher education and illiteracy cross-culturally. 
Research Finding: Industrialization is the most adequate single 
predictor of: secondary and higher (income would also serve) edu-
cation and social security coverage in Brazil; illiteracy and voter 
registration in Chile; social security coverage in the U.S.; pri-
mary education and social security coverage cross-culturally. 
it is concluded that: 
Research Finding: Selection between income and industrialization as 
the most adequate single predictor of socio-political linkages 
shifts concomitantly with changes in the strength of association be-
tween income and industrialization. The strength of association 
depends on the level of industrialization and specifically whether 
(referring to the 1960-1970 period) it is (1) accelerating as in 
Chile, (2) stabilizing as in Brazil, or (3) tapering off after reach-
ing an advanced level as in the U.S. Respectively, income increases 
and industrialization declines as predictors of socio-political link-
ages. 
Therefore, 
Research Finding: The expectation that economic linkages are 
established prior to socio-political linkages is supported; i.e., 
when rural-urban residence as a line of differentiation is con-
trolled (and/or differences decline), increases in income--an 
economic linkage--generated by industrialization in turn generate 
socio-political linkages within a specific population. 
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In the causal model of the combined cross-cultural cases, radios 
per capita (r) is most consistently associated (dotted lines indicate 
that findings are not definitive) with secondary Ce2) and higher (e3) 
education and illiteracy (1); this coincides with the pattern of asso-
ciation between income (w) and the socio-political linkages. In addi-
tion, radios per capita (r) is more closely associated with income (w) 
than industrialization (i). It is therefore suggested that (1) as in-
come increases, radios become more accessible and (2) the association 
of radios per capita with the socio-political linkages is primarily 
because of its association with income. The background literature sup-
ports this suggestion specifically in the observation that the rapid 
spread of communications as a twentieth-century phenomenon has not been 
so much a concomitant as it has been an obstacle to development by 
accelerating internal demands for change. 
Voter registration is excluded from the causal model for the cross-
cultural cases for lack of significant associations. It is one example 
of the need to evaluate the social indicators used in this study. The 
conclusion& based on causal analysis are tentative. The findings do, 
however, permit revisions in the analytic model developed for this 
study. 
Social indicators: evaluation 
One of the objectives of this research was to determine whether 
percentage of the labor force employed in industry or percentage con-
tributions of the major economic sectors to the G.N.P. would serve as 
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a more adequate indicator of industrialization. If percentage of the 
labor force employed in industry and percentage contributions of the 
major economic sectors were indicators of the same phenomenon (indus-
trialization), then it is expected that they would (1) be closely 
associated, (2) be similarly related to the socio-political variables, 
and (3) reflect the same trends over time, i.e., increase, remain 
stable, or decline. This is not the case. First, where an association 
of the four sectors does exist with labor force in industry, the clos-
est and in most cases the only sector associated is the industrial sec-
tor with first-order partials (see tables 38-41 in appendix C) of .705 
in 1960 and .704 in 1970 in Chile, .590 in Brazil in 1970, and .460 in 
the U.S. in 1970. Labor force in industry is not associated with any 
of the sectors in 1960 in Brazil and the U.S. or in the cross-cultural 
cases in 1960 or 1970. Secondly, the causal models illustrate that 
either labor in industry or sectoral contributions to the G.N.P. is 
selected as most adequate and, in those cases when both are included in 
the models, the strength of association with the socio-political link-
ages differs. Therefore, they do not have a similar relationship with 
the socio-political variables. Lastly, they do not reflect the same 
trends over time; the mean values for these variables in 1960 and 1970, 
as already noted, show that they differ within and among the three na-
tions as to whether they decline, increase, or remain stable. 
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Sectoral percentage contributions to the G.N.P. depend in part 
on the history of growth of each sector, the current stage of indus-
trialization, and the pattern of industrialization, i.e., the sequence 
in which each sector was emphasized prior to, during, and following 
rapid industrialization. The history of the major economic sectors in 
this sense is important as a background influence on the actual level 
and rate of, and obstacles to, industrialization. As an indicator of 
industrialization per se, the suggestion here is that it is the per-
centage contribution of the industrial sector that reflects growth or 
decline in industrial productivity, traditional versus advanced tech-
nology, and inefficient or efficient utilization of the labor force, 
i.e., industrialization. The mean values of the data on sectoral con-
tributions to the G.N.P. in 1960 and 1970 indicate that the industrial 
sector was the most important in the three nations. 
Percentage of the labor force in industry depends in part on 
(1) the availability of skilled labor, (2) the capacity of industry to 
absorb available labor, and (3) the level of industrialization, given 
that at more advanced levels the percentage of the labor force in indus-
try declines as other economic sectors increase in importance. This 
variable was selected as the most or one of the most adequate indica-
tors of industrialization in all causal models except that for Chile; 
the partial correlation tables show that it is significantly associated 
with socio-political variables in Chile even though it was not selected 
for inclusion in the causal analysis. Therefore, both industrial per-
centage contributions to the G.N.P. and labor force in industry can be 
used for national and cross-cultural analysis. The suggestion here, 
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however, is that industrial contributions to the G.N.P. is a more sensi-
tive indicator of the actual level of industrialization whereas labor 
in industry reflects the stage of industrialization. There is an addi-
tional factor in the determination of which would be the most adequate 
indicator of industrialization; i.e., if a linear model is being used, 
it is suggested that industrial contributions to the G.N.P. is most 
adequate and, if a curvilinear model orients the analysis, labor force 
in industry would be the most adequate. Therefore, 
Research Finding: The selection of adequate social indicators 
depends in part on whether the underlying analytic model for re-
search assumes linearity or curvilinearity in the study of pro-
cesses or sub-processes of development and change. 
Two final suggestions concerning the use of percentage contributions of 
the industrial sector are that (1) as far as possible, industry should 
be defined as manufacturing and (2) percentage contributions should be 
stated in relation to total provincial income rather than G.N.P. which 
would reveal greater provincial variations and would be more consistent 
with the selection of provinces as the units of analysis. 
Of the industrial-economic set of linkages only average annual 
income was significantly associated with all socio-political linkages 
in one or more nations. It has already been suggested that (1) income 
intervenes as the first type of functional linkage established by in-
dustrialization in the association of industrialization with socio-
political linkages and (2) since ethnicity is an inadequate control 
variable, it can be replaced by white-collar versus blue-collar occu-
pation as a line of differentiation. Support for the second suggestion 
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is seen in the selection for causal analysis of income variables that 
most frequently were either income in agriculture or income in services, 
i.e., the sectors in which income is lowest. Two conclusions concern-
ing income are (1) the variable should be defined as average annual 
income rather than income in the major economic sectors to avoid multi-
collinearity and (2) average annual income should include both wage and 
salary earners rather than just wage earners as in this study, particu-
larly if occupation is used as a control variable. 
Access to marketing districts as indicated by number of ports 
was not found to be an adequate predictor of socio-political linkages. 
It is associated with industrialization in the U.S. but not in Brazil 
or Chile; the conclusion here is that this association in the U.S. re-
flects, as noted in the background information, that transportation 
networks in the U.S. were part of the industrial infrastructure rather 
than an obstacle to industrialization as has been the case in Brazil 
and Chile. This variable should therefore be relocated in the analytic 
model as a background factor influencing industrialization. 
The problems encountered with radios per capita as an indicator 
of communications have been discussed in terms of its inadequacy for 
national analysis where provinces are the units of analysis. The neces-
sity of relocating communications in the analytic model has already been 
implied in the suggestion that income determines access to communica-
tions which, in turn, possibly explains the strong associations of 
radios per capita with social linkages. An alternative indicator of 
communications for which provincial data would more likely be available 
in the three nations in this study is newspaper circulation which would 
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then also be influenced by literacy rates or educational level. 
Decisions reached concerning the indicators of educational link-
ages used in this study are that (1) they are inadequate as social in-
dicators and (2) a single indicator (i.e., of one dimensionality) of 
educational linkages is preferible. The interpretation of the associa-
tion of primary- and secondary-school enrollment ratios with industrial-
economic linkages was restricted by the interference of population 
growth particularly as this affects age structure. This is possibly 
the underlying reason why the rural-urban differences in primary edu-
cation noted in the descriptive background were not substantiated in 
this study, especially for the Chilean cases. The association of 
higher education as a percentage of primary- and secondary-school en-
rollments was associated with the industrial-economic linkages although 
inconsistently. However, since the bottleneck in education tends to be 
at the secondary level in many nations, a single indicator of educa-
tional linkages preferibly would concern this level. In addition, the 
causal models give a suggestion that the higher the level of industri-
alization and/or income, the higher the level of education with which 
they are most strongly associated. An alternative indicator of educa-
tion for future research--where provinces are the units of analysis and 
published data are relied on--is total secondary-school enrollment of 
a cohort at a single point in time expressed as a percentage of the 
cohort's primary-school enrollment at a single point in time. This 
indicator would reflect relative educational attainment and retention 
rates; it would also avoid the problem of changes in educational struc-
ture as these affect data on enrollment at each level. If field re-
search is conducted in place of relying on published data, then the 
indicator suggested is average number of years of school completed by 
the population 25 years of age and over. 
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Illiteracy rates are considered to be adequate as a social indi-
cator. Two changes are suggested concerning this variable for future 
research. First, it would be preferible to define the indicator as 
literacy rather than illiteracy rates; otherwise, that part of the 
analytic model dealing with the establishment of functional linkages 
must treat indicators of implied non-integration and integration simul-
taneously. Secondly, it is suggested that functional literacy would 
be a more adequate indicator than literacy which was found to be the 
case in the U.S. data in this study. Functional literacy reflects the 
strength of educational linkages and as such can also be used as an 
indicator of educational linkages if comparable data between nations 
can be collected. 
Voter registration as defined in this study is inadequate as an 
indicator of political participation which has already been noted. It 
is suggested that this indicator be redefined for future research as 
votes cast (valid) in national elections as a percentage of the voting-
age population. Since descriptive data demonstrates the impact of high 
illiteracy rates on voter participation and it was associated with 
secondary education in this study, political linkages also must be 
relocated in the analytic model. 
Social security coverage was found to be an inadequate social 
indicator in part, it is suggested, because (1) it might more accurately 
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be defined as an economic rather than a social linkage and (2) coverage 
and the extent of coverage depend on legislation and government plan-
ning, not the level of industrialization per se. The capacity to fi-
nance social security programs, it is suggested, co-varies with indus-
trialization and, given this assertion, over-extensive coverage is not 
concomitant to a high level of industrialization but rather it is an 
obstacle to industrialization as has been the case in Chile. A pos-
sibly more adequate indicator of social linkages to replace social 
security coverage for future research is suggested as the availability 
of health care and specifically the number of doctors per 100,000 popu-
lation. 
Additional findings concerning social indicators are based on 
the problem of multicollinearity encountered in this study and the 
following observations: 
1. Social security coverage in Chile includes almost the entire labor 
force and is dissociated from industrial-economic linkages while 
this association is declining in Brazil and the U.S. 
2. Education at the primary and secondary levels is expanding as is 
voter registration while the association with industrial-economic 
linkages tends to be declining 
3. There was an overall decline 1960-1970 in the percentage of the 
variance explained, with few exceptions, in the socio-political 
variables in each nation and cross-culturally 
4. As the urbanization process begins to taper off at a high level, 
the need to control for rural-urban residence declines 
5. Different variables in many instances were selected as the most 
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adequate for causal analysis in 1960 and 1970 in each nation and 
cross-culturally while the cross-cultural combination of cases 
concealed differences among nations 
6. The co-variation in cross-time analysis between two social indi-
cators is necessarily affected when one of these, e.g., number of 
ports, does not substantially vary from time 1 to time 2 (which 
therefore reduces its usefulness as a social indicator) 
7. The percentage contributions of the four major economic sectors to 
the G.N.P. were affected by the number of cases (50 in the U.S. 
versus 25 in Brazil and Chile) by defining these indicators in terms 
of the national rather than the provincial level of analysis 
The conclusions are therefore that: 
Research Finding: The adequacy of specific social indicators 
varies--depending on the level of national development--at differ-
ent points in time within nations and cross-culturally. 
Research Finding: Once the phenomenon represented by a specific 
social indicator becomes a predominant characteristic of a popula-
tion, i.e., evenly distributed in relative terms, the usefulness 
of the social indicator lessens for national analysis although it 
might continue to be useful for cross-cultural analysis. 
Research Finding: Where units of analysis are provinces within 
nations, different sets of social indicators need to be selected 
for (1) cross-time analysis within nations, (2) analysis at single 
points in time within nations, (3) cross-time, cross-cultural anal-
ysis, and (4) cross-cultural analysis at single points in time. 
Research Finding: The selection of social indicators depends in 
part on research objectives. If the objective is generalization 
and theory construction, the same indicators must be selected for 
all nations in cross-cultural analysis. If the objective is social 
policy, different indicators must be selected by nation. 
Research Finding: The definition of any specific social indicator 
must be one dimensional in order to maximize its usefulness. 
Research Finding: Where units of analysis are provinces, the 
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definition of each social indicator must be in terms of the pro-
vincial level of analysis in order for the number of cases within 
each nation not to affect cross-cultural analysis; i.e., national-
level indicators, e.g., G.N.P. or variables defined in relation to 
the G.N.P., do not serve as social indicators when provinces are 
the units of analysis. 
In summary, the selection of social indicators for inclusion as 
industrial-economic and socio-political linkages in the revised anal-
ytic model includes: industrialization as indicated by percentage of 
the labor force in industry (curvilinear model) or percentage contri-
butions of manufacturing to provincial income (linear model); average 
annual income of wage and salary earners; communications as indicated 
by newspaper circulation; educational linkages as indicated by secon-
dary-school enrollment of a cohort as a percentage of the cohort's 
primary-school enrollment (for research based on secondary sources), 
average number of years of school completed by the population 25 years 
of age and over (for field research), or functional literacy; political 
participation as indicated by valid votes cast in national elections as 
a percentage of the voting-age population; and availability of health 
care as indicated by the number of doctors per 100,000 population. 
The directionality of relationships 
The strength of association between industrial-economic and socio-
political linkages in the causal models tended to be weakest in the U.S. 
The mean values of the data for the three nations indicate in most cases 
that socio-political linkages are stronger, in relative terms, in the 
U.S. than in Brazil or Chile. Since the U.S. is at a more advanced 
level of industrialization, it is suggested--although not substantiated 
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in this study--that the association between industrialization and na-
tional integration is curvilinear. It has also been concluded that in-
dustrialization generates (1) economic linkages directly and (2) socio-
political linkages indirectly through income and directly until more 
advanced levels of industrialization are reached. 
In the revised analytic model in figures 6 and 7, one direction-
ality continues to be assumed in the association of industrialization 
with socio-political linkages and income. Interaction, i.e., recog-
nizing that income and socio-political linkages have an impact on indus-
trialization (e.g., extreme income inequality or an excess of unskilled 
labor), is incorporated into the background context. The assumption of 
one directionality is also made concerning the relationship between in-
come and socio-political linkages with the exception of educational 
linkages. Given the literacy requirement for voting in many nations and 
the relationship between income and level of educational attainment, 
income and education are therefore assumed to interact in generating 
political linkages. This reverses in part one expectation at the be-
ginning of this study, i.e., that political linkages precede social 
linkages. 
Background context: sources of variations 
Functional linkages to the international system have a signifi-
cant impact on the emergence and maintenance of variations among and 
within nations. Although Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. similarly began 
by being linked functionally to the international system as political 
and economic dependencies, the course of events in the on-going pro-
cess of the redefinition of functional linkages from the sixteenth to 
the twentieth century led to one basic line of differentiation of in-
terest in this study. That is, by the twentieth century the U.S. was 
an industrial nation; Brazil and Chile were not. 
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In none of these three nations did economic independence accom-
pany political independence. During the period of time extending from 
the Napoleonic Wars and their impact on the U.S. economy to the twen-
tieth century, the realization grew and was confirmed by the 1929 
world-wide depression that national economies within the international 
system were not independent but rather were, and must be, interde-
pendent. That industrialization had to be a planned process in Brazil 
and Chile was one consequence of their being caught up in the rapid 
industrialization of Western Europe and the U.S. as suppliers of raw 
materials, markets for manufactured goods, and sources of capital in-
vestment by nations such as the U.S. concerned with maintaining a rapid 
rate of national economic growth. Although Brazil and Chile were world 
powers politically, their economic links to the international system 
had not substantially changed from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
century. 
Small industry had emerged in Brazil and Chile prior to the twen-
tieth century but the industrialization process did not begin to accel~ 
erate until import substitution in this century. The problems or ob-
stacles faced by the three nations in this study prior to and during 
industrialization are similar and yet different. It is not the fact 
that industrialization occurred earlier in the U.S. that differentiates 
its experience from that of Brazil and Chile, Rather, it is the se-
quence of certain events that is important, e.g., formation of an 
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industrial infrastructure prior to and not during industrialization, 
emergence of national entrepreneurship prior to and not after the domi-
nance of the multinational corporation, growth of the tertiary sector 
after and not prior to the growth of the secondary sector, rapid urbani-
zation concomitant to and not prior to industrialization, rapid popula-
tion growth after and not prior to or during periods of rapid economic 
growth, emergence of internal demands for change during and not prior 
to rapid industrialization, and concentration of landownership after 
and not prior to growth in agricultural production. "Cooperation in 
development" among nations in this century has been limited by the con-
flict that often emerges between the goals, e.g., of the U.S., to main-
tain rapid economic growth and, e.g., of Brazil and Chile, to industri-
alize. As Brazil, Chile, and other Latin American nations found them-
selves moving increasingly toward the periphery of the international 
system, the "Latinization" Movement began and, concomitantly, the role 
of international organizations has become increasingly important. 
This study, however, is not one of contrasts but of differences 
in degree. The functional linkages of nations to the international 
system contribute to variations not only cross-culturally but also 
within nations. The mean values of the provincial data for the three 
nations in this study tend to reflect national trends noted in the 
literature although provincial variations were observed to be under-
going change (increasing or declining) in many instances. Thus, given 
the historical context of this research, influences on both industri-
alization and national integration that have contributed to cross-
cultural and to provincial variations concerning the nations in this 
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study are in the following areas: 
1. Economy. Differences in the degree to which: the different eco-
nomic sectors are emphasized, a domestic market exists, a modern 
technology and skilled labor force are available, self-sufficiency 
in agriculture exists, the balance of trade is favorable, resources 
and production are nationally owned and/or controlled, transporta-
tion and communications networks represent one component of the 
industrial infrastructure, marketing districts are accessible, 
trade relations expand, economic growth is relatively even, all 
regions are included in development planning, and the capacity to 
finance reform legislation expands. 
2. Political system. Differences in the degree to which: the politi-
cal elite responds effectively to demands for change, the system 
is centralized and/or authoritarian, the military is involved in 
the decision-making process, a mass-party system has evolved, the 
transition in power is abrupt or smooth, sectionalist differences 
are reduced, and suffrage expands. 
3. Demographic and ecological change. Differences in the degree to 
which: migratory movements contribute to industrialization, the 
population has a relatively even distribution, population growth 
rates decline, and city primacy is reduced. 
4. Educational system. Differences in the degree to which: education 
is universal, retention rates increase, higher education is avail-
able, and specialization contributes to development. 
5. Stratification system. Differences in the degree to which: the 
plantation system continues to have an impact, the two-class system 
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has expanded, restrictions to social mobility are removed, the mid-
dle class plays a role in reform or identifies with the upper class, 
class conflict exists, and extreme income inequality has been re-
duced. 
6. Geography. Differences in the degree to which: basic resources for 
national needs are available, priority resources for international 
needs are available, barriers to international and/or inter-
provincial contact exist, natural water routes are available, and 
natural disasters have an impact on economy and society. 
Although far from comprehensive, this listing of background contextual 
factors supports the decision not to basically revise this section of 
the original analytic model although some changes were made in the 
ordering of factors. 
The revised analytic model 
Figure 6 presents the general revised analytic model incorpora-
ting suggested variables, sources of variation or contextual factors, 
and the proposed direction of relationships based on the findings from 
this study. Lines of differentiation are shown as moving from predomi-
nantly ascribed to ascribed-achieved and lastly to achieved. The impact 
of industrialization on lines of differentiation and functional linkages 
is primarily through its relationship with income. Economic, social, 
and political functional linkages associated with industrialization are 
viewed as being the most basic or minimum to fulfill national system 
needs after which more diffuse linkages are gradually generated. The 
type and degree of functional linkages define the level of national 
Fig. 6. General revised analytic model for cross-cultural 
research on industrializati~n and national integration* 
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apopulation growth and distribution; migratory movements. 
brncluding administrative divisions, civil conflicts, party system, 
characteristics of political elite. 
crncluding history of major sectors, transportation and communi-
cations networks, access to marketing districts, inflation, real in-
come per capita. 
drncluding legislation related to economy, polity and society. 
eFamily background, ethnicity, sex, religion. 
fRural-urban residence. 
gOccupation (blue collar- white collar). 
hPercentage of labor force in industry (curvilinear model) or 
percentage contribution of manufacturing to provincial income (linear 
model). 
iAverage annual income of wage and salary earners; newspaper 
circulation. 
jSecondary-school enrollment as percentage of cohort's primary-
school enrollment, average number of years of school completed by 
population 25 years of age and over or functional literacy; number of 
doctors per 100,000 population. 
kvalid votes cast in national elections as percentage of voting-
age population. 
lMembership in voluntary associations or interest groups. 
integration at any point in time which in turn is suggested to be di-
rectly associated with the degree of social disorganization. 
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Figure 7 illustrates the specific analytic model proposed for 
future research that, although different directions in associations are 
proposed, is largely repetitive of this study in order to confirm or 
reject inconclusive findings by incorporating social indicators con-
sidered to be more adequate than those used in this study. Rural-urban 
residence is redefined as an ascribed-achieved rather than ascribed 
characteristic and, as suggested, is viewed together with occupation 
as necessary control variables. Contrary to one expectation in this 
study, basic social functional linkages are located in the model as 
occurring prior to basic political functional linkages. 
At this point, it is concluded that national integration is a 
concomitant of industrialization and, considering the causal analyses 
of the three nations in this study, it is further concluded that the 
overall expectation has been supported, i.e., that only at very high 
levels of industrialization does an economically, socially, and politi-
cally integrated society emerge. None of the three nations in this 
study can be defined as highly integrated. 
The suggested relationship between industrialization and national 
integration needs to be confirmed by further research based on more 
adequate social indicators and the proposed association between eco-
nomic and socio-political linkages must be clarified. Theoretical pro-
positions to orient future research are presented in the final chapter. 
Fig. 7. Revised analytic model for proposed cross-
cultural research on industrialization and 
national integration 
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gNumber of doctors per 100,000 population. 
hvalid votes cast in national elections as percentage of voting-
age population. 
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Summary of Research Findings 
Of the industrial-economic set of variables in this study, in-
dustrialization, as indicated by percentage of the labor force em-
ployed in industry in 1960 and 1970, shows an increase in Chile and a 
decline in the U.S. whereas insignificant change is observed in Brazil 
and the combined cross-cultural cases. Industrialization, as indi-
cated by percentage contributions of the major sectors (agriculture, 
industry, commerce, services) to the G.N.P. in 1960 and 1970, shows 
an increase in industry and commerce in Brazil, in industry and serv-
ices in Chile, in services in the U.S., and in commerce, industry, and 
services in the combined cross-cultural cases; a decline or insignifi-
cant change was noted in the other sectors for each nation. The num-
ber of ports increased only in Brazil. Income in the four major eco-
nomic sectors increased in the three nations. Communications, as 
indicated by radios per capita, can be analyzed only in the combined 
cross-cultural cases due to the lack of data at the provincial level. 
Provincial variations increased 1960-1970: in labor force in 
industry, percentage contribution of commerce to the G.N.P., income in 
agriculture and services, and number of ports in Brazil; in percentage 
contribution of industry and services to the G.N.P. and income in the 
four sectors in Chile; in percentage contributions of services to the 
G.N.P. and income in the four sectors in the U.S.; and in the percentage 
contributions of all sectors except agriculture to the G.N.P., radios-
per capita, number of ports, and income in the four major sectors in the 
combined cross-cultural cases. Provincial variations for other vari-
ables in each nation either decreased or remained relatively stable. 
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Of the education indicators--as part of the socio-political set of 
variables in this study--only higher education shows an overall increase 
in the three nations and cross-culturally although relatively stable in 
Brazil; the primary-school enrollment ratio declined in the U.S. and 
cross-culturally but increased in Brazil and Chile; the secondary-school 
enrollment ratio increased except in Chile. Illiteracy declined in the 
three nations and cross-culturally. Social security coverage and voter 
registration increased in the three nations and cross-culturally. Pro-
vincial variations increased 1960-1970 in: the primary-school enroll-
ment ratio in Brazil (slightly); the secondary-school enrollment ratio 
in Brazil, the U.S., and cross-culturally; higher education in Brazil 
(very slightly), Chile, the U.S., and cross-culturally; illiteracy in 
Brazil; social security coverage in all cases. In all other cases, the 
provincial variations declined. 
In spite of its importance to this study, ethnicity was excluded 
as an inadequate control variable because of the unreliability and/or 
lack of data at the provincial level. Rural-urban residence remained 
as a control variable; it was found to be significantly associated with 
the industrial-economic variables (except number of ports and radios per 
capita) and the socio-political variables. Although of declining im-
portance in the U.S., rural-urban differences, contrary to much of the 
existing literature, continue to exist. Rural-urban residence is not 
associated with all variables in all three nations in this study but it 
must be controlled because of its effects on the relationship between 
some of the variables. The 1960 and 1970 data show an overall increase 
in the percentage of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more 
in the three nations. Provincial variations appear to be declining in 
Brazil and Chile in contrast to the increase in variations in the U.S. 
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Regression analysis shows that linear combinations of the indus-
trial-economic and socio-political sets of variables based on zero-order 
correlations are possible for research at single points in time except 
in the case of social security coverage in Chile (1960 and 1970) and 
voter registration in the U.S. (1970). The set of variables on which 
the socio-political set was regressed was most useful (in terms of per-
centage of variance explained) for the Brazilian cases, less useful for 
the Chilean cases, even less useful for cross-cultural analysis, and 
least useful for the U.S. cases. 
In general, it was found that the industrial-economic and socio-
political functional linkages do co-vary. When controlling for rural-
urban residence, there is a significant association with the socio-
political set of variables (in one or more nations in this study and 
cross-culturally) of industrialization as indicated by labor force in 
industry, industrialization as indicated by contributions of the major 
economic sectors to the G.N.P., communications as indicated by radios 
per capita (but not with voter registration), number of ports (but not 
with secondary-school enrollment ratio, higher education, or voter 
registration), and average annual income in the major economic sectors. 
The only element of the industrial-economic set significantly associ-
ated with all socio-political variables is average annual income. 
The findings in this study are inconclusive because of th~ prob-
lems encountered with multicollinearity and inadequate social indicators. 
Still, the causal analysis based on first-order partial correlations 
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controlling for rural-urban residence tends to support the expectation 
that industrialization breaks down lines of differentiation within a 
specified population increasingly on the basis of achievement rather 
than ascription by first generating economic functional linkages. Eco-
nomic functional linkages, specifically increases in income, were found 
to generate basic social and political functional linkages. The possi-
bility was suggested, contrary to one of the expectations of the study, 
that social linkages (specifically educational) with income and the 
communications linkages generated by income jointly operate to generate 
basic political linkages. 
The decision to use provinces as the units of analysis proved to 
be beneficial in this study. The combination of the provincial cases 
of the three nations into a cross-cultural subfile led to the observa-
tion that variations among nations were concealed in many instances both 
for industrial-economic and socio-political variables. It was suggested 
that, where cases are provinces, the association between the two sets of 
variables within a nation may be linear at single points in time but 
curvilinear in cross-time analysis. The implication is that the ade-
quacy of any particular set of social indicators will depend in part on 
whether the underlying analytic model assumes linearity or curvilinearity 
in the study of processes or sub-processes of development and change. 
If the phenomenon represented by a specific social indicator has become 
evenly distributed, in relative terms, within a population, its useful-
ness as a social indicator lessens for national analysis although it 
might continue to be useful for cross-cultural analysis; therefore, the 
selection of adequate social indicators also depends in part on the 
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level of national development. This implies the need for different sets 
of indicators depending on whether research is at the national or cross-
cultural level and whether it is at one or more points in time. Addi-
tionally, the adequacy of any set of indicators will depend on the re-
search objectives; if the objective is generalization and theory con-
struction, the same indicators would have to be used in cross-cultural 
research but, if the objective is to formulate social policy at the 
national level, different indicators would have to be selected for each 
nation. 
Aside from the observed interaction between income and education, 
one directionality was assumed in the revised analytic model, given the 
necessity of including the context of background influences on the re-
lationship between industrial-economic and socio-political linkages in 
cross-cultural research. Inadequate social indicators were excluded 
and replaced by a new set for future research. In addition, it was sug-
gested that both rural-urban residence and occupation (blue collar -
white collar) be controlled as lines of differentiation based, respec-
tively, on ascribed-achieved and achieved characteristics. The overall 
conclusion of the study is that national integration is a concomitant of 
industrialization in its accelerating and stabilizing phases after which 
national integration becomes more closely associated with the combined 
effect of existing economic, social, and political linkages than with 
industrialization. These conclusions apply only to the Western Hemi-
sphere. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR SOCIOLOGY 
Implications for Theory 
The following theoretical propositions applicable at this point 
only to the Western Hemisphere are presented for future research con-
cerning the relationship between industrialization and national inte-
gration: 
1:1 The component parts of the international system are interdependent 
nations, identifiable individually by their distinct political-
geographic boundaries. 
1:2 Maintenance of the international system in the twentieth century 
is mediated through cooperation in development and conflict re-
solution. 
1:3 The needs of the international system for system maintenance through 
cooperation in development and conflict resolution change as world 
development increases and as economic and political polarization 
becomes increasingly multi-directional. 
1:4 The position of any nation within the international system at any 
point in time is defined by its capacity to contribute toward the 
fulfillment of international system needs. 
1:5 The capacity of any nation to contribute toward the fulfillment 
of the international system's development needs at any point in 
time is determined by the needs of the international system and 
by the nation's economic resources, the extent to which these 
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resources are nationally owned and/or controlled, whether these re-
sources are raw materials and/or manufactured products and/or 
capital, whether available raw materials are more vital to national 
or international needs or to both, and the extent to which the na-
tion is economically dependent on another nation or nations, i.e., 
the capacity of the nation to fulfill its national system needs and 
the type of economic ties of the nation to the international sys-
tem. 
1:6 The capacity of any nation to fulfill the national system's devel-
opment needs is determined by its ties to the international system 
and ties within the national system. The ties within provinces 
and of provinces to the nation determine the provincial capacity to 
contribute toward the fulfillment of the national system needs. 
2:1 Those ties established to fulfill national and international system 
needs are called functional linkages. 
2:2 Functional linkages break down existing lines of differentiation 
between and within nations. 
2:3 By breaking down successively existing lines of differentiation 
such that former lines of differentiation are weakened, functional 
linkages eventually generate national and international integra-
tion. 
3:1 Lines of differentiation within a specified national population 
are first defined on the basis of ascribed characteristics (e.g., 
ethnicity, religion, sex, family background). 
3:2 As lines of differentiation based on ascribed characteristics are 
broken down, they are gradually replaced by differentiation defined 
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on the basis of ascribed-achieved characteristics (e.g., rural-
urban residence). 
3:3 As lines of differentiation based on ascribed-achieved charac-
teristics are broken down, they are gradually replaced by lines 
of differentiation defined on the basis of achieved characteris-
tics (e.g., occupation) which are then, in a continual process, 
redefined along increasingly more narrow lines. 
3:4 Once lines of differentiation are predominantly based on achieved 
characteristics, the remaining--although weakened--lines of dif-
ferentiation based on ascribed and ascribed-achieved characteris-
tics are called cultural residues; i.e., they are dysfunctional 
to the fulfillment of national system development needs. 
4:1 Development is an economic, political, and social process in 
which industrialization and integration are sub-processes. 
4:2 The process of industrialization has far-ranging social and eco-
nomic consequences that originate in the role of industrializa-
tion in breaking down existing lines of differentiation through 
the establishment of functional linkages. 
4:2:1 At the onset of, and acceleration in, industrialization, it is 
functional to the fulfillment of national system needs that ex-
treme income inequalities be reduced to make possible the emer-
gence of a mass domestic market, that there be an adequate supply 
of skilled labor and high-level manpower for industrialization to 
accelerate more rapidly, that the cost of social and public 
health services to the central government be reduced to allow 
more capital to be directed toward industrialization, and that 
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potential disruption from increasing internal demands be avoided 
to facilitate industrialization in an atmosphere of relative 
social and political stability. 
4:2:2 Industrialization contributes to the fulfillment of national 
system needs by generating basic economic, social, and political 
functional linkages, e.g., increases in the level of income, 
education, health, and political participation, and thereby 
breaking down existing lines of differentiation. 
4:2:3 Industrialization first establishes basic economic functional 
linkages and specifically increases in income. By so doing, in-
dustrialization breaks down existing ascribed and/or ascribed-
achieved lines of differentiation which are gradually replaced 
by differentiation on the basis of achieved characteristics and 
specifically occupation. 
4:2:4 As long as industrialization is accelerating, industrialization 
and income operate jointly to generate basic social functional 
linkages such as education and health care. Once basic social 
functional linkages are established, they, in combination with 
industrialization and income generate basic political functional 
linkages, e.g., increases in voter participation in national 
elections as a percentage of the voting-age population. 
4:2:5 In spite of variations within and between nations and the notion 
that governmental planning in the twentieth century can achieve 
in a single decade what previously evolved over a much longer 
period of time, planned industrialization in the Western Hemi-
sphere can and does generate functional linkages in the same 
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manner as has industrialization, e.g., in the U.S. 
4:3 Basic economic, social, and political functional linkages, once 
established, exert an independent influence on the establishment 
of additional functional linkages. 
4:3:1 Once established, basic economic functional linkages (income) 
generate other economic linkages, specifically functional link-
ages to communications or mass media. 
4:3:2 Once established, basic social linkages (education) contribute 
toward generating functional linkages to mass media and, jointly 
with economic linkages (income and mass media), generate basic 
political functional linkages (voter participation). 
4:3:3 Once established, basic economic, social, and political linkages 
generate increasingly more diffuse socio-political functional 
linkages. 
4:3:4 As industrialization stabilizes or tapers off at an advanced 
level, it is the existing--and first of all increases in income--
basic functional linkages rather than industrialization that gen-
erate new economic, social, and political functional linkages. 
5:1 National integration is that process which, due to the establish-
ment of functional linkages generated by industrialization, con-
sists in the redefinition of lines along which a population with-
in political-geographic boundaries is differentiated such that 
there is a weakening of former differences based predominantly 
and consecutively, as the level of industrialization increases, 
on ascribed, ascribed-achieved, and achieved characteristics. 
5:2 Variations in the level of national integration among and within 
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nations at any point in time stem from differences in the type and 
degree of functional linkages and type of lines of differentiation 
that exist. 
5:3 National economic integration in the twentieth century begins to 
emerge first because of the functional linkages established by in-
dustrialization which is, first of all, an economic process and 
reinforced by the emphasis on economic linkages of the nation to 
the international system through organizational (regional and in-
ternational) cooperation in development and priorities of national 
governments in the emphasis on autonomous economic decision making 
to reduce the role of the multinational corporation and other na-
tions in the national economy. 
5:4 National integration in the Western Hemisphere is a concomitant of 
industrialization--whether planned or unplanned--in its acceler-
ating and stabilizing phases. However, a highly integrated society 
(economically, socially, and politically integrated) does not ac-
company the beginning of an advanced level of industrialization. 
Rather, it is an "ideal" potentially possible only at some as yet 
undetermined highly advanced post-industrial phase. Therefore, the 
relationship between industrialization and national integration is 
curvilinear cross-culturally and, over time, nationally. 
5:5 The degree of effectiveness of national planning for development 
depends in part on whether or not it occurs in the light of nation-
al system needs. Premature expansion of any type of functional 
linka~e through government planning which may or may not be a re-
sponse to internal demands can lead to over-integration economi-
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cally, socially, and/or politically which, in turn, becomes an ob-
stacle to development and the sub-process of industrialization 
whether it is accelerating, stabilizing, or tapering off at an 
advanced level. 
5:6 Social, economic, and political changes occur at different rates 
within nations which may give rise to under-integration and/or 
over-integration. 
5:7 The level of national integration at any point in time gives rise 
to social disorganization because of (a) economic, social, and 
political functional linkages that begin at different times and 
expand at different rates, (b) continuing lines of differentiation 
some of which are cultural residues, and/or (c) over-integration 
economically, socially, and/or politically, concomitant to the in-
crease in internal demands for change that accompany and follow 
rapid industrialization. 
The implications for sociological theory of the research findings, 
the revised analytic model, and the above theoretical propositions de-
signed to orient future research revolve around basically one assertion, 
i.e., that the construction of a theory of development is eventually 
possible. First, the procedure of formulating intermediate-level theo-
retical propositions based on research of the sub-processes of develop-
ment with the intention of gradually constructing a universally appli-
cable global theory appears to be an advantageous one. Second, there is 
some evidence to support the implication that the use of basic concepts, 
e.g., functional linkage, permits the discovery of common threads in the 
experiences of nations in the development process in spite of differ-
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ences in the sequence of specific events and other sources of variation 
among nations. Third, the process of discovering these common threads 
is facilitated in cross-cultural research by focusing on the differences 
in the degree to which specific characteristics and/or trends occur 
rather than contrasts in experiences; this approach does not ignore nor 
should it ignore that nations' experiences in development have been dif-
ferent given that the sources of differences in degree are also sources 
of contrasts. The conclusion that the adequacy of specific social in-
dicators differs by nation and by time period reflects the notion that 
development is a multilinear process. Fourth, if common threads can be 
discovered by using basic concepts such as functional linkage, the pos-
sibility also exists that many of the existing theories, models, and 
concepts related to development such as modernization theory, the de-
pendency model of development, and the concept of multilinear evolution 
may in the end be incorporated as useful components into ~ theory of 
development. Last, macro-sociological theory has focused on nations as 
units of analysis; there is evidence in this study to suggest that this 
may have been, up to this point in time, one obstacle to fuller compre-
hension of development and its sub-processes, e.g., industrialization 
and national integration, as well as to theory building. The use of 
smaller units of analysis, i.e., provinces, in this study raises two 
questions concerning the nature of the relationship between industriali-
zation and national integration and, in more general terms, the nature 
of the development process itself given that the suggested sources of 
provincial variations related to these two processes within nations are 
comparable to sources of variation among nations. Specifically, is the 
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relationship between these two sub-processes of development linear with-
in nations at single points in time and curvilinear in cross-time and/or 
cross-cultural analysis? If so, why? 
Methodological Problems 
One methodological problem encountered in this study that has not 
yet been discussed as a problem per se concerns the units of analysis 
and specifically the question of appropriate procedure in cross-cultural 
research using provinces as the units of analysis when some, but not 
all, of the nations included in the study have a federal district. An 
argument can be made in favor of assigning to federal districts--where 
they exist--the status of provinces given that their social, economic, 
and political characteristics often vary significantly from those of 
provinces within a nation. Of the nations in this study where this 
problem appeared (Brazil and the U.S.), a stronger case can be made for 
treating Washington, D.C.--in contrast to Brasflia--as a separate entity 
since it exists totally outside of provincial boundaries. Support for 
this approach can be found in Brazil where the former capital (Rio de 
Janeiro) was given provincial status (Guanabara State) once Bras{lia was 
inaugurated as the new capital. On the other hand, Brastlia is in the 
interior of, rather than adjacent to, Goifs and has been influential in 
the transformation of the predominant characteristics of Goi{s. This 
might lend support to a position of not treating federal districts as 
separate entities. However, to use a single criterion consistently, it 
is suggested that federal districts be treated separately in future 
cross-cultural research, i.e., that they be treated as a unit of analy-
sis equal to the status of provinces. 
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Other methodological problems encountered during this research 
have been discussed in varying degrees. They pertain directly to one 
set of problems related to social indicators, i.e., how to use existing 
data. The solution to difficulties introduced by assigning the na-
tional rate of radios per capita to each province in the three nations 
is obvious, i.e., select a different indicator for which provincial 
data are available. If indicators of a particular phenomenon for which 
data exist are found to be inadequate, it is preferible to then omit 
that phenomenon from cross-cultural research until a field-study phase 
can be undertaken. The interference of multicollinearity and its 
effect on the findings in this study illustrate the importance of care-
ful selection and/or definition of social indicators and particularly 
the requisite that definitions be of one dimensionality; this problem 
emerged in this study in the case of average annual income in and con-
tributions to the G.N.P. of the major economic sectors. However, the 
significant associations found among different elements of the indus-
trial-economic set are not considered a problem of multicollinearity; 
rather, this is a case of close associations because of economic link-
ages generated by industrialization. 
Lastly, methodological problems related to the use of existing 
data for cross-cultural research pertain to the comparability and reli-
ability of data collected from secondary sources. These problems are: 
1. In official sources of data, e.g., national censuses, of different 
nations or of one nation at different points in time, data collec-
tion may be on a de jure or de facto basis which reduces the com-
parability of data when provinces are the units of analysis. 
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2. Census data and other data collected by official agencies are fre-
quently collected at different points in time; e.g., agricultural, 
manufacturing, and other specialized censuses are usually done in 
years other than the population census year in the three nations in 
this study. This reduces the comparability of data within and be-
tween nations when the selection of specific time periods is im-
portant to the achieving of the research objectives. In this study, 
the data on production and income in the major economic sectors and 
school enrollment data were affected in particular with data per-
taining at one extreme to 1959-1960 and 1968-1970 at the other ex-
treme in the three nations. As already noted earlier, voter par-
ticipation data were even more strongly affected but, in this case, 
more so by the decision to select national election years within or 
as close as possible to the 1960s decade. The consequences include 
not only a reduction in comparability but also, e.g., the failure 
for certain trends to appear in the data as is the case with the 
estimated 23 per cent annual increase in university enrollments in 
Brazil that began in 1970. A related issue is the fact that collec-
tion of data at two points in time conceals fluctuations--both in 
the data and in indices that have been developed--during the interim 
period. One possible solution where yearly data exist, as is the 
case particularly with economic statistics, is to use averages of, 
e.g., five-year periods, as the points in time for cross-time anal-
ysis; this, however, is not a solution in the case of indicators 
for which yearly data are not available. In addition, if both 
types of indicators are used in a study, it is preferible not to 
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combine these two methods since the reliability of the findings 
would be reduced. The development and use of indices (single or 
composite) for social data would reduce but not eliminate this 
problem given that indices also fluctuate although to a lesser de-
gree; it is an alternative that should continue to be considered. 
3. Data collected by official agencies reflect what the nation, cer-
tain national or provincial agencies, and/or the government selec-
tively define as important. One consequence is that all nations do 
not collect the same data which limits the selection of, and ade-
quacy of many, social indicators for cross-cultural research based 
on existing data. A second and related consequence is the issue of 
whether or not to include missing cases that may be provinces within 
nations or nations in cross-cultural analysis. This issue is raised 
in this study in relation to provincial voter registration data in 
the U.S. Since missing cases were included (i.e., where voter 
registration is not required), this becomes one possible reason for 
the lack of a linear equation in searching for an explanation of 
voter participation in the U.S. To avoid the interference of this 
problem in future research, missing cases should be excluded or a 
different social indicator for which data are available for all 
provinces should be selected. A third consequence of the selective 
nature of data collection by official agencies was, in this study, 
the necessity of excluding ethnicity as a control variable; the 
rather obvious conclusion here is that, once a line of differenti-
ation within a population has been obliterated officially, then 
official sources of data cannot be used if the researcher is seeking 
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to discover whether or not that particular line of differentiation 
continues to exist. 
4. The data in censuses or other official publications released by na-
tional agencies are often estimates and/or based on sample data. 
In addition, data not infrequently in these sources pertain only to 
"reporting institutions," a situation signifying in a sense acci-
dental or biased sampling which should therefore be treated as such. 
The comparability of cross-time national or cross-cultural data is 
reduced if the procedure for estimates and/or sampling changes as 
is often the case. Reliability of the data is reduced when data 
refer only to reporting institutions and when error introduced into 
the data by the procedures used for making estimates or sampling is 
not calculated and/or not made available to those who use the data. 
5. The official sources of data and specifically censuses in all three 
nations in this study disproportionately exclude certain segments of 
the population, e.g., the Amerind population in Brazil and .Chile and 
the non-white (especially males in the young-adult age group) in the 
U.S. Additionally, it has already been noted that Brazilian census 
data often represent only urban data which, at any rate, are more 
reliable than data for rural areas. Distortion of the data and par-
ticularly the effect on reliability is apparent under both these 
circumstances. 
6. Existing literature, e.g., case studies, on specific nations can 
often serve as a source of data for U.S. researchers if, as in this 
study, the data represent census data from these nations that would 
otherwise be unavailable in the U.S. Particular caution needs to 
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be exercised, however, since these sources do not always indicate 
if they are relying on population figures, sample figures, esti-
mates, or projections. For example, 1970 provincial data pertaining 
to percentage of the population living in cities of 20,000 or more 
in Brazil and Chile that are available in studies of these nations 
are frequently based on projections that were, especially for Bra-
zil, extreme underestimates. As a consequence, these sources fre-
quently present different figures for the same variable in the same 
year. In this study, official sources of data for the three nations 
were relied on predominantly; when these were unavailable, other 
existing studies were used only if both the sources and type of data 
were clearly identified and the reliability of the studies could be 
cross-checked. Reliability was cross-checked by comparing those 
data that appeared both in the studies and in census data available 
in the U.S. This remains, however, one source of error in this re-
search. The problem of the unavailability of published data on 
other nations to U.S. researchers within the U.S. is a real one. 
The above problems are all serious sources of error in this study. 
A related problem and additional source of error indicated early in the 
study is the variation among nations in urban classifications and in the 
definition, e.g., of the service sector. Lastly, one of the major 
sources of error in this research relates to the possibility that some 
or all of the variables eliminated prior to causal analysis should have 
been left in the study. 
When data for selected and/or newly developed indicators are un-
available within the U.S. to researchers interested in cross-cultural 
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research thus requiring travel to other nations, it then becomes propi-
tious to do field research in addition to utilizing published data. 
There is much to be said in favor of simultaneously using both types 
of sources of data. On the one hand, field research carries its own 
set of potential pitfalls but does avoid problems associated with the 
use of published data, allows the researcher greater freedom in the 
selection and/or development of social indicators, and permits more 
control over the type of data collected as well as sources of error. 
On the other hand, some data are available only through the use of 
secondary sources, e.g., provincial internal income or votes cast in 
national elections; the reliability of these data can be checked in part 
by comparison with findings from field research or, when militarized re-
gimes are included, with observations made by foreign observers within 
the nation. 
Given the main concerns of this study and similar types of cross-
cultural research topics, the primary disadvantage of field research is 
its costliness particularly when units of analysis are provinces and 
the adequacy of commonly used social indicators is questioned. It is 
therefore suggested that research based on published data serves, and 
should continue to be done, to refine the analytic model in this study 
(or others that have been developed in several fields) and to select 
the most adequate of available social indicators as well as develop and 
test indices (single or composites) for use as social indicators. Once 
these objectives have been achieved, subsequent cross-cultural field 
research combining the use of primary and secondary sources will then 
be more productive. 
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One final comment on problems related to the selection of indica-
tors concerns the importance of government planning today. Indicators 
must be defined in such a way so as to reflect but not distort the im-
pact of government planning. As an example, the primary- and secondary-
school enrollment ratios used in this study were defined as inadequate 
social indicators. These ratios contributed to the inconclusiveness of 
the research findings in part because they were affected by, rather than 
a reflection of, the impact of educational reform in Chile during the 
1960s. The suggested alternatives to these indicators, e.g., average 
educational level attained by persons 25 years of age and over or func-
tional literacy, serve as illustrations of indicators that will reflect 
the impact of reform over time but the indicators will not themselves 
be affected by that reform. In sum, the objective is not to explain 
the indicator but to explain trends in society over time as measured by 
the indicator. In turn, when the reliability and comparability of so-
cial statistics used as social indicators are reduced, it follows that 
their validity as social indicators declines. 
The methodological problems related to cross-cultural research 
based on published data alone or in combination with field research and 
to the discovery of adequate social indicators affect commonly used 
longitudinal research designs in cross-cultural analysis, e.g., the 
quasi-experimental, cross-lagged comparison and, of particular interest 
for the topic of this study, panel analysis. To the extent that re-
search findings continue to be distorted by these problems so too will 
they be inconclusive and thus an obstacle to theory construction. In 
turn, plausible solutions to these problems at this point in time have 
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several implications for cross-cultural research on development and its 
sub-processes. 
Implications for Future Research 
The following discussion of implications that the findings as well 
as problems encountered in this study have for future research limits 
itself to: (1) research that uses and attempts to determine the ade-
quacy of social statistics as social indicators (including social, eco-
nomic, and political data); (2) concerns cross-cultural and/or longi-
tudinal analysis specifically within the Western Hemisphere; and 
(3) uses a central explanatory concept susceptible to measurement as a 
basis for an analytic model guiding the research. 
Given the research findings, methodological problems, and sug-
gestions made in this study, the closely interrelated implications for 
future research are as follows: 
1. Implicit in the suggestion that research continue to concentrate on 
analyzing available social statistics to be followed by field re-
search later is the need to prepare the groundwork now for future 
field research. On the one hand, de Neufville (1975:10, 44-45, 241-
243) describes the process of formulating adequate social indicators 
as a complex one covering several years from the conceptualization 
of an indicator to its full acceptance. The nature of this process 
thus provides support to the assertion that it is requisite to con-
sider future field research needs while developing both social in-
dicators and analytic models. On the other hand, social statistics 
vary in the degree to which they represent social, economic, and 
political reality particularly when the problems associated with the 
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use of these data are considered as is the awareness that this re-
ality is constantly changing. Only through direct observation, 
where this is possible, can the researcher check the accuracy of 
social indicators, the association between social indicators, and 
the analytic models based on the use of available data. The anal-
ytic model, i.e., its components, and at least some of the social 
indicators must therefore be directly observable in field research. 
2. Since the question was raised concerning the possibility that de-
velopment and the association between sub-processes of development 
vary depending on the units of analysis, more research should be 
done using provinces as units of analysis. More cross-time research 
is needed both within nations and comparing nations. Future re-
search must also focus on the possbility of including assumptions 
of both linearity and curvilinearity in analytic models pertaining 
to the study of development and/or its sub-processes; the difference 
in these assumptions may be the difference between static and dynam-
ic models but this has yet to be determined. Additionally, once an 
analytic model has been designed, there is a need for much more 
longitudinal national and cross-cultural research of the type de-
scribed above. 
3. Underlying this necessity for more research is the need to continue 
in the direction of developing analytic models that incorporate spe-
cific indicators. Consensus exists in that social indicators must 
be grounded in theory (de Neufville, 1975:10, 58-69, 242; also see 
Wilcox, et al., 1972:1-49) but there is disagreement over the most 
appropriate theoretical approach. It has been and continues to be 
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the position of the author, with support from Land and Spilerman 
(1975:1-3), that the most fruitful and practical approach at this 
time is to develop and use analytic models that permit the gradual 
build-up of intermediate-level theory rather than prematurely at-
tempt to use general systems theory as a basis for these models. 
Also pertaining to the development of analytic models is the con-
clusion in this study that distinct sets of social indicators must 
be defined for national versus cross-cultural analysis, for single-
time versus cross-time research, and for theory building versus 
social policy as research objectives. The implication is that, 
although specific indicators may vary depending on these circum-
stances as well as the fact that social reality constantly changes, 
an analytic model for the study of development and/or its sub-
processes must be flexible enough to be applicable in all of these 
research situations. 
4. The findings of this study tend to show that the use of basic con-
cepts, e.g., functional linkage, is useful in developing analytic 
models and contributes to the understanding of development and/or 
its sub-processes. The search for additional basic concepts of this 
type that are susceptible to measurement should continue; they serve 
to guide future longitudinal research although the operationaliza-
tion of these concepts must necessarily undergo constant revision. 
5. Since the industrialization process and functional linkages gener-
ated by this process have an impact that varies over time as sug-
gested by the findings in this study, the regression of integration 
variables at time 2 on industrialization variables at time 1 (and 
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consecutively of economic on industrial, social on economic, and 
political on social, etc.) might contribute to a greater understand-
ing of the association between industrialization and national in-
tegration. The implication is that different methodologies should 
be used in cross-time research followed by a comparison of the find-
ings to determine which methodology is more appropriate. In this 
case, the suggestion is to use both panel analysis (Heise, 1970:3-
12) in combination with regression analysis of the same variables 
at the same points in time and to compare the results. 
6. In addition to those problems that are methodological in nature (how 
to use existing data), there is a second set of problems related to 
social indicators and therefore cross-cultural research, i.e., how 
to develop a system of comparative data or social statistics as 
social indicators for use now and in the future. As the social in-
dicator movement began to gain popularity in the U.S., Bauer (1966: 
1-67) was one who defined the need to remove weaknesses and gaps in 
existing data. This study confirms the need for improvement in so-
cial statistics if they are to be used as social indicators but this 
improvement, in turn, limits comparison with the past. In addition, 
these improvements do not necessarily remove basic weaknesses in the 
data. The OAS recently designed the COTA system (a classification 
system for ten-year censuses of American nations) to standardize 
data submitted to the OAS by member nations. Revisions have been 
made in the 1950 and subsequent data; while past data can be simi-
larly revised, basic weaknesses have not been removed nor are com-
parable data available for all indicators in all member nations of 
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the OAS. The efforts of the OAS do represent, however, one step 
forward toward increasing the comparability (but not necessarily the 
reliability) of cross-cultural data. Zapf's (1975:492) promotion 
in favor of the standardization of census data can be expected to 
have similar results. Efforts such as these should continue but a 
greater effort to accumulate more as well as more reliable cross-
cultural comparative data should be organized. The validity of so-
cial indicators can be implied from longitudinal research but only 
if obstacles to this research are removed. This is not to say that 
a system of social indicators cannot be defined at this point in 
time; its usefulness and the validity of its components, however, 
cannot be determined until longitudinal, cross-cultural research 
based on comparative, reliable data becomes a reality. Lastly, in 
relation to a system of social indicators, such a system must pre-
sent a multi-dimensional (Zap£, 1975:490-491) picture of the social, 
economic, and political characteristics of the social system at 
specific points in time; greater attention needs to be paid to dis-
covering, as concluded in this study, individual indicators or com-
ponents of the system each of which is simultaneously of one dimen-
sionality and adequately representative of a specific component of 
the social system. 
The broadest implication for future research concerns the need 
for increased cooperation, both nationally and internationally, among 
social scientists involved in cross-cultural research in the Western 
Hemisphere and/or in the development of social indicators for this type 
of research. A certain amount of hemispheric cooperation at the govern-
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mental level might be encouraged recognizing that there are basically 
two related and inherent difficulties with cooperation at this level. 
First, the governmental role in data collection on the nation and its 
population constitutes part of the political process and is therefore 
biased to the extent that the type of data collected and the communica-
tion of social statistics on the nation are selective. Second, a na-
tional government must necessarily concentrate on collecting data re-
quired for effective planning to meet the nation's needs as defined by 
priorities established by the government itself. One result, as noted 
in this study, is the lack of data on certain groups within the nation. 
Zapf (1975:492) indicates, similarly, that data on certain groups can be 
found only in monographs. This does not constitute an adequate source 
of data, however, when provinces are the units of analysis. In this 
case, certain indicators and in fact certain characteristics of a popu-
lation, e.g., ethnic composition, must be excluded from cross-cultural 
analysis until field research can be done. It therefore becomes more 
practical to suggest that hemispheric cooperation at the governmental 
level be encouraged in the direction of permitting social scientists to 
conduct research and communicate the findings. Cooperation in the col-
lection of comparative data then becomes the responsibility of social 
scientists. 
Interaction between government policy makers and social scientists 
should continue to be promoted. Researchers working with existing so-
cial statistics recognize the urgency of improving the data which in 
fact is an obstacle to effective government planning given the inade-
quacy of some and the uncertain validity of many social indicators. The 
244 
social indicator movement in the U.S. began as a program evaluation 
technique and a basis for governmental planning (Wilcox et al., 1972:1-
49). Although Land (1975:21-33) argues that the use of social indica-
tors as a basis for social policy should follow rather than precede im-
provements in the measurement of social change and therefore in social 
reporting, social scientists would like policy makers to utilize their 
findings on social indicators and the association between them, Recog-
nizing this tendency, de Neufville (1975:10, 241-243) asserts that so-
cial indicators must not only be grounded in theory but also related to 
social policy if social scientists expect policy makers to accept the 
indicators that they develop. It is suggested here that sociologists 
(and social scientists in general) need to exercise caution. Sociolo-
gists working toward the development of adequate social indicators 
grounded in theory must remember, in their eagerness for their work to 
form a part of the basis for social policy, that policy makers are not 
infrequently untrained in sociology. The potential for distortion, 
misuse, and/or rejection of sociological research findings is consider-
able. 
It was one conclusion of this study that the collection of data 
for national planning needs does not necessarily satisfy the needs of 
national or cross-cultural research oriented toward theory building and 
vice versa. It is suggested, however, that there are points of inter-
section between research for social policy and research for theory 
building where some social indicators could satisfy the needs of both. 
In this sense, all researchers involved in an attempt to develop ade-
quate social indicators are directly or indirectly contributing to a 
foundation for social policy. It is at those potential points where 
interests intersect that interaction between policy makers and social 
scientists at national and hemispheric levels should be encouraged as 
well as cooperation between social scientists oriented toward theory 
building and those oriented toward social policy research. 
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The effort to establish a system of indicators for research with-
in nations and cross-culturally also requires cooperation among social 
scientists and particularly those involved in comparative research as 
well as between social scientists in the U.S. and in other nations of 
the hemisphere. Concomitant to the growing need for cooperation is the 
increasing unlikelihood that cooperation will expand. With respect to 
sociology, trends within the U.S. do not favor cooperation. Similarly, 
the breakdown in inter-American relations appears to have carried over 
into sociology. In the last decade, Rex Hopper (Wagley, 1964) de-
scribed Latin American sociology as a discipline concerned primarily 
with promoting social change. The situation is no different today when 
the lack of cooperation (or declining cooperation) between U.S. and 
Latin American sociologists is explained by Partes (1975:131-140) as 
primarily because of the contrast between U.S. sociology as academic 
and scientific versus Latin American sociology as a force for change. 
Given that "scientific sociology" is now taught in Latin American uni-
versities, it is suggested here that the "oppositeness" of the two ap-
proaches is a false one in the same sense that theory construction and 
social policy do not have to be conflicting research objectives. Points 
where interests intersect can be found but not until dialogue begins. 
The decline of cooperation between U.S. and Latin American socio-
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logists is a critical one. As long as U.S. and Latin American sociology 
continue to develop independently of each other, there will be no dia-
logue over the development of social indicators applicable nationally 
and cross-culturally within the hemisphere, the groundwork for future 
field research cannot be prepared, Latin American sociologists cannot be 
certain that the measures they are using to determine where change is 
necessary within their nations are valid, and the lack of cooperation 
will continue to be a major obstacle to cross-cultural research. 
Sociology and sociologists, perhaps inadvertently, have been 
caught up in a series of political processes. Within the U.S., sociolo-
gists find themselves in a rather peculiar position of attempting to be 
objective observers of society and apolitical in their work. Yet, the 
process of obtaining funds for research is political. The selection of 
social indicators for policy making is political which de Neufville 
(1975:236-239, 243-245), for one, condemns. Whatever use or misuse is 
made by policy makers of sociological research findings all too often 
embroils the sociologist's work in political debate and controversy. 
The implications for research within the U.S. and for improved relations 
between U.S. and Latin American sociologists are clear. However, the 
possibility that the sociological research process will be divorced 
from political processes and that different sources of research funding 
will be created so that cross-cultural research can be conducted in an 
atmosphere free of the dictates of funding agencies and/or government 
is unlikely. One alternative is, as suggested, to increase the dialogue 
between sociologists and funding agencies on points where their inter-
ests intersect, i.e., research that would contribute both to the field 
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of sociology and to the needs of policy makers in their problem-solving 
role. In this manner, the funds that are becoming increasingly scarce 
might be directed toward research that is more productive than is too 
often the case. 
The apparatus for hemispheric cooperation among sociologists 
exists, e.g., in the form of research institutes most often associated 
with universities, international libraries, and library exchange serv-
ices. Access to this apparatus is, however, more illusory than real. 
Data banks and other data sources need updating and upgrading. Cross-
cultural data possessed by universities within the U.S. in particular 
and, therefore, by library exchange services tend to have a selective 
audience, a situation that is possibly more detrimental to students 
than to professional sociologists. One possible solution in terms of 
hemispheric cooperation is to encourage an acceleration of existing 
university exchange programs of students and professionals with an em-
phasis on cross-cultural research. This constitutes, however, only a 
stopgap measure. 
The obstacles faced by sociologists are varied, stemming not only 
from within the field itself, e.g., inadequate research tools, but also 
from sources external to the field over which sociologists have little 
or no control. The suggested need for more attention to analytic models 
and basic unifying concepts, adequate social indicators, the groundwork 
for future field research, comparative cross-cultural data, and increas-
ing cooperation in research efforts in the Western Hemisphere necessi-
tates communication among sociologists at a plane where cultural differ-
ences and "cultural defensiveness" have been overcome. If these differ-
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ences cannot be overcome, it does not speak well for the profession nor 
for those of us--both in the U.S. and Latin America--who are members of 
the profession. If Partes' (1975:131-140) suggestion is taken, in order 
to pursue the directions for future research outlined in this report, it 
is concluded that U.S. sociologists interested in cross-cultural re-
search will have to turn their attention to other world regions where 
cooperation in research is possibly more feasible until Latin American 
sociologists initiate cooperative research efforts. There is no other 
alternative from this perspective. It ignores, however, that there can 
be compromise over specific research interests and objectives to open 
the way to cooperation without compromising the attempt to attain as 
high a level of scientific excellence as is possible. 
Sociologists trained in the scientific method are in an ideal 
position to serve as catalysts in the synthesis of research findings, 
model building, and theory construction in several fields both national-
ly and cross-culturally in order to construct a system of social indica-
tors of use to policy makers, social scientists, and future research. 
First, however, the artificially-created obstacles that place limita-
tions on their thinking and on their research must be removed and their 
hands must be untied. 
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GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF BRAZIL, CHILE, 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
Geographical Barriers to International 
Contact 
Of the three nations, Chile has been the most adversely affected 
as a maritime nation by geographical conditions. It has also bene-
fited, however, from the three centuries of isolation that geography 
has afforded. To the west lies the Pacific Ocean; Chile has few and 
poor natural harbors which improve somewhat towards the south as the 
coastline becomes more irregular in Forest Chile. To the east lie the 
Andes Mountains (and smaller ranges in the North); they are the second 
highest mountain range in the world and one which has no "breaks" (no 
low passes) causing difficulties even for the most advanced aircraft. 
To the north lies the Atacama, one of the most arid deserts in the 
world. And to the south lies the Antarctica. 
The United States and Brazil do not have physical barriers to in-
ternational contact comparable to these. Brazil's regions of difficult 
access (North and Central-West) receive an influx of people from bor-
dering nations; the Amazon Basin, though still formidable to cross, has 
the advantage of the Amazon River which is navigable by ocean steamer 
3,680 kms. to Iquitos, Peru. In addition, the fact that the U.S. and 
Brazil have an Atlantic coastline with good harbors has contributed to 
the greater contact of these two nations with Europe as well as their 
greater involvement in European conflicts compared to that of Chile. 
Primary Resources 
Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. have had, since their origins, ex-
tensive mineral, forest, agricultural, fishing, and hydroelectric po-
tential. Of the three nations, Chile has the greatest potential in 
hydroelectric power exceeded only by Norway and Canada and represent-
ing five times that of the U.S. The three nations have reserves of 
coal, petroleum, and iron ore for industrial needs but the Chilean 
economy in particular, with the richest and largest copper reserves in 
the world (40 per cent of the world total), relies on the mining sector. 
Of the third of Chile's national territory that is not desert or 
mountains, 56 per cent is forest (one-fifth of Chile); although only a 
third of this forest is commercially exploitable, it is one of the most 
valuable in Latin America. An estimated 56 per cent of Brazil is 
covered by three major forests: the Amazon Tropical Rain Forest, the 
Coastal Subtropical Rain Forest, and the Paran! Pine Forest in the 
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southern highlands. Forestry has always been an important economic 
activity in Brazil as it has in the U.S. since the early colonial 
period. Originally, about 50 per cent of the U.S. was covered by for-
ests but a 90-per-cent depletion in resources, primarily in the last 
100 years, has left five major forest regions: the Mixed Northern, 
Central Hardwood, Southern Mixed, Rocky Mountain, and Pacific Coast. 
Since its origins the U.S. has had greater agricultural poten-
tial than Brazil or Chile but particularly the territory acquired from 
1790 to 1860 had some of the most valuable farmland in the world as 
well as mineral, water, and timber resources. In 1960, the popula-
tion/km.2 of cultivable land was 17 in the U.S., 8 in Brazil, and 9.7 
in Chile; the ratio of cultivable land to total land was 45.5 per cent 
in the U.S., 18.9 per cent in Brazil, and 18.5 per cent in Chile. 
Two-thirds of Chile's area is wasteland agriculturally (desert and 
mountains) and only 20 per cent of the cultivable area is being util-
ized; however, this constitutes one of the world's largest cultivated 
areas in relation to total population and active farm population. 
Despite this, Chile imports food to meet basic needs because of a 
history of low agricultural productivity. In contrast, although more 
than half of Brazil's territory is unexploited in agriculture, it is 
self-sufficient in food production except for wheat. 
Although Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. are all maritime nations 
with extensive coastlines, the U.S. leads in fishing catch and con-
sumption of sea products both of which remain very small in Brazil. 
Despite being a relatively new industry in Chile contributing .3 per 
cent of the G.N.P., fishing and fish produce rank second in importance 
in Latin America. By 1970, Chile's fishing catch was (in 1,000 metric 
tons) 1,179 (including foreign craft in port) and 1,487 in 1971 in con-
trast to 515 in Brazil in 1970 and 2,767 in the U.S. in 1971. 
Brazil and Its Major Regions: Basic Facts 
Brazil 
The following data for Brazil and its regions refer to the 1960s 
unless otherwise indicated. The same is true of the subsequent data for 
Chile and the U.S. and their major regions. 
Area: 8,456,508 km.2 Represents 5.7 per cent of world land area 
and 47.3 per cent of South America. Greatest width: 4,320 kms. 
Greatest length: 4,328 kms. 
Climate: Located within more degrees of latitude than any other 
South American nation. Extends through tropical, subtropical, and 
temperate zones. 
Borders: 15,719 kms. with 10 South American nations (all but 
Chile and Ecuador). 
Settlement: Discovered by Pedro Alvarez Cabral in 1500; coloni-
zation began in 1521; first permanent Portuguese settlement was Sao 
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Vicente in 1532; territory completed by end of seventeenth century ex-
cept for Maranhao State created in 1621 and incorporated into Brazil 
in 1777 nor had Acre yet been annexed (1903). Settled along coast and 
then to interior. 
Other features: Triangle formed by Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, 
and Belo Horizonte cities represents social, political, and industrial 
center, dominant in mining and locale for all automobile plants, four 
largest iron and steel mills, all shipyards; Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do 
Sul, and Guanabara States account for 90 per cent of industrial pro-
duction; 81 per cent of G.D.P. comes from East and South Regions. 
Over 90 per cent of population found in East, South, and Northeast 
Regions in 1872 and in 1970. Drought Polygon includes States of Piaut: 
Cear8(. Rio Grande do Norte, Para{ba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and part of 
Sergipe, Bahia, Minas Gerais. 
Brazil: Regiao Norte (North Region) 
Area included: States of Amazonas, Part and territories of Amap~, 
Rondonia, Acre, Roraima. Represents 42 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Predominant is Amazon Basin--hot, wet, dense equa-
torial jungle; access is difficult. The region was entered in colonial 
period mainly by Jesuits to establish missions; permitted the French / 
access to the region. Population clusters near cities especially Belem 
(largest city and commercial center of the region), Manaus (second 
largest city), Bragan~a; Macap[ is principal port; accounted for 3.4 per 
cent of Brazil's population in 1872, 3.7 per cent in 1960, and 3.8 per 
cent in 1970; about 60 per cent of region's population was in Part in 
1970; 1960 density/km.2 was 0.7 and, in 1970, ranged from 0.2 in Roraima 
to 1.8 in Para: The region of concentration of Amerinds although,Popu-
lation is predominantly mameluco; Japanese colonies exist in Amapa, 
Rond$nia, and Amazonas. Economy is predominantly extractive (rubber, 
timber, nuts); some small-scale industry of consumer goods (for local 
consumption) and primary processing of region's products; accounts for 
only two per cent of production in each of major sectors but less criti-
cal economically than Northeast Region. 
Brazil: Regiao Nordeste (Northeast Region) 
Area included: States of Maranh~o, Piau!', Ceara(, Rio Grande do 
Norte, Para1ba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Fernando de Noronha. Represents 
11.4 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Tropical but irregular rainfall; droughts, floods; 
represents most of Drought Polygon. Part of original area of settle-
ment; agricultural coastal plain characterized by ~ grande of the 
early sugar engenho and now the usina; pastoral zone to interior set-
tled by migration from coast and characterized by vaqueiro, corrals, and 
more recently cattle fazendas. Maranhao occupied early by French; 
Pernambuco settled early by Dutch and, under their protection, Sephardic 
Jews. Recife is principal city of region; population is concentrated 
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along coast; accounted for 22.1 per cent of Brazil's population in 1960 
and about 21 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 16.3 and, i.n 1970, 
ranged from 6.7 in Piau{ to 57.4 in Alagoas. Ethnic composition: pre-
dominantly mixed; of region's population, heavy concentration of mulat-
toes, persons of African ancestry, and most of those of European an-
cestry along the coast; mamelucos concentrated in interior; Japanese 
found in Natal in Rio Grande do Norte. Accounts for 15 per cent of 
Brazil's agricultural production, 9 per cent of commerce, 7 per cent of 
industry, 12 per cent of services; contributes 15 per cent of G.D.P.; 
droughts, political unrest, and little attention from national govern-
ment prior to 1964 make this Brazil's most critical region; some im-
provement since 1964 but still has one of world's lowest per capita in-
comes, extremely high mortality rates, and predominantly subsistence 
farming with four million rural dwellers having no land or permanent 
jobs. 
Brazil: Regiao Centro-Oeste (Central-West Region) 
Area included: States of Mato Grosso, Goi/s, and the Federal 
District. Represents 22.2 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Tropical, sub-tropical; dense forest, savanna; pla-
teau with valleys and gorges cut by numerous rivers makes access to, 
and crossing of, region difficult; similar to Mountain Region of U.S., 
it has been an area crossed rather than settled. Settlers entered 
region during mining period (1700-1775) but settlement is sparse; 
some influence from Bolivia and Paraguay; accounted for 2.2 per cent 
of Brazil's population in 1872, 4.2 per cent in 1960, and 5.5 per cent 
in 1970; population concentrated in southern part of region; 1960 
density/km.2 1.6 and, in 1970, ranged from 1.3 in Mato Grosso to 4.6 in 
Goifs and 93.1 in Federal District. Ethnic composition: all ethnic 
groups represented; population of Goi{s is predominantly of European 
ancestry; Mato Grosso is about 50 per cent of European ancestry and 50 
per cent mameluco with some persons of African ancestry; Japanese are 
found in Mato Grosso and Goi{s. By 1970, Brasflia had some impact but 
still development of region only beginning; primary sector predominates 
(small farming, cattle, yerba mate(, some mining); accounts for 5 per 
cent of Brazil's agricultural production, 2 per cent of commerce, 1.5 
per cent of industry, and 3 per cent of services; combined with North 
Region, contributes about 4 per cent of G.D.P. 
Brazil: Regiao Sul (South Region) 
Area included: States of Sao Paulo, Parani, Santa Catarina, Rio 
Grande do Sul. Represents 9.6 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Temperate; subtropical along littoral. Pastoral zone 
in extreme south settled in eighteenth century from other regions; 
strong Spanish influence from bordering nations; characterized by 
estancias and ga~cho. Region of foreign colonization settled first by 
Germans and Italians followed by Polish, Russian, Arab, and, more re-
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cently, Dutch and Japanese as well as German immigrants; noted for non-
Luso-Brazilian characteristics. Population concentrated along coast; 
accounted for 35 per cent of Brazil's population in 1960 and 37 per 
cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 30.6 and, in 1970, ranged from 24.9 in 
Rio Grande do Sul to 71.9 in Sao Paulo. Ethnic composition: there-
gion of European concentration (about 90 per cent of European ancestry); 
Germans settled in Rio Grande do Sul, Paran{, Sao Paulo, and Santa 
Catarina; Italians settled in Rio Grande do Sul, Paran~, and Sao Paulo; 
Polish immigrants settled in Paran~. Japanese colonies exist mainly in 
Sao Paulo State (Sao Paulo City has largest Japanese population outside 
of Japan) but also in Paranl and Rio Grande do Sul. South Region is 
Brazil's center of industry and commercial agriculture; accounts for 51 
per cent of Brazil's agricultural production, 47.5 per cent of commerce, 
53.5 per cent of industry, and 47 per cent of services; Sao Paulo City 
is most important industrial center of Brazil; Sao Paulo State is rich-
est state of Brazil, most important state in agriculture, locale of two-
fifths of Brazil's industries, one-third of income. 
Brazil: Regiao Leste (East Region) 
Area included: States of Sergipe, Bahia, Minas Gerais, Esp~ito 
Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara. Represents 14.8 per cent of national 
territory. Following facts include part of Sao Paulo State. 
Features: Rainy, tropical in north; subtropical in southern high-
lands with rugged terrain and Brazil's highest mountains. Part of area 
of original settlement; mineral region settled in seventeenth century by 
bandeirantes and later by mamelucos, mulattoes, and (English and Jewish) 
immigrants; coffee region settled in nineteenth century characterized 
first by coffee fazendas and now estancias and an industrial belt. 
Densely populated with population clustered along coast; accounted for 
35 per cent of population in 1960 and 32.6 per cent in 1970; 1960 
density/km.2 was 19.7 and, in 1970, ranged from 13.4 in Bahia to 3631.0 
in Guanabara. Ethnic composition: the region of concentration of per-
sons of African ancestry although majority of population is of European 
ancestry except in Bahia (only Brazilian state where majority of popula-
tion is not of European ancestry); Japanese are found in Minas Gerais, 
Rio de Janeiro City, and Salvador. Economy is based on coffee (which 
began with slave labor and free labor of immigrants), mining, industry; 
accounts for 27 per cent of Brazil's agricultural production, 39.5 per 
cent of commerce, 36 per cent of industry, 38 per cent of services. 
Chile and Its Major Regions: Basic Facts 
Chile 
Area: 756,629 km.2 (excluding Antarctica territory). Greatest 
width: 352 kms. (least 22.4 and average 176). Greatest length: 4,208 
kms. 
Climate: Of South American nations, second only to Brazil in 
degrees of latitude represented from north to south. Ranges from 
tropical in north to sub-Antarctic in south. 
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Borders: 170 kms. with Peru to the north, 856 kms. with Bolivia 
and 5,120 kms. with Argentina to the east. 
Settlement: Southern Chile discovered by Fernao de Magalhaes in 
1520; Spanish under Diego de Almagro began conquest from Peru in 1536; 
first permanent Spanish settlement was Santiago in 1541; territory com-
pleted in nineteenth century. Central Valley in topographical terms 
(combination of Central and Forest Regions) was colonial Chile; settle-
ment extended north after War of the Pacific (1879-1884) by which Chile 
acquired territory north of Aconcagua Province from Peru and Bolivia; 
settlement increased south of B{o-B!O River with end of Araucanian 
Indian Wars (1887) and incorporation of their territory. 
Other features: Social, political, and industrial centers are 
Santiago, Valparaiso, and Concepcion cities; 75 per cent of population 
lives between Coquimbo and Bfo-Bfo River, 44.6 per cent in Santiago and 
ValparaiSo Provinces, and about 25 per cent in Greater Santiago metro-
politan area alone; 70 per cent of manufacturing and 80 per cent of 
production workers in manufacturing are in Valparar;o, Santiago, and 
Concepci~n Provinces. Chile has jurisdiction over a section of the 
Antarctica as well as Rapa Nui (Easter Island) 3,728 kms. west of 
Caldera, Juan Fern!ndez Islands 576 kms. west of Valpara~o, and other 
small Pacific islands. 
Chile: Zona Norte Grande (Big North Region) 
Area included: Provinces of Tarapaca(, Antofagasta. Represents 
24.3 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Part of territory acquired from Peru and Bolivia. Pre-
dominant is white desert more barren than Sahara--the Atacama; high pla-
teau basins, extremely narrow lowlands along coast; rainfall is rare. 
Population concentrated in cities, towns; size varies according to 
fluctuation in mining sector; accounted for 4.6 per cent of Chile's 
population in 1960 and 4.8 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km. 2 2.1 for 
Tarapaca(, 1.7 for Antofagasta and, in 1970, respectively, 3.0 and 2.0. 
Ethnic composition: predominantly mestizo. Economy based on mining 
(iron ore, copper, nitrates, iodine) and totally dependent on interna-
tional trade; region accounting for largest source of Chile's income but 
receives little government assistance; accounts for 16 per cent of 
Chile's unionized labor force. Region where Communist Party began in 
Chile. 
Chile: Zona Norte Chico (Little North Region) 
Area included: Provinces of Atacama, Coquimbo. Represents 15.5 
per cent of national territory. 
Features: Part of territory acquired from Peru and Bolivia. 
Transitional region; Mediterranean climate, steppe vegetation, drought; 
predominant are numerous short transverse valleys which make north-
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south movement difficult. Accounted for 5.8 per cent of 2hile's popu-
lation in 1960 and 5.5 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km. 1.5 for 
Atacama, 7.8 for Coquimbo and, in 1970, respectively, 1.9 and 8.5. 
Ethnic composition: predominantly mestizo. Economy is based on mining 
(iron ore, copper) and agriculture. 
Chile: Zona Central (Central Region) 
Area included: Provinces of Aconcagua, Valpara~o, Santiago, 
O'Higgins, Colchagua, Curic6, Talca, Maule, Linares, Rfuble. Repre-
sents 12.2 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Also referred to as Mediterranean Chile or Central 
Valley in regional terms (topographically, central valley extends south 
to Puerto Montt and then drops to ocean floor); very fertile, sloping 
plain; of the 20 per cent of national territory that is level land, most 
of that which is arable is found in this region. Represents Chile of 
colonial and early republican periods; region where hacienda system was 
established and majority of latifundia still found in this region. 
Region of concentration of population, labor force, ports, major cities, 
industry, and commerce; accounted for 60.4 per cent of Chile's popula-
tion in 1960 and 62.4 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 ranged from 
14.0 for Maule to 137.8 for Santiago and, in 1970, from 14.5 for Maule 
to 181.9 for Santiago. Ethnic composition: predominantly mestizo but 
greater proportion of Amerinds than in north or extreme south. Economy 
based on mining (copper), vegetables, vineyards, orchards, cattle, other 
agriculture; accounts for 25 per cent of Chile's hydroelectric power. 
Chile: Zona Sur (Forest Chile) 
/ / / Area included: Provinces of Concepcion, Arauco, B1o-B1o, Malleco, 
Caut{n, Valdivia, Osorno, Llanquihue. Represents 13.3 per cent of na-
tional territory. 
Features: Temperate, colder than Central Region, rainy, abundant 
forests, grazing lands. Chile's "frontier" at the time of Araucanian 
Indian Wars; settled predominantly by European immigrants brought under 
colonization laws; Lake Region (Valdivia, Osorno, Llanquihue) settled 
by German immigrants (about 10,000 annually averaging about 100 from 
1846 to 1926); the need to clear land for agriculture south of Bfo-B{o 
River led to predominantly small farms rather than latifundia though 
the latter exist in this region. Accounted for 26.4 per cent of Chile's 
population in 1960 and 24.4 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 ranged 
from 9.2 for Llanquihue to 95.0 for Concepci6n and, in 1970, respec-
tively, 10.9 and 112.3. Ethnic composition: mainly mestizo but this 
is Chile's region of concentration of Amerinds (Mapuches) who live pre-
dominant~ on reducciones. Industry predominates only in province of 
Concepcion where, in addition, organized labor is active especially in 
coal zone; about 24 per cent of labor force in Concepci6n Province 
(equal to 78.3 per cent in region) employed in industry. 
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Chile: Zona Patagtnica (Patagonian Region) 
Areas included: Provinces of Chilo~, Ays~n, Magallanes. Repre-
sents 34.7 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Also referred to as Channel Region, Island Region, or 
Archipelagic Chile; consists predominantly in islands, channels, gla-
ciers, rugged terrain, scarce arable land; a wilderness region. Ac-
counted for 2.8 per cent of Chile's population in 1960 and 2.9 per cent 
in 1970; concentrated on Chilo~, in Puerto Aysen and Punta Arenas; rest 
of region mainly uninhabited; 1960 density/km.2 3.7 for Chilo~, 0.4 for 
Aysen, 0.6 for Magallanes and, in 1970, respectively, 4.1, 0.5, and 0.7; 
extensive seasonal emigration to Argentina for work; Punta Arenas is 
world's city located farthest to the south. Ethnic composition: mainly 
mestizo. Economy based on agriculture and cattle as well as oil and 
coal in Magallanes; landholdings are large in Aysln and Magallanes; 
Tierra del Fuego characterized by large commercial sheep ranches and 
oil. 
United States and Its Major Regions: Basic Facts 
United States 
Area: 9,160,412 km. 2 Represents 6.9 per cent of world land area. 
Greatest width of coterminous states: 4,320 kms. Greatest length of 
coterminous states: 2,560 kms. 
Climate: Coterminous states lie in temperate zone; sub-tropical 
crop belt along Gulf of Mexico. 
Borders: 3,093 kms. of coterminous states with Mexico and 6,379 
kms. with Canada; 2,456 kms. of Alaska with Canada. 
Settlement: Discovered by Cristofaro Colombo in 1492. First 
permanent Spanish settlement was St. Augustine in 1565; first perma-
ment English settlement was Jamestown in 1607. English colonization 
began in late sixteenth century; settled predominantly along Atlantic 
coast and then to interior; territory completed in twentieth century. 
Other features: 72 per cent of population and 78.5 per cent of 
manufacturing are found along Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in East 
North Central Region (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin). 
U.S. has jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Canal Zone, 
Guam, Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Virgin Islands. 
United States: Atlantic Region 
Area included: District of Columbia and States of Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida. Represents 12.1 per 
cent of national territory. 
Features: Heavily forested, predominantly temperate; Appalachian 
Mountain system includes Blue Ridge, Green, White, and Allegheny Moun-
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tains; gradual rise of terrain from east to Piedmont Plateau and 
Appalachians; Atlantic coastal plain narrow in New England where cli-
mate, soil, irregular topography resulted in system of small self-
sufficient landholdings; wide coastal plain and rich soil further south 
was locale for plantation system which later spread to South Central 
Region. Accounted for 39.4 per cent of U.S. population in 1960 and 
39.2 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 63.6 and 71.7 in 1970. Ethnic 
composition: 11.9 per cent of non-European ancestry in 1950, 12.9 per 
cent in 1960, and 14.2 per cent in 1970. Accounts for about 41 per 
cent of U.S. non-agricultural labor force, 41 per cent of manufacturing 
labor force, 44.6 per cent of manufacturing establishments, 16.9 per 
cent of agricultural production, and 35.3 per cent of manufacturing 
exports. 
United States: North Central Region 
Area included: States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin,: 
Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, 
Nebraska. Represents 21.3 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Temperate; Mississippi River Valley is prominent with 
prairies gradually appearing to west of forested downward slope from 
Alleghenies in eastern part of region; prairies extend westward to the 
rise in terrain and Great Plains that characterize western part of 
region; droughts in Great Plains states largely due to overplanting of 
wheat and loss of topsoil in past; Ozark Mountains in Missouri. Ac-
counted for 28.7 per cent of U.S. population in 1960 and 27.8 per cent 
in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 26.5 and 29.1 in 1970. Ethnic composition: 
5.3 per cent of region's population of non-European ancestry in 1950, 
7.1 per cent in 1960, and 8.7 per cent in 1970. High agricultural pro-
duction accounting for 44.1 per cent of total in U.S.; contributes 37 
per cent of U.S. manufacturing exports and accounts for 28 per cent of 
non-agricultural labor force, 33 per cent of manufacturing labor force, 
and 26.9 per cent of manufacturing establishments. 
United States: South Central Region 
Area included: States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Missis-
sippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas. Represents 17.2 per cent 
of national territory. 
Features: Temperate in north, sub-tropical in south; eastern half 
forested, western section part of Great Plains; Appalachian Mountain 
system extends into northeastern part of region, Ozark Mountains in 
north central section; coastal plain along Gulf of Mexico is sub-tropical 
crop belt. Accounted for 16.2 per cent of U.S. population in 1960 and 
15.8 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 18.5 and 20.5 in 1970. Ethnic 
composition: 20.1 per cent of non-European ancestry in 1950, 19.2 per 
cent in 1960, and 18.1 per cent in 1970. Rich agricultural region, part 
of Cotton Belt; accounts for 14 per cent of non-agricultural labor force, 
13 per cent of manufacturing labor force, 12.1 per cent of manufacturing 
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establishments in U.S.; contributes 18.6 per cent of total agricultural 
production and 12.5 per cent of manufacturing exports. 
United States: Mountain Region 
Area included: States of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona. Represents 24.2 per cent of national 
territory. 
Features: Temperate, predominantly semi-arid tableland extending 
from Mexico to Canada; eastern boundary of region formed by Rocky Moun-
tain system including Sawatch, Front, Sangre de Cristo, Park, and San 
Juan Ranges; in northwest is part of Columbia Plateau; along western 
boundary of region is rugged, arid Great Basin (Nevada, part of Utah 
and Idaho). Accounted for 3.8 per cent of U.S. population in 1960 and 
4.1 per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 3.1 and 3.7 in 1970. Ethnic 
composition: 4.5 per cent of non-European ancestry in 1950, 5 per cent 
in 1960, and 5.8 per cent in 1970. Economy based on agriculture (graz-
ing, some irrigated farming) and mining. Accounts for 4 per cent of 
non-agricultural labor force, 2 per cent of manufacturing labor force, 
2.8 per cent of manufacturing establishments in U.S.; contributes 8.4 
per cent of total agricultural production, 1.7 per cent of manufacturing 
exports. 
United States: Pacific Region 
Area included: States of Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, 
Hawaii. Represents 25.2 per cent of national territory. 
Features: Mainland coterminous area: forested with abundant 
rainfall in coastal northwest; Columbia Plateau in Washington and Oregon; 
Great Basin extends into parts of Oregon and California; mountain ranges 
include Cascades, Sierra Nevada, and coast ranges; narrow coastal low-
lands. Accounted for 11.9 per cent of U.S. population in 1960 and 13.1 
per cent in 1970; 1960 density/km.2 9.2 and 11.5 in 1970. Ethnic compo-
sition: 7.8 per cent non-European ancestry in 1950, 8.9 per cent in 
1960, 11.1 per cent in 1970. Agriculture important in some sections of 
region; accounts for 13 per cent of non-agricultural labor force, 11 per 
cent of manufacturing labor force, and 13.6 per cent of manufacturing 
establishments in U.S.; contributes 12 per cent of total agricultural 
production and 13.5 per cent of manufacturing exports. 
APPENDIX B 
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POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS OF BRAZIL, CHILE, AND THE U.S. 
FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE MID-TWENTIETH CE1~URIES, FUNCTIONAL 
LINKAGES AND LINES OF DIFFERENTIATION IN THE SIXTEENTH, 
SEVENTEENTH, AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 
Politico-Administrative Systems 
Prior to 1548, the government in Brazil had an administrative sys-
tem similar to Portugal's until the Crown was unified with the Spanish 
Crown (1580/81-1640). In 1533, Brazil had been divided into (hereditary) 
captaincies and, as a result, the expense of colonization fell to indi-
viduals rather than the Crown. During the unification of Crowns, the 
Spanish administrative and viceroyalty systems were adopted in Brazil. 
Since the conquistadores who, by Crown approval, ruled in Spanish 
territories as adelantados (provincial governors), governors, or 
captains-general were increasingly perceived as a potential threat to 
the absolutism of the Crown, direct government was soon established in 
Spanish colonies. Under the viceroyalty that had been created in Peru 
in 1542, supreme authority in Chile was vested in the real audiencia 
(in Chile, the governor was also the president of the ~encia). Under 
this system, the Crown appointed the gobernador (governor), teniente 
general (deputy to the governor), corregidores (governors of cities and 
departments), and other officials. 
Local political administration was by the Castilian system of 
authority vested in cabildos (municipalities) appointed by the governor 
when a city was founded and the corregidores appointed by the Crown. 
The members of cabildos (which could call open meetings of the local 
population) named their own successors with the exception of three of the 
six regidores (councilmen) assigned to lifetime positions and whose of-
fices were to be sold at public auction when they died. Under Carlos 
III, government reorganization and reform included the establishment of a 
system of intendants (fiscal administrators) throughout Spanish territory 
and the captaincy-general of Chile (1778). Brazilian administration be-
came similarly unified. 
The Brazilian and Chilean municipalities in the eighteenth century 
gained some degree of self-government. England had also viewed it as 
advantageous to allow some autonomy in her colonies. Government on the 
eastern seaboard of the U.S. reflected the English system but varied 
according to whether colonies were corporate, proprietary, or royal. 
While the colonies in the East v1ere invol•red in the ~.Jar for Independence 
in the eighteenth century, Spain organized California, New Mexico, and 
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Texas as Provincias Internas with a commandent-general under the Crown. 
Brazil 
The preindependence experience of Brazil varied from that of the 
rest of Latin America. Rio de Janeiro became the capital of the Portu-
guese Empire (1808) and Brazil became a kingdom (1815-1822). After in-
dependence (1822), it became an empire (1822-188~ and then a republic 
(1889-1930). 
Brazil reflects the tendency of Latin American governments to be-
come increasingly centralized. The first constitution (1824) promul-
gated during the empire period remained in effect until 1891 when a new 
constitution established a federal republic, a president to be elected 
for four years, a bicameral legislature, and separation of Church and 
State. The rise of Getfrlio Vargas to power in 1930 brought the fall of 
the republic and the beginning of "benevolent dictatorship"; in this 
period, the powers of the central government were increased to an ex-
tensive degree. Further centralization was apparent in the Constitution 
of 1934 which stated that the president, ineligible for re-election, was 
to be elected by Congress and in the Constitution of 1937 proclaimed by 
Vargas and which gave the president dictatorial powers. 
During the "Democratic Era" (1945-1964), characterized by the 
emergence of mass parties and the beginnings of a mass electorate, a 
new constitution (1946) was promulgated by which the president was to 
be elected for a five-year term (later reduced to four) by popular vote 
and could not succeed himself; in addition, the government was given the 
authority to ban anti-democratic parties. Still, Rosenbaum and Tyler 
(1972:3-28) assert that this was not a "democratic" era but merely an 
"interlude" between the authoritarian regimes of the Vargas dictator-
ship and the post-1964 military governments because the major charac-
teristics of the 1937-1945 period persisted 1945-1964, e.g., centrali-
zation of authority and militant anti-communism. A parliamentary form 
of government was established by the 1961 constitutional amendment with 
control centralized in a Council of Ministers. 
The increasing authoritarianism of the governments of Castelo 
Branco, Costa e Silva, and Garrastaz~ Mldici following the 1964 coup 
is reflected in the constitutional changes and institutional acts 
issued by the military leadership. The first institutional act issued 
in 1964 merely provided the guidelines for governing Brazil. Castelo 
Branco gained dictatorial powers in 1965 and issued a second institu-
tional act abolishing all existing political parties, authorizing in-
creased federal intervention in the provinces (thus a decline in pro-
vincial autonomy), and establishing indirect presidential elections 
(by a majority vote in congress). Castelo Branco also replaced members 
of the supreme court, began the "suppression of radicalism" and sus-
pended constitutional rights. 
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There were thirteen political parties that had emerged 1945-1965 
to be abolished. The largest were the Partido Social Democra'tico or 
P.S.D. (Social Democratic Party), Uniao Democr{tica Nacional or U.D.N. 
(National Democratic Union), and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro or 
P.T.B. (Brazilian Labor Party). Following in importance were the 
Partido Comunista Brasileiro or P.C.B. (Brazilian Communist Party) 
which was illegal having lost its rights in 1947, Partido Comunista do 
Brasil or PCdB (Communist Party of Brazil) which was a pro-Chinese off-. 
shoot of the P.C.B. in 1961 and also illegal, and the Partido Social 
Progresista or P.S.P. (Social Progressive Party). Minor parties not 
ideologically well-defined were the Partido Demtcrata Cristae or P.D.C. 
(Christian Democrats), Partido Socialista Brasileiro or P.S.B. (Brazil-
ian Socialist Party), and the Partido de Representas~o Popular or 
P.R.P. (Popular Representation Party). The remaining parties were ill-
defined, unorganized, and not ideologically aligned. For the 1966 
elections, two new parties were allowed to participate but were not 
true parties since they were established rapidly prior to the elections; 
these were the Alian~a Renovadora Nacional or ARENA (National Renovating 
Alliance) which was pro-government and the Movimento Democr!tico 
Brasileiro or M.D.B. (Brazilian Democratic Movement). 
The power of the president and federal control over provinces 
were increased in the Constitution of 1967 (still in effect) by which 
the nation's name changed from "United States of Brazil" to "Brazil." 
In 1968, Congress was suspended for an indefinite period, the president 
gained the power to rule by decree, and extensive censorship began. An 
institutional act issued at this time included authorization for the 
president to declare states of siege, suspend individuals' political 
rights for ten years, and nullify parliamentary decrees; this act was 
followed by the 1969 constitutional amendment made by the junta and 
extensively restricting congressional power as well as strengthening 
presidential authority in the decision-making process. 
Presidential succession in Brazil 
The term of the first president, Deodoro da Fonseca (1889-1891), 
who was forced to resign by a naval revolt, was completed by the vice-
president, Floriano Peixoto (1891-1894). Prudente Josf de Morais 
Barros (1894-1898), Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales (1898-1902), and 
Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906) served full terms. 
Afonso Augusto Moreira Pena (1906-1910) died in 1909; his term was com-
pleted by Nilo Pe~anha. The 1910 election was the first to confront 
directly the issue of the military role in politics but (Marshal) Hermes 
Rodrigues da Fonseca (1910-1914) won the election and was succeeded by 
the pro-militarist candidate Venceslau Br!s Pereira Gomes (1914-1918). 
Rodrigues Alves (who served 1902-1906) was re-elected in 1918 but died 
before taking office; the vice-president, Delfim Moreira da Costa 
Ribeiro~ served as acting-president until new elections in 1919 when 
Epit~cio da Silva Pessoa (1919-1922) was elected; Artur da Silva 
Bernardes (1922-1926) succeeded him. 
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Washington Lu{s Pereira de Sousa, elected in 1926, was deposed 
after the 1930 elections (before finishing his term); the newly elected 
president, J~lio Prestes de Albuquerque, was prevented from taking of-
fice by the losing candidate Get~lio Dorneles Vargas. With the support 
of young military officers and much of the population, Vargas led a re-
volt in the southern states, took over the government, and forced 
Pereira de Sousa to resign. Vargas' "benevolent dictatorship" ended 
in 1945 when some of the same military officers who had helped him gain 
office in 1930 forced him to resign; he was allowed to run in elections 
and became a senator. Chief Justice Jose(Linhares succeeded Vargas in 
1945 until elections could be called. Eurico Gaspar Dutra served 1946-
1951 when Vargas was re-elected to serve 1951-1956; unable to contend 
with problems such as rising inflation, Vargas was forced to resign by 
the armed forces in 1954 and, soon after, he committed suicide. The 
vice-president, Jo[o Caf{ Filho, was to finish his term but resigned in 
1955; Carlos Coimbra da Luz was deposed three days after being named 
acting-president and was replaced by Nereu Ramos. Juscelino Kubitschek 
de Oliveira, in spite of military opposition, served a full term (1956-
1961). He was succeeded by the popular J~nio da Silva Quadros who won 
about 45 per cent of the popular vote in a three-man race; his orthodox 
economic policies, progressive social ideas, and independent line in 
foreign policy brought a warning by the army to use caution which re-
sulted in his resignation eight months after being inaugurated. 
Vice-president Joao Belchior Marques Goulart, ideological heir to 
Vargas, served as president although he was left-wing and therefore 
opposed by the three top military leaders. Goulart's government was a 
modified parliamentary system dividing executive power between the 
president and an appointed prime minister; a national plebiscite in 
1963 returned full presidential power to him. On March 20, 1964, 
General Castelo Branco reasserted the non-political role of the armed 
forces; on March 31, he led a coup supported by several state govern-
ments and Goulart fled to Uruguay. Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco 
served 1964-1967 and was succeeded, in indirect elections, by Arthur da 
Costae Silva (1967-1971). When Costae Silva suffered a stroke in 
1969, a military junta prevented the vice-president from taking office, 
took over the government, and named Emflio Garrastaz6 Mldici (a "hard-
liner") president after which Congress "elected" him. In 1974, Ernesto 
Geisel was named president. 
Chile 
Chilean independence was declared in 1810 after which Chile under-
went Spanish reconquest (1814-1817) and finally achieved independence 
in 1818. Two basic factors shaped the early political history of Chile 
as was true of other Spanish American nations. First, the intelligent-
sia that participated in the independence movements were in their ma-
jority republicans influenced by French intellectuals and the French 
Revolution as well as the success of the War for Independence of the 
U.S.; thus, once independence was achieved, Spanish American nations 
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established republican forms of government for which they were not pre-
pared. Second, the period of wars between the time that independence 
was first declared and finally achieved contributed to the importance 
assigned to the military. These two factors combined with the divisive-
ness that had emerged among groups sharply differentiated along politi-
cal, social, economic, and religious lines and contributed to a long 
period of Conservative-Liberal conflict following independence. 
After Chilean independence was declared in 1810, internal divi-
sions led to conflict between two factions--one led by Jos/Miguel 
Carrera Verdugo and the other by Bernardo O'Higgins--with juntas gov-
erning in the meantime. The first junta (1810-1811) elected by open 
cabildo in Santiago was deposed on September 4, 1811, when the Carrera 
family led a coup and established a new junta. The Carreras spear-
headed a second coup and formed a new junta on November 15, 1811; Jose' 
Miguel Carrera became dictator (1811-1812). New juntas served in 1812-
1813 and, with the second dictatorship of Carrera, in 1813-1814. This 
in-fighting facilitated the 1814-1817 Spanish reconquest of Chile. 
Even though Carrera and O'Higgins finally joined forces, it was too 
late; the forces of the viceroy of Peru defeated their armies and re-
established royal government in Chile. After independence, the Liberal 
faction controlled the government 1818-1830. The Conservatives won the 
1829-1830 Civil War and remained in power until 1861. 
The Chilean government has passed through several phases since 
independence: 
1. An autocratic system from 1818-1823 under O'Higgins who, as 
Supreme Director, created a highly centralized government 
2. Anarchy 1823-1830 with a federalist form of government adopted for 
a short time in 1826 and, due to growing discontent, the promulga-
tion of a second federalistic constitution in 1828 
3. Autocratic Republic 1830-1871 under the 1833 Constitution giving 
broad powers to the president with the "presidential system" be-
coming similar to a monarchy (the president named his own succes-
sor) until 1860 when an era of party-supported presidents began 
and lasted until 1890 
4. Liberal Republic 1871-1891 with the first constitutional reform in 
1871 stating in part that the president cannot succeed himself 
5. Parliamentary Republic 1891-1925 beginning after the 1891 Civil War 
(with the parliamentary system fully established by 1910) and char-
acterized by the supremacy of political parties that ruled while 
presidents remained inactive 1891-1920 and rapid ministerial turn-
over 1895-1925 (there were 121 different cabinets and 530 different 
ministers during this period) 
6. The emergence of new mass parties and a mass electorate after the 
1920 election with the 1941-1958 period characterized by government 
based on party coalitions and the 1958-1964 period by the mass 
electorate becoming a power in the governing of ~he nation 
There were eleven major parties in existence in 1964: Partido 
Nacional (National Party), Partido Radical (Radical Party), Partido 
Liberal (Liberal Party), Partido Dem6crata Cristiano de Chile (Christian 
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Democratic Party of Chile), Partido Democr[tico Nacional or PADENA 
(National Democratic Party), Partido Independiente (Independent Party), 
Partido Democra'tico Social (Social Democratic Party), Vangardia Nacional 
Popular (National Vanguard of the People), Partido Comunista de Chile 
(Communist Party of Chile), Partido Socialista (Socialist Party), and 
Uni~n Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Union). The last three 
parties formed a coalition in 1956 known as the Frente de Accitn Popular 
• or FRAP (Popular Action Front). Like Brazil, the emerging party system 
became a confusing array of mass parties but, in contrast, Chile is the 
only Latin American nation in which parties are definitely aligned into 
three blocs (Right, Center, Left) as in Europe; one result has been the 
frequent comparison of Chile to France. 
The Chilean Constitution of 1833 was replaced by the Constitution 
of 1925, amended in 1943, 1957, and 1959 and still in effect; it pro-
vides for a unitary republic with three branches of government, a presi-
dent elected by direct vote for a six-year term and ineligible to suc-
ceed himself (a vice-president is not elected), responsibility of the 
cabinet to the president, expansion of suffrage, separation of Church 
and State, provincial autonomy, guarantee of freedom of religion, and 
extensive social and labor legislation. Constitutional rule was sus-
pended in September, 1973. 
Presidential succession in Chile 
The dictatorship of Bernardo O'Higgins lasted until 1823 when he 
resigned; a junta replaced him until Ram~ Freire y Serra was named 
president in 1823. Freire resigned in 1826 as did acting-presidents 
Manuel Blanco Encalada in 1826 and Agust~ de Eyzaguirre in 1827; 
Congress named Freire president in 1827 but he resigned in the same 
year and was replaced by the vice-president, Francisco Antonio Pinto 
(1827-1829). Pinto resigned in 1829 and was succeeded by the vice-
president, Francisco Ram~n Vicu~a Larrafll (1829). A junta ruled in 
1830 until Francisco Ru12 Tagle was named president; he resigned in the 
same year and the vice-president, Jos~Tomrs Ovalle, served as acting-
president. From 1831 to the 1891 Civil War, the presidents were 
Joaquin Prieto Vial (1831-1841), Manuel Bulnes Prieto (1841-1851), 
Manuel Montt y Varas (1851-1861), Jos~ Joaqu:(n P€rez Mascayano (1861-
1871), Federico Err~uriz Za!lartu (1871-1876), An{bal Pinto Garmendia 
. / I ~ (1876-1881), D~ingo Santa Mar~a Gonzalez (1881-1886), and Jose Manuel 
Balmaceda Fernandez (1886-1891). 
After Balmaceda committed suicide in 1891, a junta ruled until 
Jorge Montt (1891-1896) took office; he was succeeded by Federico/ 
Err~uriz Eshaurren (1896-1901). Errfzuriz died in 1901 and German 
Riesco Err~uriz (1901-1906) became president, succeeded by Pedro Montt 
y Montt who died in 1910 and whose term was finished by the vice·-
president, El~s Fernandez Albano. Ram~ Barros Luco served 1911-1915 
and Juan Lu~ Sanfuentes Andonaegui 1915-1920. Elected in 1920, Arturo 
Alessandri Palma was forced out by the military in 1924 when a junta 
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headed by General Lu(s Altamirano ruled. Carlos Ibf~ez del Campo led a 
coup in January, 1925, and recalled Alessandri who resig~ed in Oc~ober 
of the same year. Emiliano Figueroa Larra~ became president in 1925 
and was forced out by Ib{n'ez in 1927; Ib{~ez named himself dictator-
president but resigned in 1931. For two days, Pedro Opazo was actin~­
president, resigned, and was succeeded by Juan Esteban Montero Rodrfguez 
who became acting-president for about one month after which he resigned. 
~~nuel Trucco was acting-president until Montero was again named presi-
dent (1931-1932); he was deposed in 1932 by a coup. 
In 1932, a socialist junta led by Carlos nfvila took over in 
June and served for a month after which D~ila served as acting-
president for two months until deposed by a coup in September; General 
Bartolom~Blanche served as acting-president for less than one month 
and resigned after which Abraham Oyanedel served as acting-president for 
three months until Alessandri was re-elected (1932-1938). Pedro Aguirre 
Cerda (1938-1941), candidate of the Popular Front, died in office and 
the vice-president, Gertnimo Mendez, completed his term (1941-1942). 
Juan Antonio Rfos Morales (1942-1946) died in office and was succeeded 
by Alfredo Duhalde who resigned after one month; Vice-Admiral Vicente 
Merino Bielech served for three months until the leftist candidate 
Gabriel Gonzflez Videla took office (1946-1952). Twenty-one years after 
being forced out of office, Carlos Ib(irez was re-elected (1952-1958); 
he was succeeded by Jorge Alessandri Rodrtguez (1958-1964), Eduardo Frei 
Montalva (1964-1970), and Salvador Allende Gossens (1970-1973). In 
1973, after a military coup and Allende's death, a junta took power led 
by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. 
United States 
In relation to political changes, the U.S. differs from Brazil and 
Chile, it is suggested, basically in the following: 
1. In spite of assassinations and deaths in office, the electoral 
transition in power has been smoother in the U.S. and the presi-
dential election procedure differs by being both direct (by popular 
vote) and indirect (Electoral College) 
2. There has been only one major change in the system of government in 
the U.S. after independence, i.e., the change from the original 
confederation system which failed, in large part because of finance, 
to the federal system under a constitution 
3. The U.S. has resorted to the procedure of constitutional amendments 
(26 amendments by 1971) in contrast to promulgating new constitu-
tions with one result being that of having the oldest written 
federal constitution in the world 
Similar to Brazil and Chile, the U.S. has placed limitations on presi-
dential terms of office with the 22nd constitutional amendment in 1951 
whereby the president can serve only two terms. 
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Presidential succession in the U.S. 
The first president, George Washington, served 1789-1797 followed 
by John Adams (1797-1801), Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), James Madison 
(1809-1817), James Monroe (1817-1825), John Quincy Adams (1825-1829), 
Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), and Martin Van Buren (1837-1841). William 
Henry Harrison died one month after inauguration and his vice-president, 
John Tyler, finished his term (1841-1845). James K. Polk (1845-1849) 
was succeeded by Zachary Taylor (1849-1850) who died in office; the 
vice-president, Millard Fillmore, finished his term (1850-1853). 
Fillmore was succeeded by Franklin Pierce (1853-1857), James Buchanan 
(1857-1861), and Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) who was assassinated in 
1865 and succeeded by the vice-president, Andrew Johnson (1865-1869), 
Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877), and Rutherford B. Hayes (1877-1881). 
James A. Garfield was shot and died in 1881 after his inauguration; his 
vice-president, Chester A. Arthur, served his term (1881-1885), suc-
ceeded by Grover Cleveland who served two non-successive terms (1885-
1889 and 1893-1897) and Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893). 
William McKinley (1897-1901) was assassinated in 1901; the vice-
president, Theodore Roosevelt, finished his term and was elected for 
two additional terms (1901-1909). William Howard Taft (1909-1913) and 
Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) were followed by Warren G. Harding (1921-
1923) who died in office in 1923; the vice-president, Calvin Coolidge, 
completed his term (1923-1925) and was elected for an additional term 
(1925-1929). Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) was succeeded by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (1933-1945) who died in office in 1945; his fourth term was 
completed by the vice-president, Harry S. Truman (1945-1949), who was 
elected for an additional term (1949-1953). Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-
1961) was succeeded by John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) who was assassinated 
in 1963; the vice-president, Lyndon B. Johnson, completed his term 
(1963-1965) and was elected for an additional term (1965-1969). Richard 
M. Nixon (1969-1974) resigned in 1974; his term was finished (1974-1977) 
by the vice-president, Gerald R. Ford. 
Brazil, Chile, and the United States in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
Functional Linkages to the International System 
Impact of mercantilism 
Brazil, Chile, and the United States were discovered, explored, 
and colonized by European nations during the era of mercantilist ex-
pansion. Some consequences were: 
1. Their economic, political, and social ties were first of all to 
Europe, sti~l a predominant tendency in the twentieth century. The 
central point of contact was the colonial city. It was in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries that most of the largest cities of 
today were founded in Brazil (e.g., Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) 
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and Chile (e.g., Santiago and Concepcibn), with early evidence of a 
tendency toward primate cities. The founding of cities continued 
over a longer period of time in the U.S. with urban growth occur-
ring at a slower pace in the southern colonies because of the nature 
of the plantation system. Colonial cities in the three nations 
early became centers of international commerce and, importantly, of 
contact with European ideas, e.g., republicanism. 
2. The highly competitive nature of mercantilist expansion made itself 
felt in the following ways: 
a. Competition over territory in the New World. It was because of 
French encroachment that Joao III, King of Portugal, began to 
colonize Brazil and it was by destroying a French colony that 
Rio de Janeiro was founded (1567). France invaded Maranhao 
1615-1619 and the area from the Sao Francisco River to Marannao 
came under Dutch control, with Recife as their capital, from 
1624 to 1654 when they were expelled. In the U.S., it was after 
mid-seventeenth century that the majority of the English colo-
nies were founded or acquired; the Spanish from 1521 and into 
the seventeenth century explored the southeast to the Mississip-
pi River and the west as far north as Oregon and as far east as 
Kansas; the Durch settled on the Hudson while Swedes first set-
tled on the Delaware; and, in the latter seventeenth century 
the French, primarily interested in furs, explored the St. 
Lawrence River Valley, the Great Lakes Region, the Fox River and 
Illinois, the Ohio Valley, the Mississippi Valley, and Louisi-
ana. Chile did not experience such competition in part because 
of geographical barriers and in part because it was thought to 
be territory relatively poor in natural resources. 
b. New World involvement in European conflicts. The colonial cities 
of Brazil and Chile became involved in the attempts of England, 
France, and the Netherlands to colonize in Spanish territories 
and to destroy Spain's monopoly in the Indies. Freebooters from 
these nations raided coastal settlements on the Atlantic and 
Pacific in the latter half of the sixteenth century and during 
the seventeenth century. This activity not only contributed to 
the decline of Spanish commerce but also Chilean cities, e.g., 
La Serena and Valdivia, in particular, suffered by being burned 
and/or captured. 
3. Economic linkages predominated since the three nations were estab-
lished as economic dependencies expected to buy European manufac-
tured products, provide raw materials for European needs, and absorb 
excess European population. It was a situation more advantageous to 
Europe than to the colonies. 
Predominance of linkages to Europe: 
two consequences 
External control over extractive, export economies. Brazil, 
Chile, and the U.S. began with extractive, export economies (forest and 
agricultural products) under economic policies dictated by foreign 
powers. Although mercantilists had a primary concern for precious 
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metals (especially gold and silver) as well as for the expansion of mar-
kets, gold was not discovered in Brazil until the close of the seven-
teenth century and much later in the U.S. while other metals were not 
yet important. Some precious metals, e.g., silver, were exported from 
Chile. Copper exports to Spain and Peru began in 1601 but Chile was 
considered poor in this respect thus experiencing relatively little in-
terference from Spain. Still, the Crowns of Spain and Portugal were to 
receive revenues mainly from taxation such as the quinto or royal fifth 
of subsoil products and customs duties; taxation thus early became an 
issue in the three nations and would later play a key role in their 
struggles for independence. Portugal rigidly monopolized trade and laid 
the basis for the characteristically cyclical nature of the Brazilian 
economy that continues today. Both the brazilwood cycle (1500-1550) and 
the sugar-cane cycle (1550-1700) in Brazil were export economies; how-
ever, Jaguaribe's (1968:101) distinction should be noted, i.e., that the 
brazilwood cycle was a "simple, extractive economy" in contrast to the 
sugar-cane cycle which was "slavocratic-capitalistic." Chile was not as 
rigidly controlled although Spain did prohibit general inter-colonial 
trade. England was prohibitive by means of the Navigation Acts of 1651 
and 1660 and similar policies although the U.S. colonies encountered 
slightly different trade problems. In the seventeenth century, all re-
gions exported agricultural products but the South was dominant in ex-
ports to England. Although tobacco cultivation and the subsequent de-
velopment of large plantations (requiring greater investment in land and 
labor) led the South to become more specialized and more affected by 
price changes than other regions, it was the only region not to have an 
unfavorable balance of trade. New England reduced this unfavorable 
balance in part by fishing, ship-building, and inter-colonial trade; 
Pennsylvania and New York resorted to some fur trade and ship-building 
as well as extensive trade with the West Indies. 
Immigration. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, immi-
grants came predominantly from the colonizing nation. In Brazil, there 
was also an influx of Dutch and French immigrants including French 
Calvinists in Rio de Janeiro who began the first Protestant activities 
in America, Spanish settlers during the sixty years of the union of the 
Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, and, under the protection of the Dutch, 
many Sephardic Jews. Immigrants to Chile were in their majority from 
the Crown of Castile. In the U.S., there was particularly massive 
English immigration to the Massachusetts Bay Colony 1630-1642 but Dutch 
and Swedish immigrants played an important role in the colonies. 
Lines of Differentiation and Functional Linkages 
Within National Systems 
Bases of differentiation among groups 
The basis for a paternalistic and dependent society was estab-
lished with the shift to the sugar-cane cycle in Brazil (mainly in 
Bahia and Pernambuco) and, similarly, with the development of agri-
culture in Central Chile and the southern U.S. colonies. The specific 
forms that emerged were the engenho and fazenda in Brazil, the lati-
fundia and hacienda originating in the mercedes de tierras in Chile, 
and the southern plantation and large estate in the U.S. 
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Engenho is a term associated with sugar plantations whereas 
fazenda refers most frequently to the coffee plantations that followed. 
In Chile, mercedes de tierras were land grants given to conquistadores; 
they could be chacras near cities or haciendas. Haciendas were divided 
into latifundia which were sometimes further divided into hijuelas. 
This continual division of land (a tendency even in the twentieth cen-
tury) was one factor that led to the decline of the "first aristocracy" 
in Chile. The term hacienda is today used to refer to the type of 
latifundia system in Chile. Holf and Hansen (1972:29-30, 135-137) dis-
tinguish between two types of latifundia systems in Latin America on 
the basis of whether or not the Amerinds encountered by colonizers were 
politically organized. vfuere political states existed (e.g., the 
Incas), the Spaniards took over the political organization; in this case, 
the hacienda system emerged based on local labor. In contrast, where 
the Amerinds had no political state (e.g., in Brazil), war was the only 
means of conquering them; in this case, the fazenda system emerged 
based primarily on African slave labor. The Chilean case would not 
necessarily refute their thesis. The hacienda system was established 
in the Central Region and local labor was used (many of these Amerind 
groups are now extinct mainly through amalgamation). The Araucanian 
(Mapuche) Wars were fought in the South; the latifundia that later 
emerged in the South were the result of government incentives to 
European immigrants to settle this region. However, geography is also 
a factor; the topography of southern Chile encouraged the stronger 
tendency to establish small farms. At any rate, the impact of the 
plantation systems in the three nations would come to compound the dif-
ficulty of national integration and lack of skilled labor once indus-
trialization began in the three nations. 
Response to the labor shortage 
Slave, indentured servant, and Amerind. The shortage of labor 
was a problem faced by all three nations. The response in the colo-
nial era of the U.S. depended in part on the type of land tenure and 
in part on geography. The New Englanders generally had landholdings 
small enough for the individual farmer and his family to maintain; 
therefore, in agriculture and other economic activities (e.g., the 
labor of servants) indentured labor was used. Some indentured labor 
was used in the South where the plantation system predominated but 
heaviest reliance was on African slaves once the slave trade began in 
the seventeenth century (1619). Brazil has always had a labor short-
age first resorting to the enslavement of Amerinds for plantation work; 
when they proved to be "unadaptable" (by continually trying to escape), 
African slaves began to be imported in the sixteenth century and par-
ticularly in the latter half of the century. Although African slaves 
were relatively numerous in Chile at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, they were never imported on a large scale because of the avail-
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ability of Amerinds and mestizos as a labor source. The Chilean slave 
trade soon stopped and those Af=icans who survived the climate (most 
died from diseases such as tuberculosis but numbered an estimated 20,000 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century) were assimilated, thus dis-
appearing as a distinct group. The Chilean labor force originally con-
sisted, therefore, in Amerind slave labor (but definitely not Mapuches) 
and mainly Picunches and Huilliches (who had become extinct by the end 
of the eighteenth century). Under the encomendero system, a conquis-
tador was assigned a specific number of Amerinds (an encomienda) to 
work his land and be house servants for a designated period after which 
they were assigned to someone else. Although the New Laws (1542) had 
prohibited the enslavement of Amerinds, stipulating that they were to 
be paid for their labor, the practice continued in some parts of Chile 
until independence. 
The mestizo. Although amalgamation existed in the colonial U.S. 
among immigrant, Amerind, and African slave, it did not occur to the ex-
tent of developing as large a segment of mixed ancestry as in Brazil and 
Chile. Mestizaje emerged very early in Chile's history and Chile grad-
ually became a mestizo nation. Although the mulatto (Spaniard-African) 
and zambo (African-Amerind) existed, they were by far out-numbered by 
and absorbed into the mestizo (primarily Basque and Andalusian with 
Amerind) segment. Extensive amalgamation also occurred early in Brazil 
but an extremely complex set of distinctions among groups according to 
physical features emerged and continues to exist today. Similar to 
Chile, the basic components were Portuguese, Amerind, and African slave 
resulting in the mesti~o or mameluco (Portuguese-Amerind), mulatto 
(Portuguese-African), and zambo (African-Amerind). In all three na-
tions, those groups of mixed ancestry were found predominantly among 
manual laborers. 
The aristocracy and the creoles: origins 
The aristocracy. The early aristocracy of Brazil consisted pre-
dominantly in the sugar-cane planters, developing to the extent that 
Portuguese "houses" (mansions) of Brazil established branches in Europe. 
The "first aristocracy" in Chile during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries was composed of the encomenderos (conquistadores from Extrema-
dura and Andalusia and their descendants); two factors--their disdain of 
work and too extensive division of property--led to their decline. The 
aristocracy of both Brazil and Chile was defined in part by a disdain 
for manual labor as was true in the southern U.S. However, most colo-
nists in the U.S. had come from middle- and lower-class origins (in 
fact, they came looking for land and work as skilled laborers) and, as 
a result, there was no particular disdain for work or trade. Differences 
in the U.S. in this period tended to be made on the basis of age, sex, 
and ancestry as well as occupation; an aristocracy did emerge, however, 
dominated by English officials, wealthy merchants and bankers, and the 
plantation and estate owners. In none of the three nations has the no-
tion of aristocracy completely disappeared. 
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The creoles. The creole (persons born in the New World of Euro-
pean ancestry), by fact of birth, could hold only minor positions in 
public office, if any at all. The preference in Brazil, Chile, and the 
U.S. shown, respectively, to the Portuguese, Spanish, and English who 
were European-born became a source of discontent and eventually a fac-
tor in the independence of the three nations. 
Education 
In Brazil and Chile, only the elite received an education as was 
generally the case in the southern colonies of the U.S. where more than 
a basic education was received only by children of plantation owners; 
in contrast, the New England colonies gave more emphasis to education. 
Before the turn of the century, Harvard College and the College of 
William and Mary had been founded. However, the elite were most often 
European-educated as was true in Brazil and Chile, an important factor 
in the case of creoles exposed to republican ideas while studying in 
Europe. 
Religion 
The Portuguese Crown originally stated that only Catholics were to 
enter Brazil and particularly after 1591 "aliens" (non-Catholics) were 
excluded; however, there was considerable avoidance in enforcing this 
policy. Portugal itself had been influenced by Africa (one reason why 
it is suggested that "race consciousness" was not as prominent among 
the Portuguese as were religious differences) and, in the end, African 
cults were allowed to exist in Brazil. In addition, Portugal had a 
Semitic population; conversion was forced on Jews in Brazil ("new 
Christians") in order to escape the Inquisition with the result that 
the Inquisition was never introduced in Brazil. In large part, this 
stemmed from the recognition of the important role played by Jews in 
Brazilian commerce. However, the distinction between "old" and "new" 
Christians continued until the late eighteenth century. 
Spain was more rigid in controlling emigration to her territories 
excluding "heretics, Moors, Jews, and their descendants" (Langer, 1972: 
538). The Inquisition was introduced with a tribunal in Lima (which 
would have authority over Chile as part of the Viceroyalty of Peru) 
1570-1571; although some Chileans were taken to Lima, the Inquisition 
had little effect on Chile. 
In the U.S., religious intolerance was one reason for emigration 
from England; it was also a prominent reason for emigration from }~ssa­
chusetts (the 1691 charter gave all non-Catholics religious freedom and 
the right to vote), Thus, while religion was one line of differentia-
tion, intolerance served to stimulate a more rapid formation of new 
colonies in the U.S. 
Provincial autonomy, sectionalism, and government 
intervention in the economy 
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Increasing local autonomy in Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. was 
accompanied by the emergence of politico-economic sectionalism in the 
form of blocs representing specific economic interests, especially in 
Brazil and the U.S. In the case of the U.S., as Hicks et al. (1970:3, 
86-87) indicate, the variation in economic interests of the original 
colonies resulted in different patterns of development; expansion to the 
frontier created additional sectional differences between the hetero-
geneity of frontier society emphasizing equality and individualism in 
contrast to eastern society with its emphasis on distinctions in social 
class and property rights. 
Government intervention in key sectors of the economy later 
reached a climax during the wars for independence of the three nations 
followed by a reaction--to which the already existing sectionalism lent 
strength--against government intervention; this reaction would continue 
until the twentieth century. However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the policies of the colonizing powers created antagonism in 
part because they showed preferential treatment to the economic interests 
of the aristocracy in the U.S. as well as Brazil and Chile. The plan-
tation aristocracy, mainly by policies of non-intervention, was in the 
most favored position. 
The role of private initiative 
Private initiative, with Crown approval, was particularly evident 
in two areas: the land and the frontier. Land was the one natural re-
source that met with a laissez-faire approach by England, Spain, and 
Portugal. It was primarily because of this approach that no conflict 
emerged between the Portuguese Crown and plantation owners in Brazil. 
Similarly, in Chile, the mercedes de tierras, once assigned, could 
either be sold or become hereditary. In Brazil, Chile, and the U.S.--
whether referring to small farms in New England, southern plantations, 
or generally to the majority of the English colonies that had originated 
as proprietary grants of land to individuals by the Crown--it was pri-
vate initiative that developed the land; on the other hand, this con-
tributed in the U.S. to the early emergence of urban and rural land 
speculation that has always been characteristic of the U.S. economy. 
In large part, the most inaccessible regions of the frontier were 
left to the adventurer and the missionary. Religious orders were given 
the responsibility by the Crown of establishing and maintaining Spanish/ 
Portuguese control in the interior and/or on the frontier. This they 
accomplished by establishing missions in Chile (south of the B{o-B£0 
River) and the U.S. (Arizona, Texas, California). The same activities 
were carried out in Portuguese territories. In particular, the Jesuits 
were assigned to Araucanian territory in Chile in 1593, to Amaz3nia in 
Brazil in 1549, and to U.S. territory in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
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The pioneer, adventurer, and outlaw also played an important role. 
The ~aulistas or bandeirantes (descendants of Portuguese who had settled 
in Sao Vicente) began in 1629 to search the Brazilian interior for 
Amerinds (as slaves) and land; although a "law unto themselves" (DeKadt, 
1968:41-46), they are credited with opening up much of the interior of 
Brazil. In 1693, they stopped their slave-raiding activities and began 
searching for gold which they discovered in Minas Gerais shortly before 
the turn of the century. The continually shifting frontier of the U.S. 
depended first on the adventurer and pioneer; later, immigrants were to 
play an important role as settlers as they did in southern Chile and in 
southeastern Brazil. Perhaps also creditable to private initiative 
(but without Crown approval) were the extensive smuggling activities as 
one result of the restrictions placed upon Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. 
by the trade policies of the colonizing nations. 
Boundaries and population concentration 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the population of Chile was 
concentrated in the Central Region although territorial jurisdiction ex-
tended south to include the Patagonia. The Spaniards had encountered 
the Araucanians when they progressed south through the Central Valley 
1540-1553. Although they succeeded in reaching the Straits of Magellan, 
the Indian Wars--beginning with the first general Mapuche uprising in 
1562--forced them to retreat to the north of the B{o-B{o River by 1599. 
Brazil was relatively complete; Maranh~o had not yet been incorporated 
nor had Acre been annexed and Brazilian territory still included the 
Cisplatine Province (present-day Uruguay). The U.S. colonies remained 
limited to the eastern seaboard. The concentration of population in the 
Central Valley of Chile and along the coast in Brazil and the U.S. has 
continued to be the predominant tendency. 
Trends in the Eighteenth Century 
Largely as one consequence of conflict, the international system 
experienced a gradual transition by which the functional linkages char-
acterizing the system were redefined; this was a process that would 
accelerate in subsequent centuries. The linkages of specific groups to 
national systems were also gradually redefined during the eighteenth 
century. 
The International System 
Brazil, the U.S., and, to a lesser degree, Chile continued to be 
involved in European conflicts in the eighteenth century. During the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), the ~rench attacked Braziliar. 
ports and Spain found it increasingly difficult to protect her territory 
in the New World. The U.S. became more closely involved during the 
French and Indian Wars. These and other conflicts contributed to a re-
definition of the international system in the following ways: (1) Eng-
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land became the dominant power when she gained control of the seas as 
one outcome of the eighteenth- and early njneteenth-century European con-
flicts and, seemingly, at that time strengthened her position on the 
American continent with the expulsion of the French after the French and 
Indian Wars and (2) toward the end of the eighteenth century (1790s) 
when England and France went to war, the U.S. remained neutral which was 
the beginning of a policy that, with intermittent reversals, would char-
acterize the U.S., Brazil, and Chile from independence until the twenti-
eth century and would also become one of the bases of inter-American co-
operation. 
The competition among European powers over territory began to 
shift gradually to competition over trade accompanied by a suggestion of 
a shift in the trade relations of Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. Brazilian 
commerce continued to be a monopoly of Portugal until 1808, Chilean cop-
per exports continued to go mainly to Spain and Peru until 1810, and 
England continued to dominate U.S. commerce up to 40-50 years after in-
dependence. However, there were differences such as: (1) the U.S. be-
gan to take the initiative in establishing trade relations after inde-
pendence, e.g., by beginning to trade with China and Russia in the 1780s 
and (2) English influence was growing in Brazil by the end of the eight-
eenth century with England soon having a monopoly on Brazilian trade. 
The European powers inadvertently prepared their colonies for in-
dependence in large part by relaxing their control over their depen-
dencies as seen in the following trends: 
1. Economic restrictions lessened. Brazilian economic activities that 
competed with those of Portugal continued to be restricted but, 
particularly between 1750 and 1777, commerce between the two nations 
was encouraged by removing some restrictions and taxes and by or-
ganizing trading companies. The series of reforms instituted by 
Carlos III 1764-1782 included the opening of some Chilean ports to 
trade with other nations. In the U.S., there had been continual 
disagreement with England after the French and Indian Wars over 
English political and economic controls. England's subsequent view 
of the colonies as a source of revenue principally from taxation 
fed the flames of the conflict over demands for more autonomy. A 
hint of a similar process occurred in Brazil after the U.S. gained 
independence. The Inconfidencia ~lineira (independence movement in 
Minas Gerais) began in 1786. It was desirous of establishing a 
republic as in the U.S. and ended in 1789 when Joaqu~ Jos~de 
Silva Xavier (Tiradentes) led an abortive revolution in Minas Gerais 
in reaction against the gold tax. Tiradentes was executed and be-
came a national hero. Nothing else, however, resulted at this time 
although this movement was a reflection of the continual conflict 
between the miners and the Crown over taxes. 
2. Internal political autonomy continued to increase. In addition, 
creoles in :Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. began obtaining ~ore govern-
ment positions which provided them with some experience, though 
inadequate in most cases, in self-government. 
3. Encouraged by the expulsion of the French and with the assistance 
of France, Spain, and the Netherlands, the U.S. won its War for 
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Independence (1775-1783) which, as previously suggested, encouraged 
both Brazil and Chile. 
4. The Jesuit religious order was expelled from Brazil and Chile, an 
event that at first had an adverse impact on both nations since the 
Jesuits had played an important role in their internal development. 
The sharpest impact was felt in Chile where the land controlled by 
the Jesuits became property of the aristocracy. In addition, there 
was sharp regress in education, agriculture, and other economic 
activities in which Jesuits had predominated. However, it is sug-
gested here thatthis impact was also a force for Brazil and Chile 
to take the initiative of development in these areas. 
National Systems 
Analysis of the redefinition of functional linkages at the na-
tional level during the eighteenth century shows this to be a period 
during which Brazil, Chile, and the U.S~ began to diverge. Chile con-
tinued to experience the same trends as in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. For the U.S., the eighteenth century signified in-
dependence and the groundwork of an 11 industrial revolution." In Brazil, 
the economy's shift to the mining cycle was accompanied by social, 
economic, and political ramifications. 
Impact of the mining cycle in Brazil 
Following the bandeirantes' discovery of gold at the end of the 
seventeenth century, the Brazilian economy entered the mining cycle 
(170D-1775) which further strengthened Brazil's tendency to have an ex-
port economy. Gold (in Minas Gerais) became the major export with the 
diamond rush (1730-1800) in ~linas Gerais and Goi.(s also of importance. 
The components for a change in functional linkages were mainly the 
following: 
1. One result of the mining boom was a massive population exodus from 
the sugar-cane area in the Northeast to the mining area in the south-
central region 
2. A second result was the first large influx of Portuguese immigrants 
(this had not occurred earlier because sugar-cane plantations re-
quired a much greater capital investment than mining) 
3. Lastly, it was in the mining area that Brazil experienced its first 
real "urban boom" 
The redefinition of functional linkages in Brazil occurred in the 
following: 
1. The mining cycle with the concomitant shift of the economic, popu-
lation, and urban center from the Northeast to the South signalled: 
(a) the beginning of the decline of the politico-economic power of 
the sugar plantation aristocracy although in this century they re-
mained prominent, (b) one basis of the twentieth-century problem of 
the Northeast (the most critically poor region of Brazil), and 
(c) increasing conflict between miners and the Portuguese Crown 
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(v.1hich exacted a "royal fifth" of all m1.n1ng products) contributing 
to eventual independence (recalling that the sugar plantation own-
ers were not in conflict with the Crown, their lesser role in the 
independence movement added to their decline) 
2. The influx of Portuguese (accustomed, as already discussed, to 
African and Semitic populations), the mining cycle (with an empha-
sis on individualism), and the decline in sugar plantations (with 
less emphasis on the need for slave labor) can be suggested as 
contributing to the following events in the process of redefining 
the lines of differentiation between certain groups within Brazil: 
(a) marriages with Amerinds were officially recognized (1755), 
(b) distinctions between "old" and "new11 Christians ended (1773), 
and (c) particularly between 1750 and 1777 there was a strong move-
ment advocating 11 racial equality" 
Continuation of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
trends in Chile 
Chile in the eighteenth century was still an agricultural nation 
with an export economy that relied on the mining sector (mainly copper) 
as well as agriculture (especially wheat exports to Peru). The con-
tinuing trends from previous centuries that predominated during the 
eighteenth century were related to mestizaje and the aristocracy. Al-
though Chile increased contact with other nations after Spain had eased 
trade restrictions, the relative geographic isolation was the major fac-
tor in the process of Chile becoming a mestizo nation. Events of the 
eighteenth century directly or indirectly contributing to this process 
were: 
1. The Chilean population remained concentrated in the Central Region. 
2. There were five epidemics in the eighteenth century (in 1743, two 
in 1774, 1779, and 1793) of which those in 1774 have been identi-
fied as typhoid and typhus and that in 1793 as smallpox (Mattelart, 
1964:309). These epidemics were probably of more serious propor-
tions because of the population concentration but, in turn, it can 
be suggested that, by reducing the population, they probably con-
tributed to more extensive amalgamation. 
3. A few Swiss, English, Polish, French, Italian, Portuguese, and 
Irish immigrants began arriving after 1700 but immigration con-
tinued to be at an extremely low rate and, it follows, did not in-
troduce persons of European ancestry in significant numbers. Addi-
tionally, the history of Basque immigration to Chile shows it to 
have been most significant in the eighteenth century; Basques were 
one of the basic elements in the formation of the mestizo group. 
Not only did the mestizo population increase but mestizos also be-
came functionally linked to the economic system as a major source of 
(manual) labor. Encomiendas were abolished i~ 1791 by the Crown because 
of abuses to Amerinds under this system. Although the practice con-
tinued in some parts of Chile until independence, encomiendas were in 
their majority.replaced by inquilinos (mestizo laborers)--a practice 
that continues in the twentieth century. Lastly, Basque immigration 
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also played a role in the emergence of a new (Castilian-Basque) aris-
tocracy in the eighteenth century which replaced the old aristocracy of 
conquistadores from Extremadura and Andalusia and their descendants. 
Bases for changes in functional linkages in the U.S. 
Some of the events in the eighteenth-century U.S. that primarily 
laid the groundwork for post-eighteenth-century changes in functional 
linkages were as follows: 
1. The increase in population by immigration and a high birth rate both 
contributed to a large supply of labor (but a scarcity of skilled 
labor towards the end of the century) and increased the demand for 
land resulting, in turn, in an increase in land prices. 
2. The War for Independence sparked the growth of large-scale, capi-
talistic business and further speculation. 
3. Speculation and the lack of expanding national and foreign markets 
led to a commercial "slump" that began in 1783. As already stated, 
the confederation system of government failed largely because of 
financial difficulties. 
4. The federal system of government was based on a constitution that 
specifically recognized the rights of individuals although the right 
to vote was still limited to "white adult male property owners" 
(Fite and Reese, 1973:44). Contributing to the maintenance of dis-
tinctions among groups on the basis of ancestry was the continuation 
of slavery and of immigration predominantly from northern Europe; 
the greatest influx of immigrants in the eighteenth century were 
Germans (beginning in 1683 with the founding of Germantown, Pennsyl-
vania) and Scotch-Irish. 
5. The western farm politico-economic bloc emerged as one consequence 
of westward expansion. At the time of the War for Independence, the 
merchants of eastern port towns were dominant economically and often 
politically. However, the U.S. still had a predominantly export 
economy dependent on agriculture. The feudalistic type of land 
tenure system in the formerly French-controlled territory was elimi-
nated after independence. The Mississippi River trade particularly 
benefited agriculture in the "West" which became a region of "free 
farmers" opposed to slavery and the plantation system that, in the 
next century, would become a third sectionalistic bloc. By the end 
of the eighteenth century, the sectionalist conflict between the 
eastern aristocracy and the "western" farmers had come into sharp 
focus. 
6. Westward expansion was also accompanied by the expansion of the 
"urban" system eventually linked by transportation and communications 
systems that would, in turn, serve as a link between the populations 
in different sections of the nation. Although a road system joined 
settlements in New England by 1740, land transportation was more ex-
pensive tha:a by wate:: so the more important eettlements of the eight-
eenth century were built near navigable rivers or the ocean. 
In 1791, the factory system began with the use of power-driven 
machinery for spinning cotton--the beginning of the Industrial Revolution 
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in the United States--and, in 1793, the cotton gin was invented. These 
-:::'-'!0 ir.novations, in combination with the above trends during the eight-
eenth century, would come to have an impact on the redefinition of func-
tional linkages within the U.S. in the nineteenth century. 
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.250 .lll -.110 .236 -.002 
=o; .160 • 004 .... :sa .126 -.142 
00: 
. 792 ,il.'l1 .451 .291 .445 .499 
liN lo: • 705 .179 -.058 .393 .137 .<99 
20: • 703 .074 -.234 .32~ .041 .472 
co: 
.472 • 574 . 784 .499 .716 .452 .396 
reo 1~: .155 • 575 .513 .718 .603 .440 .151 
.zO: 
-.260 • 399 .350 .533 .:.16 .396 .005 
00: 
.547 .55! . 631 .350 .554 .522 .638 .818 
!SE lo: .312 . 383 .JZO .456 .J.r.o .520 .304 .643 
2-': .144 .247 .144 .303 .189 .483 .238 .563 
0;,: 
.21! -.027 
-. 005 .178 -.002 .187 .114 .080 .l23 
!'OR 10: .339 .040 .127 .183 .079 .227 .312 .280 .302 
zo: .266 -.080 .003 .052 -.045 .186 • .173 .183 -~41 
.!iZQ 
oo: • 787 
ING .c. . 590 io; 
. 3lB 
Do: 
.829 .870 
COG 10: .519 . 768 
zo: 
.442 • 71.2 
oo: .519 • 779 .575 
AGG !,J: • .:.sa . 796 .559 
20: 
.263 • 789 .492 
00: 
. 789 .~6 .. • 930 . 794 
SEC ,: . • .517 . 940 .857 .853 ;o; 
.413 • 932 .841 .850 
ao: 
.314 . 333 . 4o9 ,441 .456 
IAG t.:l, .Jl2 .!86 .353 . 381 .355 :o; 
-.165 .OJ7 .249 .147 .225 
o": . i4S .532 .658 • .i.75 .592 .463 
:n1 10: .51.:. • .213 .343 .377 .268 .365 
:O: 
.248 -.036 .187 -.082 .014 .057 
CQ: 
.593 .421 . 69Z .281 .!2:3 .566 .651 
!CO !0: .354 .140 • s.:.1 .h9 .266 .500 .303 
Z"': .165 -.009 • .:.82 -.159 .127 .371 • .298 
00: .!57 -.0!7 -.007 -.094 -.044 -.315 .035 .152 
!S£ 10: .097 -.126 -.169 -.141 -.188 -.374 -.055 .104 
2.:1: 
.150 -. Jl5 -.158 -.131 -.178 -.391 -.017 .146 
oo: .036 -.055 -.069 .169 -.058 .013 .:a2 .103 .025 
POR 10: .342 .085 .123 .243 .!03 . 075 .523 .2.3.4 .().19 
20: 
.159 -.066 -.009 -. 014 -.06! -.152 .Ji66 .036 .083 
~on: N•25. DF•Z3 for z:ero-orQer correlations. 22 lor f1rsr.-ord.er 
and 21 for second-oraer partials. 1)~.;)5 for zero-order aud. firn-order 
of a< least. = ..:.oo and for .ncond.-order of =.410. P!~•laoor ,. illdustry; 
!.NG-eoatr:!.butions ot in.d.u.str, to c.~.P .• COG-eontribl.ltion.a of co~~~~~eree co 
C.N.?.; A.GG-"!ontr1but1ons of agriculture co ~.~.P.; S!G-contributiona oi 
aet"V'ices to c.~.P.; l..\(;•1ncome 1.11 agriculture; UN•tncama 
'" 
iaciustt"'J~ 
ICo-incaae in c011111erce; ZS£•1ncome in services; POI.•porta. 
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!ABU: 39 
ZERO-ORDER, FIRST-QRilER (BY RURJJ.-UMAi'i' RESIDDICE) PARTIAL AND 
SECONI>-ORil~ (BY RlJRAL-'.,~"R.BAN RESIDE!<CE AND ET!I!IICITY) 
PAB.TUI. COIU!.EU.!IONS AMONG I.NDliS'nLU.-!CONOMIC 
VA&LUILS: CIUU:, 1960 AND 1S70 
PL~ INC COG AGG SEC L\G !IN reo IS£ 
~ 
ao: . i84 
t~G 10 ~ . 705 
2~: • 702 
co: 
.674 .773 
COG lCI: .368 • 695 
20: 
.374 • 709 
OJ: 
-.•17 -. ;97 -.204 
= 
l;J: 
-.290 -.292 .035 
z"': -.295 -.301 .037 
o"': .652 .829 . 933 -.174 
SEG lo: .349 .779 .869 .065 
2"': .341 .171.+ .887 .059 
00: 
-.014 -.185 . 028 .218 .041 
L\G 1": -.005 -.203 .056 .225 .Oi2 
20: 
-.006 -.207 .OSi .2::.1 .070 
00: 
. 587 .531 .563 -.088 .601 -.140 
I!N 1"': .::.16 .319 .liZ .168 .270 -.173 
2"': .249 .308 .l79 .165 .258 -.176 
oo: 
.537 .420 .ns -.299 .508 .189 .285 
ICC 1"': .305 .228 .607 -.169 .254 .229 -.076 
20: 
.358 .Z96 .630 -.164 .328 .249 -.041 
o": .637 .559 .730 -.353 • 757 .194 .538 .532 
tSE lo! .213 .320 .368 -.174 .469 .349 .017 .240 
2"': .205 .309 .376 -.180 .~60 .350 .005 .300 
00: 
.360 .143 .213 -.043 .109 .313 .015 .157 .llJ 
POR 10: .329 .064 .lZJ .014 -.020 .321 -.ll9 .113 -.054 
ZO: .319 .037 .136 .005 -.052 .325 -.165 .200 -.080 
~ 
00: • 788 
ING zo: . 704 
20: 
.693 
00: 
.657 .772 
COG lO: .438 .678 
zo: 
. 441 .682 
00; -.~40 -.378 -.202 
AGG 10: -.207 -.198 .038 
2"': -.229 -.Zll .036 
0": • 6<.8 .s:n . 909 -.182 
SEG 1"': .459 .no .875 .045 
20: .429 . 762 .889 .031 
00: 
.532 .518 0 766 .036 .664 
L\G 1::1: .313 .363 .693 .285 .562 
;"': .307 .358 • 692 .282 .563 
oo: • 755 • 700 .675 -.152 • 732 • 757 
r:N 10: .493 .54. .496 .198 .608 .683 
20: ... si .524 .507 .187 .582 .697 
co: 
-'-92 .41'" .722 -.244 .481 .549 .358 
reo l"': . .:.as .339 . 719 •.ISS .421 .502 .259 
2"': .567 .394 • 748 -.144 .496 .531 .)50 
c"': .666 .562 .731 -.~38 . 167 .629 . 771 .520 
ISE 10: .376 .351 .599 -.llO .667 .:.96 .613 .475 
20: .346 .J27 .604 -.Ui .650 .494 .591 .;47 
00: .J!.j .142 • .::17 -.004 .097 .291 .190 .186 .115 
?01. lo: .202 .014 .102 .112 -.034 .207 .036 .132 -.044 
20: 
.161 -.022 .096 .101 -.oes .199 -.021 .186 -.091 
NOTl!: .. 25. DF•lJ for zero-orcier, 
" 
for first-order ... 21 for 
second-order eorrela:iora. p<.o5 for zero-order . .. firn-order of at 
lea.•t ::- . .:.oo aa.d for •.c.ond-order of :-. HO. PIN• labor 1n indu.a:ry; ING-
.:ontributions of ind.ustr;: to G.S .. P.; COG-eontrtbu.tioa.• of eommeree to 
G.~.P.; AGG-contr1but1Qn$ oi agr1culture to C.S.P.; StG-eontr1but1ons 
oi services to G.N.P,; L\G-ineame i:J. .agriculture.; :IN• income in ina us-
t:-'f; :co·t.~eoce in :Ol!Df';r~~t; :S!•inc.cmll!: 1~ services; '?CR~rts.. 
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TAJ!U: 100 
ZERO-ORDER. F!RST-oRD£R (BY atilW.-IIIW.N RESIDENCE) PARTLII. /Jill 
SECClill-ORDEit (BY RURAL-URBAN ll.Sli>ENCE .U."D !'l'HNICI7Y) 
P ARTIA:. COIWJ..ATIONS AMONG !NllCSTRLII.-ECONOMIC 
VAI.IAZLES: UNITED STATES • 1960 A.'ill 1970 
PIN !.~G COG AGG SEG lAG ITN reo IS£ 
lliQ 
o"' .484 
INC lo: .389 
zo:>: • .384 
00: 
.275 .880 
COG 10! .IJ1 .833 
:0: 
.l:z7 .832 
00: 
-.232 .353 . 391 
= 
to: 
-.)06 . 318 .)62 
.:Zo: 
-.328 .J:o .)59 
00: 
.253 .866 .981 .400 
SEG l.::r: .106 .812 • 974 .J7J 
::O: 
.101 .au: . 974 .370 
00: 
-.021 .073 .062 -.026 .096 
lAG .c. -.102 -.062 -.070 -.067 -.028 io; 
-.133 -.084 -.085 -.107 -.042 
ao: 
.081 .JIB .l.84 .246 .!96 .493 
IL~ !0: .004 .:28 .060 .215 .083 .463 
20: 
-.069 .221 .048 .158 .066 .01! 
00: 
.)75 .452 .397 -.032 .374 .422 .498 
reo 10: . 264 .303 .231 -.llO .209 .370 .450 
20: 
.:7! .295 .233 -.138 .204 .)46 .441 
00: 
.284 .557 .543 .057 .576 .562 .595 .738 
ISE 10: .148 .388 . 376 -.032 .422 .532 .564 .576 
zo: 
.lll .)83 .379 -.082 .426 .497 .500 .667 
00: 
.149 .461 .513 .l·:.l .524 .320 .041 .256 .373 
POR 10: .034 .332 .402 .305 .417 .260 -.054 .126 .no 
2c: 
.06l. .362 .426 .353 .44! .332 .093 .!70 .324 
~ 
Co: 
.380 
!.~G t"': . 460 
2~: 
.460 
00: 
.143 .884 
COG lo: .203 .859 
20: 
.201 .859 
O;l: 
-.001 .498 .458 
= lo: .0!2 .:.a7 .~4 
.:zo: .Oli .489 .448 
00: 
.079 .830 . 971 .440 
s;:G l'): .!)6 . 793 . 964 .425 
z->: .132 • ~94 . 965 .432 
oo: 
-.470 .017 .065 -.121 .096 
lAL 10: ---63 -.092 -.04.:. -.163 -.015 
:o: 
-.460 -.091 -.037 -.183 -.002 
00: 
-.070 .426 .360 .125 .340 .521 
IIN 10: -.035 .;o8 .220 .072 .186 .476 
:,;) : 
-.0!2 .331 .246 .052 .219 .oJ8 
00: 
.114 • .0.66 .436 -.024 .396 .425 .73: 
!CO .o. .154 .)84 .J:.6 -.071; .293 .3i7 .093 io; 
• !..S4 .)85 .J46 -.076 .294 .385 . 733 
Oo: 
-.!.:01 .408 .465 -.043 .<9Z .468 .468 .665 
lSE 10: -.112 .. 278 .J4l -.119 .365 .415 .348 .613 
:20: 
-.114 .2.78 .)40 -.117 .364 .431 .378 .614 
00: 
-.002 .486 .328 .)80 .554 .320 .268 .344 .369 
?OR ~ 0: .026 .41i .40.:. .)57 ,491 .Z67 .164 .272 .::76 
2'': .010 .426 .~70 .386 .492 .337 .266 .281 .278 
~OTE' s•5G. :n*4a for aero-onter, 47 for f1rat-ord.er aDd 46 for 
second-order cona.lationa. ? <.. 05 for zero-.)rcier and first-order cor-
relaeioaa of at la.ut '!', 280 and. for seeoaa-ord.er c:onelatiou ot =.290. 
PIN•l.&bor in indu.stry; tNG-ecm~ributions of ind.ustry to v.~.l'.; COG-
c:ontribu.tiona of c~ree to (;.::.?.; :\GG-cont:ibutions of agrie1.1lture 
to G.N.P.; SEG-contribu.;iona cf servicas to G.:i.P.; aG•iacam.e in a.gri-
c:W.ture; I:N•incoae ;n 1nauar.ry; ::co-1.ncome 1n eDIIIIIleree; ISE•ineace U1 
services; ?OR~orts. 
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!ABLE 41 
ZER~ORDER, FIRS7 -ORDER (BY IUJB.Al.-llUAN U.SIDENCE) P Alt'!L\L AND 
SECOND-ORDER (BY RGRAL-iJRBAN P.ESIDE~CE AW,J t'I'HNIC!'l"Y) PARTIAl. 
CORBr...A!IONS AMONG INDUSTRLU.-ECONOMIC VARWU:S, 3RAZI~. 
CF!U, AND lTNin.D STATES, 190U AND L~iO 
PI!< !NG COG AGV SEG lWJ lAG !IN ICO ISt 
illQ 
ING 
O": .320 
10: .144 
zo: 
.150 
COG 
oo: 
.313 • 79i 
10: 
.009 • 763 
zo: .067 • 771 
AGG 
0°:-.2.13 .601 .308 
1°:-.166 .713 .466 
zc:- .170 .713 ... 67 
SEC 
0.,: 
.lU . 919 .877 .663 
1°:-.078 .906 .869 . i76 
:z.o:- .037 • 914 .867 .778 
lWJ 
0.;): 
.538 -.093 -.084 -.396 -.233 
10: .496 -.208 -.274 -.377 -.361 
zo: 
.317 -.382 -.297 -.6U -.472 
lAC 
oo: 
.395 -.039 -.059 -.269 -.151 .818 
,o . 
. 310 -.1!5 -.~56 -.244 -.277 .805 io; 
.009 -.256 -.246 -.3 .. -.298 .496 
I!..'\': 
oc: 
.!33 -.026 -.035 -.346 -.173 .965 .868 
10: .40S -.157 -.251 
-. 323 -.319 .963 .557 
:0: 
.454 -.332 -.279 -.590 -.440 .888 .619 
reo 
co: .533 -.017 -.012 -.33i -.156 . 971 .861 .971 
1": •• 64 -.146 -.Zll -.314 -.299 .969 .850 .96ll 
2": . 254 -.299 -.:15 -.551 -.389 • •o6 .600 .885 
ISE 
oo: .508 .015 .027 -.313 -.108 .948 .885 .967 .981 
10: ... 22 
-.liS -.186 -.287 -.255 • 946 .Si6 . 964 .980 
20: 
.162 ... 255 .... 11.9 -.518 -.314 .829 .675 .862 .927 
POR 
oc: .198 .174 .319 .046 .206 .082 .221 .092 .128 .166 
10: .103 .106 .251 .076 .143 .033 .177 .033 .072 .109 
.zo: .107 .106 .255 .077 .145 .038 .256 ,043 .ll6 .191 
.!ill 
INC 
oo: 
.•sz 
10: 
.381 
zo: .345 
COG 
oo: 
. 361 .823 
ro: .270 . 763 
zo: 
.171 • 755 
oiGG 
0°:-.090 .614 .432 
! 0 :-.150 .bOB .394 
:0: 0 :-.149 . 62! . .+20 
S!C: 
oo: .297 .e9l . 936 .614 
10: 
.188 .853 .913 .615 
zo: 
.134 .849 . 915 .626 
!WI 
0.:1: .-+68 -.175 -.096 -.1.30 -.206 
10: 
.022 -.002 .102 -.394 -.028 
:o: .OS! -.24-+ -.189 -.612 -.255 
IAG 
o": .237 -.044 .047 -.243 -.029 .699 
10: 
.:75 .006 .liS -.Z29 .028 .712 
:
0
:-.G76 -.15~ -.084 -.272 -.098 .385 
!L' 
:10: 
.!02 -.092 -.OOi -.405 -.120 .965 .770 
10: 
.600 .Cl4 .130 -.377 .001 .970 . 771 
20: .406 -.198 -.139 -.582 -.Z04 .915 .521 
ICO 
oo: .450 -.liZ .001 -.395 -.129 .964 • 758 .970 
!0: .Si6 .043 .186 -.360 .036 .962 . 767 •• 70 
20: 
.361 -.173 •.047 -.567 -.150 .889 .507 .914 
ISt 
00: .334 -.125 .005 -.364 ... liZ .920 . 750 .91Z .956 
10: .4.+6 .022 .185 -. 327 .050 . 913 .757 . 907 .951 
2,:): 
.!00 -.213 -.051 -.Sl4 -.127 .744 .483 • 72.1 .654 
POR 
QO: .069 .132 .258 .070 .236 .053 .241 .113 .126 . :51 
~~: .033 .075 .z:n .045 .194 .109 .258 .149 .179 .201 
2°:-.02.2 .057 • .200 . 050 .161 .034 .251 .10.3 .155 .195 
yon, ~-100. 01•98 for z:ero-ord.er, 97 for Urst-orOer and 96 for 
secona-ord.er eorrelation.s. .~.05 for z:ero-orcter and i:Lrst-ot'cer eorre-
l&tions of at le.ut -:.196 aud :or second.-ord.er partUls of at lust z.us. 
H!'ol•l.aoor u J.nci\l:;;;try; :DIC•c=c:t".:.tnc:::.c-~s ct- J.ndust.t""t' to G.N.P.; COG-
contributi~ns of co11114ree to G • .:t.?.; AGG-contribut:.on.s of agric:uJ.ture to 
G.~.P.; StG-eontributions of sernc:u toG.N.P.; R.AD-Y"a.iios per c:ap1.ca; 
rAC-111COUIIt in a.griculture; !I!-i•itlCOG:IIt in ind.uatrr: !CO•tnccme in eom-
merce; !SE•illeome in servt.ces; POR-?oru. 
TABLE 42 
ZERO-ORDER, FIRST-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE) PARTIAL AND SECOND-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE AND ETHNICITY) PARTIAL CORRELATIONS AMONG SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES: 
VOT 
.094 
.083 
-.157 
.416 
.610 
.258 
.301 
.344 
.087 
-.232 
-.247 
.153 
.080 
.068 
-. 377 
PRI 
.375 
.047 
-.355 
-.034 
-.428 
-.688 
-.529 
-.382 
-.255 
.733 
.650 
.596 
1960 
SND 
.830 
.720 
.653 
-.671 
-.477 
-.067 
.689 
.383 
-.049 
COL 
-.394 
-.103 
.212 
.370 
-.036 
-.365 
BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
ILL 
-.674 
-.506 
-.300 
VOT 
.231 
.134 
.063 
.438 
.171 
.026 
.418 
.202 
.072 
-.337 
-.110 
.083 
.282 
-.024 
-.172 
PRI 
.503 
.544 
.521 
-.148 
-.467 
-.568 
-.445 
-.366 
-.324 
.477 
.420 
.390 
SND 
1970 
.675 
.256 
.159 
-.690 
-.396 
-.293 
.761 
.418 
.352 
COL 
-.335 
.140 
.324 
ILL 
• 360 -. 756 
-.232 -.572 
-.364 -.517 
NOTE: N=25. DF=23 for zero-order correlations, 22 for first-order and 21 for second-order par-
tials. p~.OS for zero-order and first-order partial correlations of at least ~.400 and second-order 
partials of ~.410. VOT=voter registratl.on; PRI=primary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher 
education; ILL=illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
w 
0 
~ 
TABLE 43 
ZERO-ORDER, FIRST-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE) PARTIAL AND SECOND-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE AND ETHNICITY) PARTIAL CORRELATIONS Al10NG SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES: 
CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT PRI SND COL ILL VOT PRI SND COL lLL 
1960 1970 
00: 
-.122 00: -.314 
PRI 10: -.057 PRI 10: -.274 
20: 
-.041 20: -.269 
oo: 
.687 -.131 ao: .557 -.173 
SND 10: .434 -.042 SND 10: .440 -.078 
20: 
.456 -.065 20: .444 -.086 
00: 
.233 -.094 . 561 00: .077 -.172 .454 
COL 10: -.183 -.022 .130 COL 10: -.156 -.099 .143 
20: 
-.182 -.026 .128 zo: -.159 -.094 .145 
00: 
-.803 .101 -. 716 -.430 00: -.469 .526 -.644 -.433 
ILL 10: -.684 -.002 -.109 .100 ILL 10: -.303 .594 -.282 -.089 
20: 
-.680 -.023 -.128 .098 2o: -.297 .582 -.297 -.082 
00: 
.313 .388 .004 -.026 -.186 00: .181 .117 -.168 -.024 -. 185 
SSE 10: .326 .404 -.132 -.098 -.196 SSE 10: .142 .143 -.368 -.112 -.128 
20: 
.311 .463 -.103 -.095 -.173 20: .131 .186 -.369 -.126 -.083 
NOTE: N=25. DF=23 for zero-order correlations, 22 for first-order and 21 for second-order par-
tials. p~.05 for zero-order correlations and first-order partials of at least ±.400 and for second-
order partia~ of ±.410. VOT=voter registration; PRI=primary education; SND=secondary education; COL= w 
0 higher education; ILL=illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. \..n 
TABLE 44 
ZERO-ORDER, FIRST-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE) PARTIAL AND SECOND-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE AND ETHNICITY) PARTIAL CORRELATIONS AJfONG SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES: 
UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT PRI SND COL ILL VOT PRI SND COL ILL 
1960 1970 
00: 
-. 151 00: -.000 
PRI 10: -.075 PRI 10: .009 
20: 
-.068 20: .009 
00: 
.194 .187 00: .141 .105 
SND 10: .350 .086 SND 10: .154 .086 
20: 
.347 .122 2o: .154 .087 
00: 
.093 -.340 .088 00: . 073 -.197 .036 
COL 10: -.054 -.242 .340 COL 10: .050 -.159 .106 
20: 
-.084 -.174 .304 20: .051 -.144 .107 
00: 
-.021 .241 -.057 -.480 00: .044 -.039 -.115 -.497 
ILL 10: .013 .218 -.112 -.486 ILL 10: .053 -.057 -.137 -.490 
20: 
.075 .105 .020 -.221 20: .084 -.151 -.180 -.351 
00: 
.513 -.106 -.119 .135 -.069 00: .347 -.220 -.459 .037 -.077 
SSE 10: .443 .076 .145 -.202 -.000 SSE 10: .358 -.178 -.444 -.183 -.019 
20: 
.442 .112 .122 -.319 .206 20: .360 -.172 -.449 -.245 .094 
NOTE: N=50. DF=48 for zero-order correlations, 47 for first-order and 46 for second-order par-
tials. p~.05 for zero-order and first-order partial correlations of at least ±.280 and for second-
order partials of ~.290. VOT=voter registration; PRI=primary education; SND=secondary education; COL= w 0 
higher education; ILL=illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. "' 
TABLE q5 
ZERO-ORDER, FIRST-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE) PARTIAL AND SECOND-ORDER (BY RURAL-URBAN 
RESIDENCE AND ETHNICITY) PARTIAL CORRELATIONS AMONG SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES: 
BRAZIL, CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT PRI SND COL ILL VOT PRI SND COL ILL 
1960 1970 
00: 
-.300 oo: .027 
PRI 10: -.336 PRI 10: .011 
20: 
-.319 20: .017 
00: 
-.204 .818 00: -.?.42 .264 
SND 10: -. 271 .815 SND 10: -.182 .297 
20: 
-.274 .792 20: -.050 .457 
00: 
-.181 .615 .878 00: -.271 .189 .903 
COL 10: -.253 .594 .859 COL 10: -.227 .210 .898 
2o: 
-.281 .426 . 656 20: -.125 .326 .705 
00: 
.185 -. 774 -.847 -.718 00: .145 -.537 -. 774 -.754 
ILL 10: .279 -. 784 -.823 -.657 ILL 10: .157 -.537 -.819 -.782 
2o: 
.260 -.715 -.719 -.388 2o: .040 -.696 -.636 -.547 
00: 
-.024 .759 .719 .589 -.793 00: .051 .564 .502 .525 -. 778 
SSE 10: -.091 .761 .669 .502 -.738 SSE 10: .006 .562 .591 .592 -.786 
20: 
-.047 .708 .596 .320 -.675 2o: .110 .622 .405 .408 -. 719 
NOTE: N=100. DF=98 for zero-order correlations, 97 for first-order and 96 for second-order par-
tials. p~.05 for zero-order and first-order partial correlations of at least ~.196 and for second-
order partials of ±.198. VOT=voter registration; PRI=primary education; SND=secondary education; COL= w 0 
higher education; ILL=illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. '-1 
TABLE 46 
ZERD-ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL-ECONOMIC AND 
CO~TROL VARIABLES, 1960 AND 1970 
PIN 
POP 
T1: .517 
r,: .826 
ETR 
r 1:-.5o6 To:-.586 
POP 
r 1 : .675 
r2: . 785 
ETH 
ING 
.441 
.645 
COG 
.676 
.782 
AGG 
. 019 
.312 
-.482 -.480 -.635 
-.485 -.479 -.643 
.489 
.535 
.718 -.317 
.547 -.423 
SEG RAD 
A.· Brazil 
.491 
.706 
-.505 
-.511 
B. Chile 
. 689 
.514 
r 1:-.222 -.232 -.137 
Tz:-.275 -.236 -.121 
.034 -.267 
.013 -.276 
lAG 
.219 
.307 
-.239 
-.526 
-.015 
.458 
!IN 
.711 
• 629 
-.244 
-.752 
.658 
.674 
-.010 -.236 
-.132 -.331 
C. United States 
POP 
T1: .320 .545 .526 
r 2:-.092 .408 .429 
ETH 
r 1:-.115 -.088 -.063 
T2: .o7o .012 .029 
.166 
.142 
-.155 
-.070 
.524 
.452 
-.064 
.052 
.229 .243 
.243 .1.18 
-.238 -.554 
-.213 -.303 
D. Brazil, Chile, and United States 
POP 
r 1: .554 
r 2 : .268 
ETH 
T1:-.445 
r 2:-.363 
.378 
.496 
-.093 
.004 
.554 
.510 
-.013 
-.061 
-.137 
.194 
. 053 
.097 
.370 
.532 
.248 
-.349 
.263 .295 
-.100 -.228 
.022 -.825 -.770 -.865 
.038 -.826 -.670 -.817 
ICO 
.737 
.510 
-.499 
-.549 
.507 
.257 
ISE 
.675 
.124 
-.350 
.007 
.805 
.612 
POR 
-.145 
-.185 
-.205 
-. 313 
.180 
.244 
.168 -.257 -.238 
.169 -.266 -.238 
.402 
.329 
-. 162 
-.004 
.295 
-.297 
-.854 
-.833 
.5oe 
.440 
-.279 
.021 
.371 
.300 
.200 
.226 
.315 .205 
-.289 .136 
-.863 -.056 
-.836 -.063 
NOTE: T1•1960; Tz•1970. Zero-order correlations between rural-urban resi-
dence and ethnicity in 1960 and 1970, respectively, are -.110 and -.387 far 
Brazil, -.237 and -.170 far Chile, -.037 and -.002 far the U.S., and -.212 and 
.298 for the combined cases. ETH•ethnicity; POP•rural-urban residence; PIN•labar 
in industry; ING•cantributians of industry to G.N.P.; COG-contributions of com-
merce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributians of agriculture to G.N.P.; SEG•cantribations of 
services to G.N.P.; RAD-radios per capita; lAG-income in agriculture; !IN•income 
in industry; ICO•income in commerce; ISE=income in services; POR•ports. 
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TABLE 47 
ST~IDARDIZED REGP~SSION COEFFICIENTS: 
BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
Socio-Political Variables 
VOT PRI SND COL ILL 
1960 
-.243 .628 -.129 -.146 -. 272 
-.514 -.541 -.337 -.193 1.150 
-1.035 -1.014 .126 2.430 -.627 
-.675 .121 -.531 .289 .087 
1.872 1.156 .921 -1.847 -.859 
-.008 .475 -.130 -.469 -.807 
-.186 -.260 .280 .573 .129 
-.203 .114 .307 -.046 
.304 -.339 .272 .159 -.015 
-.113 .105 -.009 -.170 . 037 
.936 -.019 -.648 .085 
-.932 -.151 -.429 -.051 . 095 
1970 
-.291 .861 .845 -.160 -.090 
.367 -.569 -.539 -.484 
.713 -1.003 .570 1.822 .490 
.474 .404 .487 .398 -.242 
-1.499 .374 -.588 -1.076 -.220 
.198 -.083 .039 .183 .310 
-.185 .248 .212 -.060 -.717 
-.109 . 048 -.024 -.030 -.101 
-.042 .299 .046 -.163 -.148 
. 085 -.072 -.033 .112 -.101 
.748 .170 .289 .357 -.341 
-.410 .143 .291 -.025 -.138 
309 
SSE 
.906 
-.220 
-.041 
-.187 
.362 
.137 
-.112 
.125 
.074 
.033 
.049 
.036 
.928 
.147 
-1.334 
-.253 
.633 
-.123 
.180 
.323 
-.149 
.260 
.416 
.163 
NOTE: See tables 2, 8, 14, 20, 26, and 32 in text for order in 
which variables were entered into the equations. PIN=labor in industry; 
ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce 
to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of 
agriculture to G.N.P.; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in indus-
try; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; POR=ports; POP= 
rural-urban residence; ETH=ethnicity; VOT=votEr registr~tion; PRI=pri-
mary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher education; ILL= 
illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 48 
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: BRAZIL, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT 
13.189 
15.205 
14.833 
14.255 
14.684 
13.878 
13.552 
13.366 
13.223 
13.356 
9.753 
12.004 
11.294 
11.615 
10.962 
9.951 
10.673 
10.175 
12.483 
10.417 
9.797 
9.969 
Socio-Political Variables 
PRI 
5.853 
5.136 
5.069 
5.044 
5.374 
5.395 
5.264 
5.908 
5.251 
5.530 
5.015 
5.718 
7. 720 
6.850 
6.780 
7.423 
6.850 
7.019 
6.792 
8.236 
8.052 
7.209 
7.660 
7.917 
SND 
1960 
.730 
1.125 
1. 429 
.811 
.741 
.818 
.806 
.744 
1.206 
.774 
.844 
.986 
1970 
2.329 
2.090 
1.582 
1.644 
1. 784 
1. 718 
1.698 
1.787 
1.620 
1.663 
1.704 
1.646 
COL 
.287 
.328 
.452 
.307 
.296 
. 311 
.294 
.280 
.301 
.305 
.289 
.322 
.296 
.354 
.460 
.302 
.304 
.313 
.312 
.325 
.301 
.292 
.294 
.293 
ILL 
4.679 
5.255 
6.111 
4.891 
4.591 
8.655 
4.623 
5.453 
5.059 
4.740 
5.245 
4.801 
7.256 
6.828 
6.987 
7.750 
7.545 
8.498 
7.481 
7.258 
6.917 
6.838 
7.054 
SSE 
4.385 
3.103 
2.930 
3.021 
3.050 
3.068 
3.170 
2.914 
3.396 
2.973 
3.170 
3.284 
10.698 
8.063 
9.352 
8.466 
8.692 
8.175 
7.985 
8.082 
8.083 
8.945 
7.978 
8.031 
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NOTE: See tables 2, 8, 14, 20, 26, and 32 in text for N, SSres' and 
order in which variables were entered into the equations. PIN=labor in 
industry; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of 
commerce to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; SEG=con-
tributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income 
in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; POR=ports; 
POP=r•Iral-urban residence; ETH=ethnic:i.ty; VOT=voter registration; PRJ= 
primary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher education; ILL= 
illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 49 
STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS: 
CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
Socio-Political Variables 
VOT PRI SND COL ILL SSE 
1960 
PIN -.061 -1.427 .057 .038 -.332 -.480 
ING -.095 1.787 -.590 -.518 .172 .748 
COG .201 -1.087 .537 -.094 -.449 
AGG -. 201 .081 -.391 -.509 -.043 -.115 
SEG . 618 -.958 .147 .291 -.089 -.351 
IAG .028 .181 .069 .266 -.163 .088 
IIN .378 .258 .244 .173 -.164 .498 
reo -.118 .820 -.448 -.245 .308 .056 
ISE .386 -.122 .093 .138 -.255 .059 
POR .249 .768 .048 -.245 .403 
POP -.478 .841 .507 .448 -.116 -.252 
ETH .096 .151 .161 .074 -.100 -.116 
1970 
PIN -.681 -.016 1.049 1.009 -. 277 -.364 
ING .727 .537 -.954 -1.404 .208 .912 
COG -2.009 -.456 .389 1.639 -.160 .145 
AGG -.414 -.169 -.274 -.208 -.201 .057 
SEG 1.603 -.560 .391 -.177 -.394 -.527 
IAG 1.037 .264 . 646 -1.008 .058 -.132 
IIN -.691 -.629 -.472 .254 .020 
ICO .225 .320 -.490 -.644 .081 
ISE .253 -.183 .028 .511 -.350 .170 
POR .026 -.247 .051 -.306 .323 
POP .408 .333 .063 -.251 -.199 
ETH .070 -.135 .106 .149 -.089 -.162 
NOTE: See tables 3, 9, 15, 21, 27, and 33 in text for order in 
which variables were entered into the equations. PIN=labor in indus-
try; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of com-
merce to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; SEG=con-
tributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income 
in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; POR=ports; 
POP=rural-urban residence; ETH=ethnicity; VOT=voter registration; PRI= 
primary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher education; ILL= 
illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 50 
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: CHILE, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT 
3.760 
3.998 
4.140 
4.181 
4.518 
4.304 
4.232 
3.873 
3.703 
4.369 
4.047 
3.731 
2.935 
2.919 
4.079 
4.300 
4.695 
3.528 
2.994 
2.901 
2.859 
3.013 
2. 877 
2.922 
Socio-Political Variables 
PRI 
4.230 
4.633 
3.535 
3.592 
4.902 
3.662 
3.529 
4.696 
3. 711 
5.321 
3.790 
3.508 
3.493 
3.597 
4.023 
3. 611 
3.866 
3.522 
3.475 
3.901 
3.516 
3.694 
3.799 
SND 
1960 
2.297 
2.185 
2.307 
2.324 
2.421 
2.278 
2.275 
2.290 
2.249 
2.330 
2.331 
2.284 
1970 
1.977 
1.897 
1.983 
1.876 
1. 919 
2.139 
2.063 
1. 934 
1.993 
2.110 
2.315 
1. 922 
COL 
.701 
.737 
.754 
.718 
.784 
.696 
. 711 
.728 
.728 
.779 
.759 
.758 
.849 
.800 
.727 
.794 
.974 
.745 
.731 
1.190 
.766 
.896 
.732 
ILL 
2.601 
2.444 
2.405 
2.529 
2.826 
2.755 
3.234 
2.535 
5.108 
4.028 
2.638 
2.414 
2.394 
2.398 
2.722 
2.376 
3.158 
2.456 
2.536 
2.629 
4.823 
3.795 
2.780 
2.371 
SSE 
11.778 
12.061 
12.288 
11.504 
11.705 
11.628 
13.024 
13.508 
11.720 
12.598 
11.965 
14.570 
14.720 
15.921 
16.423 
15.070 
14.394 
15.462 
14.302 
14.812 
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NOTE: See tables 3, 9, 15, 21, 27, and 33 for N, SSres• and order 
in which variables were entered into the equations. PIN=labor in indus-
try; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of com-
merce to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; SEG=contri-
butions of services to G.N.P.; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income in 
industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; POR=ports; 
POP=rural-11rban residence; ETH=ethnicity; VOT=voter registration; PRI= 
primary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher education; ILL= 
illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 51 
STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS: 
UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
Socio-Political Variables 
VOT PRI SND COL ILL SSE 
1960 
PIN .542 .354 .481 -.263 .123 .731 
ING -.449 -.399 -.693 -.266 -.053 
COG .333 .271 .590 -.410 .062 
AGG -.131 .081 .037 -.038 -.071 -.049 
SEG .657 .135 .007 
IAG .272 .180 .225 -.605 -.145 
IIN -.052 . 271 .329 -.104 .138 .085 
reo -.364 .088 .053 .176 -.138 -.050 
ISE .244 -.071 -.689 -.517 .102 .083 
POR -.104 -.039 -.153 -.035 .202 .122 
POP .220 -.374 -.220 .599 -.011 .292 
ETH .045 .373 -.031 -.537 .664 -.063 
1970 
PIN .208 -.439 -.635 -.070 .195 .594 
ING .309 .725 .141 -.218 -.228 .112 
COG -.508 -.534 -1.066 -.578 .061 .200 
AGG -.375 -.087 .018 -.007 -.302 
SEG .408 -.165 .662 .984 -.126 
IAG .205 -.376 .505 -.508 -.056 
IIN -.310 .314 -.028 -.028 .269 
reo -.254 .558 -.030 .170 -.184 -.040 
ISE .207 .164 .306 -.549 .179 .065 
POR .114 -.107 .136 -.061 .229 .192 
POP -.043 -.249 -.320 .363 .010 .330 
ETH -.046 .035 -.237 .525 -.142 
NOTE: See tables 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, and 34 in text for order in 
which variables were entered into the equations. PIN=labor in indus-
try; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of com-
merce to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; SEG=con-
tributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG=income in agriculture; IIN=income 
in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; POR=ports; 
POP=rural-urban residence; ETH=ethnicity; VOT=voter registration; PRI• 
primary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher education; ILL= 
illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 52 
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: UNITED STATES, 
1960 AND 1970 
VOT 
33.444 
31.507 
31.424 
32.002 
32.745 
32.491 
32.299 
31.395 
31.754 
31.277 
32.095 
27.909 
27.667 
28.179 
28.464 
28.411 
27.826 
27.868 
27.860 
27.649 
29.095 
28.744 
Socio-Political Variables 
PRI 
9.161 
9.183 
9.228 
9.318 
9.117 
9.421 
9.526 
9.642 
9.375 
9.289 
7.206 
6.997 
6.962 
7.064 
7.293 
7.099 
7.542 
6.919 
7.000 
6.940 
7.151 
SND 
1960 
2.413 
2.325 
2.273 
2.347 
2.286 
2.350 
2.319 
2.529 
2.292 
2.365 
2.441 
1970 
7.380 
6.853 
7.085 
6.785 
7.044 
6.876 
6.938 
7.136 
6.787 
7.227 
COL 
1.493 
1.481 
1.497 
1.454 
1. 471 
1.471 
1.463 
1.475 
1.516 
1. 750 
1.565 
2.676 
2.630 
2.642 
2.776 
2. 714 
3.246 
2.740 
2.652 
2.864 
2.705 
3.112 
2.781 
ILL 
2.063 
2.077 
2.076 
2.069 
2.180 
2.074 
2.076 
2.071 
2.107 
2.095 
3.249 
1.515 
1.518 
1. 508 
1.508 
1. 615 
1. 516 
1.491 
1.508 
1.558 
1.527 
2.297 
SSE 
5.902 
4.580 
4.639 
4.485 
4.442 
4.426 
4.457 
4.526 
4.418 
4.460 
4.510 
4.447 
9.302 
10.734 
5.953 
6.117 
6.021 
5.841 
6. 723 
6.095 
5.889 
5.994 
7.693 
5.796 
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NOTE: See tables 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, and 34 in text for N, SSres' 
and order in which variables were entered into the equations. PIN= 
labor in industry; ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contri-
butions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; SEG=contributions of services to G.N.P.; IAG=income in agricul-
ture; IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in 
services; POR=ports; POP=rural-urban residence; ETH=ethnicity; VOT= 
voter registration; PRI=primary education; SND=secondary education; 
COL=higher education; ILL=illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 53 
STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS: BRAZIL, 
CHILE, AND UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT 
.372 
-.126 
.088 
-.338 
.401 
-1.378 
-.696 
1.397 
-.125 
.093 
-.301 
.422 
-.192 
-.324 
-.109 
.501 
-. 723 
.336 
-.493 
.457 
-.083 
Socio-Political Variables 
PRI 
.420 
-.255 
.122 
.097 
.138 
1.114 
.094 
.614 
-.080 
-. 779 
-.160 
.420 
.596 
-.325 
-.076 
. 277 
.110 
.202 
1. 071 
-.753 
. 097 
-.069 
-.052 
.746 
SND 
1960 
.167 
-. 196 
.018 
-.015 
.254 
1.304 
.101 
.240 
-.786 
-.055 
.074 
1970 
.024 
-. 017 
.060 
.039 
-.039 
.842 
.084 
.139 
-.332 
.223 
-.032 
.005 
-.035 
COL 
-.122 
-. 082 
.001 
-.102 
.172 
.800 
.130 
.080 
.045 
-.386 
• 010 
.199 
-.312 
-.133 
-.072 
-.134 
-.112 
.274 
.916 
.159 
-.043 
.161 
-.337 
.004 
.138 
-.247 
ILL 
-.403 
.241 
-.506 
-.199 
.184 
-1.075 
-.465 
-.576 
. 609 
.882 
. 091 
-.075 
-.031 
-.456 
.203 
-.100 
-.114 
-.627 
-.206 
-.732 
.772 
.085 
-.066 
-.042 
SSE 
.654 
-.074 
.141 
-.050 
.092 
.550 
-.029 
.430 
-.412 
-.060 
• 041 
-.084 
.219 
.544 
-.101 
-.052 
-.026 
.125 
-.068 
-.088 
1.139 
-.485 
-.040 
.110 
.055 
.173 
315 
NOTE: See tables 5, 11, 17, 23, 29, and 35 in text for order in 
which variables were entered into the equations. PIN=labor in industry; 
ING=contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG=contributions of commerce 
to G.N.P.; AGG=contributions of agriculture to G.N.P.; SEG=contributions 
of services to G.N.P.; RAD=radios per capita; IAG=income in agriculture; 
IIN=income in industry; ICO=income in commerce; ISE=income in services; 
POR=ports; POP=rural-urban residence; ETH=ethnicity; VOT=voter regis-
tration; PRI=primary education; SND=secondary education; COL=higher 
education; ILL=illiteracy; SSE=social security coverage. 
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TABLE 54 
ST&~ARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: BRAZIL, CHILE, AND 
UNITED STATES, 1960 AND 1970 
VOT 
26. 104 
25.229 
25.330 
27.666 
25.451 
25.736 
25.042 
26.776 
25.070 
25.137 
25.129 
21.507 
21.155 
21.275 
21.359 
21.237 
21.856 
21.057 
21.090 
21.125 
21.435 
Socio-Political Variables 
PRI 
10.750 
9.386 
9.375 
9.337 
9.396 
11.674 
9.358 
9.464 
9.448 
9.838 
9.378 
9.567 
10.788 
9.301 
10.281 
9.346 
9.436 
9.283 
9.492 
9.386 
9.386 
9.300 
9.341 
10.087 
SND 
l2.2£ 
3.622 
2. 743 
2.702 
2.688 
2.835 
4.180 
2.679 
2.888 
3.181 
2.714 
2.941 
6.944 
6.983 
6.823 
6.875 
6.910 
6.977 
6.840 
6.844 
6.789 
6.812 
6.807 
6.795 
6.788 
COL 
1.259 
1.250 
1.248 
1.242 
1.247 
1.523 
1.250 
1.256 
1.270 
1.260 
1.263 
1.384 
1.296 
2.321 
2.154 
2.155 
2.188 
2.157 
2. 778 
2.449 
2.168 
2.157 
2.189 
2.180 
2.379 
2.264 
ILL 
9.212 
7.741 
8.315 
7.702 
7.665 
11.180 
8.681 
7.859 
9.069 
8.072 
7.640 
7. 641 
7.706 
7.288 
6.527 
6.566 
6.516 
6.554 
6.786 
9.339 
6.896 
6.536 
6.551 
6.566 
SSE 
12.055 
10.647 
10.727 
10.803 
10.859 
11.139 
10.745 
10.628 
10.682 
10.920 
10.689 
10.625 
10.870 
15.319 
12.740 
12.933 
13.005 
12.794 
12.862 
12.671 
13.759 
12.843 
13.078 
12.645 
12.693 
13. 139 
NOTE: See tables 5, 11, 17, 23, 29, and 35 in text for N, SSres• 
and order in which variables were entered into the equations. PIN• 
labor in industry; ING-contributions of industry to G.N.P.; COG-contri-
butions of commerce to G.N.P.; AGG•contributions of agriculture to 
G.N.P.; SEc-contributions of services to G.N.P.; RAD-radios per capita; 
~AG-income in agriculture; IIN•income in industry; ICD-income in com-
~erce; ISE•income in services; POR-ports; POP•rural-urban residence; 
ETH•ethnicity; VOT-voter registration; PRI•primary education; SND• 
secondary,education; COL•higher education; ILL•illiteracy; SSE•social 
securit.y coverage.. 
316 
APPROV .. t...L SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Phyllis D. Knights 
has been read and approved by the following committee: 
Dr. William }1. Bates, Director 
Professor, Sociology, Loyola 
Dr. Ross P. Scherer 
Associate Professor, Sociology, Loyola 
Dr. Paul Mundy 
Professor, Sociology, Loyola 
317 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation 
and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any neces-
sary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now 
given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and 
form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
I ~I 7 1 
Director's Signature 
